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During 1991 - 1993, the average ratio of the present value of Indonesia's total debt 
services to its exports of goods and services was 192 percent (The World Bank, 1995). Its 
total external debt was 222 percent of the exports of goods and services. Both of 
Indonesia's debt indicators were higher than those of Mexico (183 and 189 percent, 
respectively). Indonesia and Mexico were moderately indebted middle income countries.1 
Mexico's gross national product per capita in 1993 was more than four times that of 
Indonesia. Mexico experienced another debt crisis in 1995. Because of its debt condition, 
the government of the Republic of Indonesia (GRI) continually needs to implement 
macroeconomic policies that can prevent debt repayment problems. The GRI also needs to 
have a rescue plan in case the economy faces another debt crisis. 2 
1The moderately indebted middle income country has either ratio of present value of 
total debt services (PV) over gross national product (GNP) or PV over exports of goods and 
services (XGS) that is 60 percent or more of the critical value (The World Bank, 1995) .. 
2This was supposed to be a hypothetical situation. The study was designed in 1996, 
but the real crisis started in August 1997, after a debt repayment problem in Thailand. The 
GRI contacted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in October 1997 and signed "the letter 
of intent" (to follow the IMF stabilization package) in its agreement with the IMF on January 
15, 1998. 
1 
There were at least four reasons why the GRI needed to have the rescue plan. First, 
the economy seems to experience debt crises every ten years (in 1966, 1976 and 1986). 
Second, as a small and open economy, Indonesia is vulnerable to external shocks such as 
hard currency realignment, changes in world interest rates and prices of its main export 
commodities such as oil.3 The economy was becoming more vulnerable to external shocks. 
For example, in October 1991, the GRI learned that the economy may experience a debt 
crisis if its private sector continues to accumulate short term offshore loans excessively. 
More vulnerability of the economy and other similarities with the condition of Mexico before 
its 1995 crisis are discussed in Chapter II. Third, a combination of various internal and 
external factors may lead to a depreciation of the rupiah and the depreciation may trigger 
difficulties in repaying external debts. Among those factors are: (1) Hberalization pressures 
to follow the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)'s schedule;4 (2) substantial and growing 
current account deficits; and (3) speculation about the new president in 1998.5 Meanwhile, 
3Indonesia has diversified export commodities. The exports of oil and 9 other main 
commodities account for more than 90 percent of the total exports. Remarkable increases 
in the non oil exports were accompanied by higher rate increases in total imports such that 
the balance on goods and services was always negative. More details about the economy 
are discussed in Chapter II. 
4ASEAN is Association of Southeast Asian Nations. AFTA was established on 
January 28, 1992, because heads of state ofASEAN perceived a more integrated ASEAN 
would help increase the bargaining position of the region and enhance the attractiveness of 
the ASEAN market (Chiew; 1997, p.3). The decision was made when the market reforms 
of the former centrally-planned Eastern European economies and other developing countries 
such as Latin America and China posed as direct competitors with the ASEAN member 
countries for international investment inflows. According to Chiew, . AFT A was formed to 
help the region face the prospects of a single unified market in the European Community, 
the likely formation of the North American Free Trade Area, the increasing bilateralism and 
the ·slow progress of the multilateral trade talks (1997, p.3). 
5The GRI scheduled general election to choose members of Parliament in 1997. · 
Parliament will then elect a president and a vice president. The author witnessed some riots 
and explicit popular discontent towards the president of Indonesia during her visit to 
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it is anticipated that the AFT A members and some other developing countries, such as China 
and Vietnam, will devalue their currencies to gain better access to the regional market. 
Together with its inflation rate which is higher than those of most of its trading partners, the 
current account deficits created pressure for devaluation of the rupiah. The build-up of 
unsustainable economic imbalances and misalignments in asset prices or exchange rates are 
known as common origins of various types of economic crises (IMF, 1998, p.111). Despite 
the above pessimistic views about Indonesia, the IMF was amazed with the Indonesian 
condition until twq months before its 1997 crisis.6 Their optimistic view was mainly caused 
by the economy's average growth rate of the real gross domestic product of more than 7 
percent during 1973 - 1996. 
The GRl has taken structural adjustment loans from the International Financial 
Institutions (IFls), IMF and the World Bank, and consulted the institutions every year since 
its first debt crisis. Therefore, it is possible that when it faces another debt repayment 
problem, which may be originated by the private sector, the GRI will come to the IMF.7 
The typical IMF policies for countries wit~ balance of payments problems are known as 
Indonesia (June - August 1996). Soeharto was the president since 1966. He was appointed 
again as the president for 1998 -2003, with B.J. Habibie as the vice president. Habibie is 
the current the president after Soeharto resigned in May 1998. 
6 At the end of 1996 the IMF predicted 8;0 percent real GDP growth with 7.3 percent 
changes in consumer prices for 1997 and increases world export market shares from 0.9 
percent to LO percent for 1997 and 1998 (IMF, 1997, p.30 and 40). The prediction was 
published in May 1997. Mexico was also a "darling" to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank moments before the 1995 - 1996 crisis (Sachs et al., 1996, 
p.268). This similarity is not discussed in Chapter ill. 
7Indonesia is a lower middle income country; therefore, in the next debt crisis the 
GRI will have to take the regular facility offered to middle and high income countries. With 
that facility, the loan has variable interest rates and fewer concessionary components when 
· compared with the IMF loans it took in 1986 as a low income country. 
3 
stabilization and reform policies or structural adjustment policies. They are referred to as 
standard reform policies in this study. 8 Among the standard policies are contractionary fiscal 
and monetary policies, liberalization of the real (trade and investment) and financial sectors, 
relative price adjustment, and devaluation (Dornbusch and Fisher, 1994; Jayarajah and 
Branson, 1995; Schadler, 1995). The study reviews the standard policies and tries to 
answer the following questions: (l}Should the GRI take the IMF stabilization policies with 
its conditionality as granted? (2) Would its standard policies help the economy? 
There are two reasons for suspectingthat the standard policy would be ineffective in 
helping the economy. First, the GRI has special ways of measuring the unemployment and 
inflation rates such that when the GRI cuts food and fuel subsidies and increases interest rate 
as parts of the standard policies, the unemployment and inflation rates will become higher. 
Second, the term structural adjustment in the course of the 1980s is misleading, according 
to Keyzer, Veen, and Tims, because the Indonesian economy remains largely driven by 
external influences in an essentially colonial manner rather than by domestic initiative to · 
diversify the structure of supply (1992, p.117).9 
Providing employment for its fast-growing labor force is a huge problem for the GRI. 
8The terminology is used by Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz who predicted that the policy 
imposition will not change considering the distribution of weighted voting right in the IMF 
( 1988, p.138). Various IMF facilities are shown in Appendix B: Table 1. More reasons for 
referring the policy as the standard policy are explained in Chapter ill. 
9Their analysis is requested by Thorbecke as a contribution to his case study for the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Center. 
They used a CGE model which they developed for over four years at the Center for World 
Food studies (SOW) in Amsterdam in cooperation with the Economic Statistics Analysis 
Division of the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics and, during the development of the 
static model version, with the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. The agricultural 
sector in their model is disaggregated into 27 sectors. The model does not have a financial 
sector .. 
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The problem exists because Indonesia has more than half the total population of the five 
ASEAN countries combined (see Table 1.1). In 1992 the Indonesia population was 184.3 
million and had the lowest per capita income among the original members of ASEAN (see 
Table 1.1). Indonesia's labor force growth is 2.0 percent annually for the period of 1992 -
2000. This growth rate was lower than those of Malaysia and the Philippines (see Table 
1.1). However, Indonesia's labor force (81 million in 1992) was more than 5 times 
Malaysia's total population and was larger than the Philippines' total population. 
TABLE 1.1 
OVERVIEW OF ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA MEMBER COUNTRIES 
Country Membership GDP 1992 Labor force Population Income 
growth .(mid 1992) per capita 
ASEAN WTO million 1992- 2000 million 1992 
($) (%) (person) ($) 
1 Indonesia 1967 yes 126,364.00 2.0 184.3 670 
. 
2 Malaysia 1967 yes 57,568.00 2.5 18.6 2,790 
3 Philippines 1967 yes 52,462.00 2.3 64.3 770 
4 Singapore 1967 yes 46,025.00 0.6 2.8 15,730 
5 Thailand 1967 yes 110,337.00 1.5 38.4 1,840 
ASEAN5 392,756.00 328.4 
.. Source: Nguyen, 1997, p.3 (modified with more recent data). 
The seriousness of the unemployment problem is also covered by the GRI' s way of defining 
employed person. The GRI defines "people who work for their families without being paid" 
as employed persons. These people do not look for jobs because they are being taken care 
of by their families. The number of people who worked for their families without being paid 
for 1990-1993 was larger than those with self-employed status (see Appendix A: Table 1). 
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If the people who worked for their families without being paid were categorized as 
unemployed, then the total number of the unemployed Indonesians was larger than the 
Malaysian population. In a worse economic condition, many of the people who previously 
work for their families without being paid will look for payingjobs, because some of the 
families cannot afford to continue taking care of them. If the ORI adopts policies that 
increase interest rates and reduce aggregate demand, more firms will discharge their 
employees in order to stay alive or because the firms can no longer do business. 
When measuring the consumer price index, the ORI puts much more weight on the 
prices of staple food (rice) than it does on the individual prices of other commodities. The 
price of rice is subsidized by the ORI. The ORI imports some of the rice from abroad. With 
a devaluation of the rupiah, moreover, when the subsidy is also lifted with the standard 
policy, it is expected that the inflation rate will be roaming. The inflation rate was 8.64 
percent in 1996 (see Appendix A: ·Table 2). 10 
Indonesia was considered successful in implementing structural adjustment 
(stabilization and reform) policies during its 1986 - 1990 balance of payment problems. 
However, according to Keyzer, Veen, and Tims, the ORI should review its previous 
experiences, particularly the effects of those policies ( 1992, p.118). Keyzer, Veen, and 
Tims notice that at the same time, the other Asian countries show more initiative and drive 
in the direction of diversification { 1992, p.118). They conclude that Indonesia's chances to 
join them may in fact be hampered because countries in the region want to rely more on 
Indonesia as a main supplier of raw materials (particularly of a non-renewable kind) and 
10It is much lower than the rate experienced by other countries helped by the IMF 
with the standard policy. 
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pursue their competitiveness in manufactured goods markets, including Indonesia's own 
domestic markets; Therefore, the Indonesian economy must move from non-renewable 
exports to renewable ones, and particularly to more labor intensive products, both 
domestically and in trade. Keyzer, Veen, and Tims suggest that when skills are enhanced, 
the export structure should follow that leadtoward more skill intensive goods and services. 
Keyzer, Veen, and Tims warn that the longer the country fails to make significant progress 
in this direction, the more difficult it will become to make this transition (1992, p.118). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to develop a computable general equilibrium model 
(CGE) to simulate the impacts of liberalization of the real sector and some other policies 
included in the standard policies, and implementation of strategic reform policies. 
Liberalization of the Real Sector 
The government of the Republic of Indonesia implemented series of wide scale 
deregulations of investment and financial sectors during 1988 - 1990. The financial sector 
liberalization had preceded real sector reform in a reverse sequence and at a faster speed than 
recommended by the World Bank in the 1989 World Development Report (Pangestu, 1996, 
. p.34). The GRI scheduled trade liberalization in accordance with AFf A for 1995 and 1998. 
AFT A is the most comprehensive arrangement yet to promote regional trade that has 
a timetable to eliminate tariffs under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) by 
7 
the year 2008, later shortened to 2003. Table 1.2 shows that when AFfA was first 
announced, all tariffs were to be reduced to O - 5 percent within 15 years and all nontariff 
barriers were to be dismantled among the ASEAN members within eight years beginning 
January 1, 1993. Trade liberalization is planned to proceed along two lines, normal and fast 
tracks. Under the "Normal Track,"tariffs of more than 20 percent w1ll be reduced to O - 5 
. . . 
percent in 15 years, while present tariffs of 20 percent or less will be pared down to O - 5 
percent in 10 years. The CEPT was initially restricted to manufactured and processed 
agricultural products. At subsequent economic ministers' meetings, a number of measures 
were taken to reduce exclusions and extend the commodity coverage to service, and to bring 
·forward the timetable to achieve a free trade area. Under the framework of the agreement, 
members also agreed to eliminate quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers on trade 
products in the CEPT and to cooperate in some areas of service trade . 
. 8 
TABLEl.2 
AFT A'S LIBERALIZATION SCHEDULES 
Duration of tariff reduction (to O - 5 percent) 
Initial plan Normal track Fast track 
(2 types) 
I II 
Tariff rates over 15 years I 15 years (2 stages) 10 years 
20% 
a 5-8 years (to 20% )" 
b 7 years (to 0-5 % ) 
Tariff rates under 15 years II 10 years 7 years 
20% 
Nontariff barrier .. 8 years (among 
J\SEAN members) 
Starting date January, 1993 Malaysia 1993 · Malaysia 1995 
Brunei 1994 Brunei 1994 
Indonesia 1Q98 Indonesia 1995 
Thailand 1999 Thailand 1995 
Philippines 1996 Philippines 1996 
Finishing date 2008 2003 2003 
Source: Summarized from Chiew, 1997, p.4. 
With regard to liberalization on investment, financial and real sectors, it is relevant 
to inform also that all A.SEAN members joined the World Trade Organization (WTO),. see 
Table 1.1. According to Nguyen, this dual status means the ASEAN members must fulfill 
their WTO obligations to all WTO members as well as their AFfA obligations to other 
ASEAN members {Nguyen, 1997 ,. p.3}. Both AFT A and WTO adhere to the principle of 
most-favored-nation (MFN) and national treatment. MFN requires all members be treated 
equally so that "no other countries will be treated more favorably." National treatment 
requires all nationals of members be treated equally so that "foreigners are treated no less 
f~vorably than own nationals" (Nguyen, 1997, p.3). While bilateral arrangements are 
generally not allowed under WTO,. ASEAN recognizes that sub-regional arrangements 
9 
either among members only or even between members and nonmembers could complement 
· the overall ASEAN cooperation effort. In other words, WTO and AFT A are complementary 
to, instead of substitutes, for each other. 
Standard and Strategic Reform Policies 
We design the strategic reform policy with four considerations. First, in the long 
term the Indonesian economy needs to reduce its,dependence on its public sector as well as 
on foreign creditors to lead the development; therefore, it is important that the GRI prevents 
the next crisis from terminating previously healthy domestic firms. Such termination would 
happen if the ORI implementcontractionary monetary policy that raises interest rates and · 
decreases credit availability suggested in the typical IMF policy package. Second, to enable 
both sectors to service their external debts, the ORI and the private sector cannot afford 
either to lose export markets and more of its domestic market nor to make another huge 
. . . 
borrowing. The standard policy has contractionary fiscal and monetary policy elements that 
increase production (capital) cost and decrease aggregate demand. Production of domestic 
and export comrnodities might be disturbed by the policy. It then promotes and prolongs 
recession. Another huge borrowing will come with higher charges, which will burden the 
government account and may discourage private agents from taking investment projects 
. . 
because they anticipate the GRI will increase tax rates in the debt repayment period. ·Third, 
also for the long term benefit of the country, the ORI should insulate the poor from the 
coming external shock and sustain the health and education entitlements of the poor.· For 
example, in the standard policy the government cuts fuel and food subsides, in the strategic 
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policy, the subsidies are maintained in order to control inflation rates, and the priorities ate . 
on cutting the two largest government expenditures (personnel and interest expenditures). 
Fourth, there are some inherent contradictions among the component~ of the standard 
policy. Detailed reviews of the standard policies are presented in Chapter ID .. Other 
components of the strategic policies which are not found in a typical IMF policy package are 
social consensus and multilateral adjustment. · The two ingredients are needed because the 
government is already unpopular, moreover, they are needed to carry politically unpopular 
standard policies, . and because the stabilization and reform would be much more likely to 
succeed if the. surplus countries help the adjustment process. Jn short, the strategic reform 
. . 
policy is based on the unique condition of the country and care for the structural condition. · 
The strategic policies are aimed .at helping the private sector solve its debt repayment 
problem and decreasing the current account deficitas well as influencing the decisions for 
saving and investment. Keyzer, Veen, and Tims observe that one feature of the Indonesian 
economy which seems to go together with its present dependent state is a sizeable flow of 
resources, which is only partly identified with factor payments to abroad. The flow 
constitutes a significant part of domestic saving and reduces the scope for balance of 
payment management. They acknowledge that the measures taken to cope with the external 
shocks in recent years did not affect this resource outflow, but these measures might have 
been much less severe if these flows had not existed. According to Keyzer, Veen, and Tims 
payments to abroad are thus part of the country's vulnerability, and they add to arguments · 
for a more active policy which strengthens domestic activity and policy as the driving forces 
for economic transformation (1992, p.119). The derivation of the strategic policies will be 
presented in Chapter ID. 
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Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of this study is to develop a computable general equilibrium 
model that captures the relationships between trade, investment, debt and other variables 
in the Indonesian economy. The specific objectives are to simulate the implementation of 
the IMF standard policies and the strategic reform policies and to compare results. 
Method and Procedure 
The study is forward-looking because it concerns a possible future debt crisis. Part 
of the analysis will utilize a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that is based on 
a social accounting matrix (SAM) for Indonesia, 1990. The model for this study follows 
the basic guidelines for developing a general macroeconomic CGE model suggested by 
Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982). The model is a disaggregated model with 22 
production sectors, but it is also a simple model that captures basic investment, trade and 
debt relationships at the aggregate level. A simple monetary sector is represented in the 
model. Because of its simplicity, some flexibility will be sacrificed (Dervis, de Melo and 
Robinson, 1982). The model uses some basic assumptions: Indonesia is an open but small 
economy such that its export demand is the same as its export supply; the export supply 
function is determined through a constant elasticity of transformation and depends on the 
ratio of domestic price to the world price of the export good; saving and investment 
functions are affected by interest rates that will be determined by the relative purchasing 
power parity relationship. The equations represent relationships described in the model and 
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will be solved simultaneously. To solve the model, parameter values are either taken from 
previous studies or calibrated. The calibration requires some exogenously specified 
parameter values, because for some equation sets the number of parameters exceeds the 
number of equations. Exogenously specified parameters for this model include elasticities 
of the various constant elasticity of substitution, (CBS) functions, and constant elasticity 
of transformations (CET) for each section. 
The CGE model assumes that the economy is in equilibrium in the base year. 
Therefore, the model should reproduce base year data of the SAM before it can be used for 
simulating policies. Starting in 1975, the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) 
published a SAM for Indonesia every five years. Ideally, this study would use SAM 1995; 
however, that is not possible because even the Indonesian Input Output Table 1995 was not 
available at the time of the study. The SAM contains 106 rows and 106 columns, which are 
broken down into the following accounts: factors of production, institutions, production 
sectors, commodities, trade and transport margins, capital, indirect tax and rest of the 
world. 
Organization of the Writing 
This study will be presented in six chapters. Chapter II discusses certain conditions 
of the Indonesian economy during 1990- 1996. It focuses on the economy's dependence on 
foreign investment and external debt to cover its current account deficits. Its current account 
and other components of Indonesia's balance of payments are discussed with rather 
pessimistic views to show a possibility of having another debt repayment problem. 
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Chapter ill presents a derivation of the strategic reform policies after a review of literature 
that has been critical of the standard policy. Chapter IV addresses the SAM structure and 
relationships in the computable general equilibrium model for this study. It also presents 
a COE solution for the base run. Chapter V discusses simulation scenarios and their results. 
Chapter VI summarizes the previous chapters, concludes some policy implications and 
explains limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTERII. 
INDONESIAN ECONOMY: POTENTIAL 
DEBT.REPAYMENT PROBLEM 
. . 
This chapter provides a description of certain conditions in the Indonesian economy 
that make it vulnerable to external shocks. The economy is vulnerable in that any 
unexpected news. such as lower oil prices, higher interest rates and recession in major 
developed countries or large currency realignment might easily trigger a potential debt crisis. 
This vulnerability is deduced from similar conditions in another indebted country, Mexico, 
before it experienced debt crisis in 1995 (summarized from Atkeson and Rios-Rull, 1995; 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996; Jeanne, 1997 and other literatures). Mexico is chosen 
for the comparison because it experienced repeated crises but it is widely cited as the most 
successful example of a country helped by the IMF stabilization package .. Our description 
focuses on changes in foreign capital inflows, depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah, and 
some other factors related to reforms that the Indonesian economy underwent from 1986 to 
1988. The chapter begins with a summary of previous debt crises and their main causes to 
illustrate "mistakes" which were supposed to be avoided in the post reform period. The 
second section discusses uncertainty of foreign investment flows and its impact on the 
balance of payments. The third section concentrates on the current account balance. The 
fourth section is about depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah, and its causes and effects 
related to the accumulation of external debts. The fifth section discusses the GRI's budget 
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deficit and its limited fiscal maneuver ability because of its external debt burden. Also, 
· discussed in the section is a special relationship between the GRI with its main creditors. 
The last section provides conclusions and some policy implications. 
Previous Debt Crises 
The Indonesian economy has experienced several debt crises. The first one was in 
1965 - 1966, when its total debt was only $2.4 billion but was 524 percent of exports (Hill, 
1996, p.5). The causes were excessive government consumption expenditures relative to 
its revenue and import substitution orientation of the economy. Inflation was more than 636 
percent for that year (Little, et al., 1993, p.410). The second crisis happened in1976 when 
PERTAMINA, the state oil company, could not refinance its. short term debt. 
PERTAMINA borrowed substantially and used its external public guaranteed borrowing 
largely to build housing and other facilities for its employees. Inflation was 40.6 percent for 
that year (Little, et al,, 1993, p.410). The economy hit by severe external shocks and 
almost experiericed ~other crisis in 1986. The GRI' s disbursed and outstanding foreign 
debts, which was mostly denominated in Japanese Yen; roughly doubled between 1983 and 
1987 (The World Bank, 1994, p.186 - see Appendix A: Table 3). Japan has always been 
the largest creditor, foreign direct investor.and the main source of import commodities for 
Indonesia. The total debt was almost $40 billion or 250 percent of its exports after a rapid 
decline of the world price of oil, sharp appreciation of Yen and a negative net transfer that 
resulted in a huge current account deficit (Hill, 1996, p. 71 ). Unlike many other developing 
countries, . such as Mexico and Brazil, Indonesia did not ask for a debt moratorium 
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(reduction). The GRI managed to pay its obligation on schedule. 
Uncertainty of Foreign Investment Flows 
Foreign investment made a significant contribution to economic recovery in the late 
1960s and 1.980s and to export growth after 1988 (Pangestu 1996, Woo, Glassburner and 
. \ .: . . . 
Nasution 1994). However, foreign. investment flows have fluctuated considerably. They 
. were negative in 1974 and jumped sharply in 1975 (Hill, 1994, p.76); Despite its rather 
similar sectoral composition (excluding oil, liquid natural gas··andfinance) with domestic 
investment, total foreign investment decreased after a boom in 1992 (Pangestu, 1996, 
p.166). Table 2.1 shows the approval figures for foreign investment. The table does not 
. . . 
show the actual foreign investment figures which were smaller than the approved ones. · A 
large gap between realized and approved foreign investment happened in 1982, 1983 and 
·. 1993 because many heavy industry programs were delayed. Approved foreign investment 
increased its importance slowly to the same level of the domestic investment in 1994 
(Pangestu, 1996, p.166). Table 2.1 shows that the approved foreign investment sharply 
increased in 1994 - 1996. 
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TABLE2.l. 
INVESTMENT APPROVAL AND CAPITAL FLOWS (US$ MILLION) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Domestic 30,662.2* 21,065.6* 14,454* 18,975.7* 24,625.3* 30,626 42,264 
investment 
approval 
Foreign 8,751.1* 8,778* 10,323* .. 8,144.2* 23,724.3* 39,915 29,931 
investment 
approval 
Direct 1,092 1,482 1,777 2,003 2,108 4,346 5,949 
investment 
Official 633 1,419 1,112 743 307 336 (440) 
capital 
(net) 
Private 4,113 4,410 5,359 5,219 3,701 10,253 10,942 
capital 
(net) 
Capital (593) 230 1,606 2,923 242 2,313 (1,678) 
flight1 
Note: l. From error and omissions in the balance of payments. Negative = () is for capital inflows 
Source: BPS, various years; *. Pangestu, 1996, p.166. 
An observation by Hill revealed that over 24 years from 1969 to 1992 foreign 
investment flows have exceeded one percent of the domestic capital formation only six 
times, three in the years 1990 to 1992 (Hill, 1994, p.76). Hill concluded that "neither, in 
comparative international perspective has Indonesia been a large recipient of foreign 
investment"(Hill, 1994, p.78). 
Until 1992 the flows were mostly from public sources. However, net private flows 
to Indonesia sharply increased to $7.7 billion in 1994, from $1.1 billion in 1993. The 
increase continued in 1995 and 1996, $11.6 billion and $17.9 billion respectively (The 
World Bank, 1997, Vol. I, p.7). 
In its study about sustaining development in Indonesia, the World Bank suggested 
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that the GRl build more infrastructure to attract foreign capital and to support domestic 
entrepreneurs and manufacturing to compete in the global market (The World Bank, 1994, 
p.104). Infrastructure development is especially needed to attract investment in the higher 
technological industry so that Indonesia can diversify from resource based and labor 
intensive production (Thee 1995, Mangkusuwundo 1995). In addition, the World Bank 
suggests that the infrastructure development should no longer be financed by external loans 
(The World Bank, 1994, p.104). 
Foreign Direct Investment 
. . 
. " 
The role of the foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Indonesian economy up until 
1992 was very small: 2~0 percent of the domestic capital formation or 1.4 percent of the 
GDP (Table 2.2). · Direct foreign investment was still a small part of the development fund 
except in 1992to 1993 when 100 percent foreign ownership was permitted (Pangestu, 1996, 
p.166). Hill determined that as a percentage of capital formation, in most years the numbers 
were less than 4 percent (Hill, 1994, p.76). 
Compared to other ASEAN members and China, FDI inflows to Indonesia were 
second to the least after the inflows to the Philippines (Table 2.2). 
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TABLE2.2. 
FOi INFLOWS TO SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Economy 1986-90 1991 1992 1986-1990 1992 
% Gross domestic %GDP 
Annual average value (US$ million) capital formation 
China 2,853 4,366 11,156 2.1 2.20 
Indonesia 599 · 1,482 1,774 2.0 1.4 
Malaysia 1,126 3,998 4,469 10.6 7.7 
Philippines 493 544 228 6.8 0.43 
Singapore 3,247 4,395 5,635 33.9 11.61 
Thailand 1,188 2,014 2,116 5.9 1.91 
Source: Pangestu, 1996, p.173 (Tables 7 and 8). 
Since 1993 the pouring of portfolio equity flows to the economy has been larger than 
those of FOi (see Table 2.3). Table 2.3 shows that the portfolio flows were $2,452 million 
in 1993, more than 12 times their magnitudes in 199.2. The figures were even larger for 
1995 and 1996, $3,672 million and $4,873 million, respectively. 
International bond issuance recorded its peak level in 1996 (The World Bank, 1997, 
Vol I, p. l 00). According to the World Bank, low yields in industrial countries coupled with 
investor interestto diversify their portfolios toward developing countries are the main factors 
that pushed debt flows to a,record $89 billion in 1996 (The World Bank, 1997, Vol I, 
p.100). The flows of the portfolio (debt and equity), which sometimes are also referred to 
as "hot money," are easily affected by any news and largely depend on investor interest as 
well as what happens in industrial countries. For example, as soon as the news about the 
assassination of the presidential candidate in Mexico appeared their equities were treated as 
worthless papers by the foreigners who bought them so eagerly before (Atkeson and Rios-
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Rull, 1995, p.342). 
TABLE2.3 
AGGREGATE NET RESOURCE FLOWS AND NET TRANSFERS 
1970 - 1995 (US$ ~ON) 
Net resource flows Net transfers 
Net flows FDINet Portfolio Grants Interest Profit re-
on long equity on long mittances 
term debt flows term debt onFDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1970 517 83 0 87 46 128 
1980 1,613 180 0 109 1,182 3,234 
1988 2,939 576 0 201 2,995 1,318 
1989 3,015 682 199 214 3,348 1,794 
1990 4,213 1,093 312 283 3,413 2,192 
1991 5,217 1,482 0 263 3,770 2,318 
1992 5,777 1,777 199 298 3,771 2,623 
1993 (1,079) 2,004 2,452 219 4,112 2,577 
1994 3,582 2,109 3,672 218 4,174 2,800 
1995 3,529 4,348 4,873 249 4,935 3,000 















There are more signs of vulnerability of financial sector. For example, in 1992, 
mismanagement of the banking system already had been noticed with the bankruptcies of 
many small banks and unhealthiness of many "large" banks. A bank crisis was explicitly 
acknowledged when Bank Duta admitted its losses of $420 million in September 1990, 
Bank Summa announced its collapse in December 1992 with losses more than $720 million 
and Bapindo stated that about $650 million of its assets were fraudulent (Hill, 1996, p.37). 
There were many other banks that admitted their problems. In many cases, the banks' 
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resources were gambled in the foreign exchange market. 
Private Non Guaranteed and Short Term Debts 
External debt made by private institutions increases as the country becomes more 
open to the international market. The era of private debt accumulation in Indonesia started 
in 1983. The proportion of private debt to total external debt has increased since 1987, 
noticeably in 1989-90.1 The proportion elevated from less than 18 percent until 1990 to more 
than 20 percent afterwards, see Table 2.4. The same table shows the interest payment on 
long term private debt in 1990 was twice as large as it was in 1988.2 The private sector's 
total debt was at least $65 million or 300 percent of the GRI's reserves at the end of 1997 
(GATRA, 6/12/97, p.1 ). Judged by the approximate magnitude of its total debt, the private 
sector has incurred at least the same amount of debt in fourteen years (1983 - 1997) as the 
government of Indonesia did in twenty five years (1965 - 1990). Debt crises are likely to 
occur not only when the debt service ratio is high, above 30 percent of annual exports, but 
also when the government's foreign reserves are less than that required to back up the debts. 
The World Bank pointed out that private nonguaranteed debt disbursements jumped from 
$20.8 billion in 1995 to $39 billion in 1996, with net inflows of $29 billion (World Bank, 
1Data about private debt are much less available than those of public borrowing. 
Available data may not represent the real amount I condition because the Indonesian 
government does not make strong suggestion moreover sanction for those who are not 
willing to report their debts. 
2'fable 2.4 only shows principal repayment and interest payment on long term debts 
because data on short term debts was less available. The unavailability was partly caused by 
the nature of short term debts (World Bank, 1997, p.276). 
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1997, p.160). According to the World Bank, a substantial part of the loans went to 
Indonesia (1997, p.160). 
TABLE2.4 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT 1970 - 1995 (US$ MILLION) 
Debt outstanding Principal repayment Interest payment TDS/ Short 
(long term debt) (long term debt) XGS term/ 
EDT 
Year Public Private Public Private Public Private Percent Percent 
1970 2,487 461 59 61 25 21 .. 
1980 15,021 3,142 940 693 824 358 .. 13.3 
1988 41,148 5,545 4,422 818 2,526 429 40.3 12.4 
1989 44,262 6,556 4,939 1,056 2,779 570 38.4 13.4 
1990 47,982 10,261 4,588 1,224 2,808 605 33.3 15.9 
1991 51,891 13,176 4,642 1,899 2,941 829 34.3 18.0 
' 
1992 53,666 16,281 5,183 2,598 2,994 777 32.6 20.5 
1993 57,132 14,029 5,697 3,447 3,233 879 33.6 20.2 
1994 63,891 15,543 5,550 3,405 3,248 926 30.7 17.7 
1995 65,347 20,134 5,717 4,483 3,774 1,161 30.9 20.7 
Note: TDS = Total debt services; XGS = Exports of goods and services, EDT= Total debt stock 
Source: World Bank, 1997, p.276 - 9. 
The World Bank also notes that therewere significant short term debt increases in 
1995 and 1996 (1997, p.160). The increases concentrated in China, Indonesia and 
Thailand (The World Bank, 1997, p.160). The Indonesian private sector got easier access 
to offshore loans after 1986 because the GRI paid its debts on time with the help from IFis 
and Japan. The offshore loans have short maturity periods and are due in one to five years, 
eighteen months on average. 
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Worried as a consequence of such rapid debt accumulation and uncertainty of foreign 
capital in the future, the GRI established the commercial offshore loan team (Colt) in 
October 1991. As quoted from the Bank, the Colt was supposed to (1) coordinate all public 
commercial borrowing, (2) set annual ceilings on external commercial borrowing by public 
and quasi-public entities and establish guidelines for loan terms, (3) determine the priority 
order and timing of approved loans and (4) improve reporting and information from public 
and private entities on external borrowing (The Bank, 1994, p.51). However, the Colt's 
action had never been heard or seen since then. 
Interest payments on short term debt became an increasing part of Indonesia's capital 
outflow since 1983. It offset part of the oil price positive effects on 1991 balance of 
payments (The World Bank,· 1994, p.41). This effect can be seen from Table 2.5. For 
example, in 1990 the non oil I gas services deficit was "only" $5,532 million, it became 
$10,207 miHion in 1995 and $10,051 million in 1996. More importantly, there are few 
short-run investment opportunities to enable the private debtors repay their offshore loans. 
In 1993, much larger amount of resources were sent abroad than they were received 
even though the amount of portfolio ($2,452 million) and FDI inflows ($2,004 million) for · 
that year were extraordinarily big. As seen from Table 23, the net flows on long term debt 
was negative (- $3,093 million) because interest on long term debts as well as profit 
remittance on FDI to be paid for that year were huge ($4,112 million and $2,577 million 
respectively). One thing can be concluded, the economy has too much external burden 
already.3 However, such burden was unseen because the economy had recently became a 
3 As cited in Chapter I, Indonesia's debt indicators were higher than those of Mexico 
before it experienced another debt crisis.· The economy had stable creditworthiness status 
according to Moody's (Baa3) and Standard & Poor' s, BBB for foreign currency debt and A+ 
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middle income country with increasing per capita income. The per capita focome was $570 
in the reform period and $740 in 1993. 
Increased Current Account Deficits 
The Indonesian economy has diversified export products (The World Bank, 1997, 
Vol. I, p.62). Exports of labor intensive manufacturing goods started in 1986 and became 
greater than resource based exports since 1991 (Pangestu, 1996, p.120). Only 14 years 
earlier, 60 percent of the outputs and 90 percent of the exports were agricultural products 
and raw minerals (Pangestu, 1996, p.120). One factor contributed to the achievement of 
the manufacturing sector was a subsidized export credit scheme. The GRI removed the 
scheme by April 1991 in accordance to the GA TT deadline. The Indonesian economy is very 
vulnerable to changes in the prices of oil and will still be even when Indonesia is.no longer 
an oil exporting but is an oil importing country in the year 2005-2010 (Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, 1995, p.18). As seen from Table 2.5, Indonesia still has a surplus merchandise 
trade balance.4 However, the merchandise trade balance has always been negative when 
exports of petroleum and gas are excluded (see Appendix A: Table 4 for the value of exports 
and imports with and without oil and gas). More importantly, in 1991 and 1995 the 
economy recorded closer gaps between magnitudes of public debt repayment with the surplus 
for domestic currency, for the period of September 1994 - December 1996 (The World 
· Bank, 1997; Vol. I, p.14). 
4Total imports is calculated in cif while the exports is in fob. Cif (cost, insurance 
and freight) includes all the cost involved until the commodity is loaded to the ship/flight 
phis the insurance and freight costs occurred to bring the commodity to importer's port of 
entry. Cif - fob = insurance and freight (BPS) . 
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in the trade balances. Table 2.5 also shows that in 1996 the surplus was actually smaller than 
the payment. The trade surplus in 1996 was also smaller than the difference between factor 
income from abroad with factor payment to abroad. 
TABLE2.5. 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF INDONESIA 1990 -1996 (US$ MILLION) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Trade balance 5,352 4,801 7,022 8,231 7,901 6,533 
Non oil I gas services (5,532) (6,129) (6,852) (7,351) (7,973) (10,207) 
Net factor income (5,082) (5,558) (6,072) (7,699) (6,641) (6,029) 
from abroad* 
Oil I gas (3,060) (3,064) (3,292) (3,178) (2,888) (3,086) 
A. Current account (3,240) (4,392) (3,122) (2,298) (2,960) (6,760) 
balance 
B. Capital and 4,746 5,829 6,471 5,962 4,008 10,589 
financial accounts 
Public Debt (3,201) (4,219) (4,708) (5,262) (5,390) (5,449) 
Repayment 
A+B 1,506 1,437 3,349 3,664 1,048 3,829 
Errors and omissions 593 (230) (1,606) (2,923) (242) (2,313) 
Official reserve (2,099) (1,207) (1,743) (741) (806) (1,516) 
Note: * from Gross Domestic Product by Type of Expenditures Table (converted to US$). 












The remarkable increases in non oil exports wen~ accompanied by higher rate 
increases in total imports such that the balance on goods and services were always negative. 
Deficit in merchandise and service balance was also caused by transportation cost for 
delivering the imported goods. Imports of almost every category increased during the post 
reform period. Since 1990, the economy became less flexible than it was before the reform 
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period because increases in imports for capital goods and accessories as well as raw materials 
used for production of exporting goods were accompanied by large increase in imports of 
consumption goods (see Appendix A: Table 5). The growth of total non oil I gas imports 
for the years were 12.91 percent and 31.59. percent, respectively (see Appendix A: Table 
5). Imports of the consumption commodities grew by 23.35 percent during 1993 -1994 and 
by 94.72 percent from 1994 to 1995 (see Appendix A: Table 5). As shown in Figure 2.1, 
the private sector increased its consumption significantly during 1991 - 1996. The figure 
also shows that there were also some increases in public consumption. Increases in private 
and public consumption happened because of higher restrictions on imports and low 
consumption levels in the previous periods, but were also largely encouraged by higher debt-
supported income per capita ... 
350000 ~--------------
300000 --+-------------.,,...::::::-








Source: IMF, 1996, p.537. 




Figure 2.1. Private and Public Consumption 1991 - 1996 (Rp Billion) 
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The current account balance has always been negative since 1965, except in 1974, 
1978 to 1980 when oil prices were exceptionally high. Among the main causes are interest 
payments and salary I wages of foreign workers (non oil I gas services). The deficit was 2.8 
percent of the GDP in 1990 and seemed to be going in one direction. The deficit reached 4 
percent of the GDP in 1995 ($6.7 billion}. In 1996, the deficit was 4.7 percent ($8.2 billion) 
and was considered unsustainable because it was close to the level when the reform started 
(5.1 percent in 1986). In 1966 and 1976 the deficits were only 2.4 percent and 2.3 percent 
of the GDP of their respective years (Little, et al., 1993, pp.412-3). Magnitudes of the 
deficits are shown in Table 2.5. Deteriorating conditions of the economic fundamentals 
( current account balance) made the Indonesian economy vulnerable to any sudden changes 
in global economic condition or any speculative attack directly or indirectly targeted to the 
economy. It is believed that speculative capital movement tends to be more often or effective 
to a country with enlarging deficits, especially when the deficit country has an easy to read 
depreciation cycle and high capital mobility. 
Depreciation of the Rupiah 
According to Martha de Melo, foreign borrowing can lead to a cyclical swings in 
the real exchange rate that weaken the signal value of relative prices as incentives indicators 
for resource allocation (1993; p.102). She continues that the initial effect of foreign 
borrowing is to cause a real appreciation of the exchange rate relative to what it would other 
wise be, whereas the subsequent effect of external debt servicing causes a real depreciation. 
The resulting variations in relative prices imply adjustment costs and can lead to 
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misallocation of resources with respect to a country's underlying comparative advantage. 
The Indonesian economy notices an annual cycle of depreciation of the rupiah and 
increases of the interest rates that accompany "more likely to fail" monetary policy.5 Every 
year the Indonesian economy experiences a rush for dollars to pay for its imports, the 
interest as well as the principal of its external debts. The rush depreciates the rupiah and 
creates expectation for further depreciation. About 20 percent of the public debt is in U.S. 
dollars, while more than 40 percent of the private debts are denominated in Yen and 
Deutsche Marks, see Figure 2.2. The ratio of debt service to exports went up from 17 
percent to 41 percent mainly because of appreciation of Yen against the U.S. dollar during 
1985 - 1987. Figure 2.3 shows that at least 19 percent of increases in debts during 1990 -
1995 or $10,282 million out of $53,754 million total change in debt stocks were caused by 
cross currency valuation. The GRI launched a tight monetary policy to stabilize the price of 
rupiah and to sustain the current account deficit. The policy was especially tight in 1992 and 
1993. As a result, interest rates increased and so was expectation of further depreciation and 
capital flight (Table 2.5, error and omissions). Because domestic interest rates were much 
higher than foreign interest rates, external borrowing increased. Parts of the inflows were 
transferred into rupiahs and deposited to gain interest revenue instead of invested in the real 
sector. As a consequence, the GRI' s tight monetary policy has never been successful. 
The Indonesian economy is still very vulnerable to realignment of any major 
currencies. The GRI and the private sector collect mostly dollars from their exports. 
5The cycle starts after the GRI gets additional debt from its annual meeting with the 
CGI (the IMF). The meeting is always announced. Some deregulations are usually 
announced few months before the meeting, in May, June or July. The President has annual 
tradition to address the nation, in August, about the government's achievements and plans. 
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Source: The World Bank, 1997, Vol. II, p. 278. 
Figure 2.2. Currency Composition of Long Term Debt 1991-1995 (Percent) 
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• Net flows on debt 
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Source: The World Bank, 1997, Vol. II, p. 278. 
Figure 2.3. Debt Stock Reconciliation 1990 and 1990-1995 (Percent) 
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However, appreciation of the U.S. dollar against other hard currencies does not necessarily 
lower the debt since only parts of the debt are invested in exporting sectors or hedged against 
currency realignment. The appreciation of the dollar certainly increases the total debts and 
debt services in rupiahs. It also increases the revenue from exports. The depreciation of 
rupiah, therefore, should carefully be watched because of its impacts on Indonesia's 
balance of payment. 6 
Budget Deficit 
During the 1986-88 reform period the deficits in the current account are accompanied 
by the fiscal deficits (Ahmed and Chhibber, 1989, p.5). The twin deficits continued in the 
post reform period because of over investment by the private sectors and continued 
accumulation of debts by the GRl.7 
It is a national consensus that external public borrowing should only be a 
complementary and temporary financing alternative. However, so far, foreign borrowing 
is the main instrument and is treated as a necessity for financing development. The GRI 
accumulates larger new debts every year, three to four billion U.S. dollars in the 80s, $4 
billion in the first half decade of the 90s and more than $5 billion afterwards. The new loans 
are made even though the GRI has undisbursed loans, 30 percent of its total outstanding 
6The GRI devalued the rupiah in 1976, 1983 and 1986. Since 1988 the GRI 
implemented "free floating exchange rate system" with some intervention. 
7Linkages among external trade, investment and debts are summarized as follows: 
current account balance = budget balance + (private saving - private investment). The 
relationship is a national accounting identity. Based on the identity, a current account deficit 
is associated either with budget deficit or over investment by private sector or both. 
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debts. Net official capital in 1996 was negative and in absolute term the magnitude was 
larger than that for.1995 or 1994 (Table 2.1). Data about the debts and its payment are 
incomplete and confusing. For example, the magnitudes .of 1990 - 1992 debt repayment 
on the principles on, public loans, shown in Table 2.5, are smaller than those shown in 
Appendix A: Table A.3. There are more unanswered questions regarding the use of the 
loans, as told by Hill, "no accurate and detailed compilation of the external debt holdings 
has ever been released" (1994, p.73). 
Table 2.6 presents budget surpluses l deficits as published in the International 
Financial Statistics by the IMF and as understood from the ORI practices together with. the 





PRIMARY SURPLUS AND BUDGET SURPLUS I DEFICITS 
1990 - 1995 (US$ MILLION) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Budget 344.63 (386.55) 696.29 114.98 2,939.50 
surplus* 
Primary 2,902.00 2,308.52 2,868.09 2,160.19 3,386.40 
surplus 
Budget (3,988.90) (5,306.99) (4,511.64) . (5,973.93) (4,987.27) 
defjcit() 





By the GRI's accounting practices the deficits are investment expenditures that are not 
covered by public saving, but by borrowing. The deficits increased noticeably since 1990, 
they became twice larger than the primary surplus in 1991 and 1993. It is therefore very 
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obvious in the Indonesian case that reducing the budget deficit, as suggested from row 3-
Table 2.6, would reduce the current account deficit. 
The Relationship between the GRI and Its Main Creditor . 
The relationship between the GRI and its main creditor, the Inter Governmental 
Group on Indonesia (IGGI) is rather obvious. 8 Mo~t of the official debts are owed to this 
group. Table 2. 7. shows magnitudes of the loans that come froni the group and how small 
a portion of the loans that come from other creditors. Every year the GRI submits proposals 
for projects to the group in order to receive funding. Annual loans from the group accounted 
for around 60 percent of the projected development budget expenditures for the first Five . 
Year Plan (Repelita), 1969-1974 (Robinson, 1986, p.138). As shown in Table 2.7, this 
percentage did not get lower until 1990. 
There are· three components of the group loans, "untied" concessionairy loans, 
project loans and program loans.9 The first one is a soft loan, with interest rates lower and 
grace period longer than that of commercial loans. It can be used for supporting the official 
.· . 
8The IGGI was formed in: 1967 as a consortium of fourteen members headed by the 
United States, Japan, the International Monetary Fund (the Fund) and the World Bank (the 
Bank). Until 1993, the official leader of the group was the Netherlands. The IGGI was 
substituted by the Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI) in 1993 .. Further insights are 
available in Hill 1994, Schw~ 1995, Vatikiotis 1994. 
9 After 1983, the fact that 25 percent of the GRI's debts were concessionairy loans 
did not mean it got a better deal compared to other countries who l>or:rowed from mostly the 
same creditors under no specific group. It can be seen in Appendix A: Table 7, that the 
interest rate on all long term debt was 16.6 percent for Indonesia. It was higher than that on 
Mexico's (16.1 percent) and Brazil's (11.2 percent), even though the earlier interest rates 
for Indonesia was lower and the other two countries had higher proportion of loans with 
variable rates. 
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reserves, while the other two can not. The project loans are 70 percent or more of the total 
loans, most of it for investment in the infrastructure. Through the project loans, the group 
exports merchandise and services for the ORI' s projects. When the economy becomes less 
flexible and more vulnerable to external shock, it needs more flexible loans and fast 
disbursing accounts. 
The loans from the group played an important role in helping the economy to grow 
as well as to establish "structural" deficits, dependence on more loans and foreign capital 
for its creditworthiness. On one hand, the access to the loans, especially to concessionairy 
loans, may provide a temptation to the ORI to bring as many proposals as it can for getting 
"has to be spent money." The ORI does not feel necessary to inform its people about the 
usage of the loans as long as it can get another loan from the groups. Indonesia is not the 
only country in the whole world that consults with the IMF every single year. It seems that 
the ORI is not the only country that assumes the credibility of the economy depends on its 
government ability to get more loans no matter what "prices" it has to take. The ORI 
presumes to tell people that the group gives the loan because the previous usage of the loans 
was. considered proper. On the other hand, the creditors give the loan as long as they 
considered it is a good business for them. Like many other developing countries, it is very 
hard for the ORI to get bilateral loans. This is especially true with the existence of the 
group. The potential creditors prefer to use the group so that they have more bargaining 
power to exercise their conditionality than if they give the loans bilaterally. 
Last but the most important in relation to the future reform strategy, the IMF 
"leadership" in the meeting may make international fund managers and capital owners think 
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the meeting is a forum for giving "involuntary lending" to the economy.10 Therefore, the 
annual consultation with the IMF could be another factor that made investors delay their 
investment until Indonesia resolves its "adjustment, " that is when the economy does not 
need the "involuntary" lending anymore. Most of the time, the CGI I IMF praised the GRI' s 
efforts, but such closeness with the CGI I IMF did not seem to help Indonesia gain enough 
international confidence for attracting foreign direct investors. 
Debt Services 
One of the reason why private investors shy away from long term "irreversible" 
investment (foreign direct investment) is they are concerned over viability of policy reforms 
in the country. According to Chhibber and Dailami: "high debt service ratios are a signal 
to both domestic and foreign investors of the likelihood of policy reversals" (1993, p.144). 
Debt service payment represents a heavy burden on Indonesia's public finance and balance 
of payments. The GRI began to pay interest on its long term debts after the grace period was 
over in 1982. From 1980 to 1989, the economy actually had been experiencing negative net 
capital transfers - additional capital inflows are less than the total payment for foreign capital 
I workers and amortization of the previous debts, see Table 2.3. The phenomenon happened 
again in 1993. The ratio of debt service payments to government routine expenditure rose 
from about 12 percent in 1983 I 84 to 27 percent in 1985 I 86 and more than 40 percent ever 
since (see Table 2.7; column 2). 
1°The IMF orchestrated involuntary lending during 1980s and lessen free-rider 
opportunity among creditors when they faced a possibility of giving debt rescheduling or 
forgiveness for certain debtors (Cline 1995). 
35 
TABLE2.7 
COMPARISONS OF PUBLIC DEBT SERVICES, GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES AND IGGI LOANS (US$ MILLION) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year Public debt IGGI NonlGGI Development Routine 
services loan loan expenditures expenditures 
---------- --------- -------- # 
(2/6) (3/5) (4/5) 
1985 2,973 ... ... 9,787 10,758 
(27.63) 
1986 42,931 ... ... 6,494 10,568 
(40.62) 
1987 4,967 4,205 685 5,746 10,634 
(46.71) (73.17) (.07) 
1988 6,443 4,930 582 7,266 12,301 
(5238) (67.84) (.05) 
1989 6,661 5,137 1382 7,816 13,746 
(48.47) (65.72) (.1) 
1990 7,133 4,507 29 10,555 16,277 
(43.82) (42.70) (.001) 
1991 6,760 5,227 411 11,161 15,501 
(43.61) (46.83) (1.88) 
1992 7,360 5,574 246 11,889 16,764 
(43.91) (46.88) (.01) 
1993 7,496 5,786 219 12,427 19,095 
(41.02) (49.31) (.87) 
1994 5,390+ 5,353 344 13,256 19,627 
(40.38) (2.6) 
1995 5,449+ 5,627 158 12,917 22,765 
(43.56) (1.22) 
1996 6,066+ 4998 628 n.a n.a 
Note: 
IGGI = Intergovernmental group for Indonesia. Ratios are in percent.; n.a = not available 
# include debt service payments + interest payment not included 
Source: The World Bank (1994): Tables 4.1, 5.1 and BPS (b). 
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With its debt accumulation, sterilization effort is a must but expensive policy for the 
ORI. 11 Sterilization is a must because with the economy's previous debt accumulation and 
increased dependence on imported raw materials, consumption goods and capital inputs, 
it is possible that a large appreciation of the rupiah may decrease export revenues while a 
large depreciation may cause high increases in its debt obligation because substitution for 
imported materials and capital is limited. Sterilizing domestic currency is also a must 
· because a large depreciation may be considered as shocking news, as in the case of Mexico. 
The country may experience a sudden and huge amount of foreign capital outflows as there 
are more investment opportunities for players in global financial market. Instead of spending 
time and resources to investigate the real situation in a country, most players would transfer 
their assets out of a country either when they hear shocking news about a situation in the 
country or when they see bigger players move their assets out (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996, 
p.245). A large depreciation may be helpful only if . the potential growth of the exports 
market is unlimited (which only exists theoretically, for a small country). 
The political situation of preparing for 1997 election will contribute to higher 
inflexibility for reducing government expenditures and for more uncertainty regarding future 
course of capital flows. There had been riot in July 1996 and popular discontent was more 
11There are two types of government intervention, sterilized and non sterilized 
interventions. The sterilized intervention (sterilization) is a way to offset I sterilize the 
impact of foreign exchange market intervention in the money supply through open market 
operations (Dornbusch, 1983, p.613). The foreign exchange loss reduces the money supply, 
the money supply is restored by the central bank's purchases of domestic assets (limited by 
the magnitude of official reserves). The bank can increase its sterilization ability when it 
increase the reserve by borrowing from the IMF I other countries, or it can persuade other 
countries to accumulate the currency that is in excess supply (Dernburg, 1989, p.113). 
"Sterilization works best when domestic and foreign bonds are poor substitutes, implying 
a highly interest-sensitive demand for money" (Dernburg, 1989, p.355). The cost of doing 
sterilization is higher when the economy is bigger or speculative attacks are stronger. 
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explicit than it ever been (see Eklof 1997 for information). 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
As of 1996, the economy was in a very fragile condition and another debt crisis 
might strike whenever there is an external shock before the GRI implement a serious attempt 
to fix the economy's sources· of vulnerability. High dependence on the coming of foreign 
capital and heavy obligation to service external debts were sources of the economy's 
financial vulnerability. The economy had every condition that Mexico had before it 
experienced 1995 debt crisis. Those were enlarging current account deficits, high 
dependence on portfolio flows, a weak financial sector, and an election. 
The growing current account deficit was not likely a short term problem that could 
be helped byjusttaking larger loans.12 It was a structural debt servicing problem because (a) 
increases in export revenue did.not catch up with the increase in debt obligations; (b) more 
liberal investment and trade policies made it less possible to direct private new investment 
as well as additional imports into infrastructure and exporting sectors; and (c) there was 
continued high dependence . on additional loans for servicing debts and preventing the 
· depletion of reserves. 
Since Indonesia has very high capital mobility, it is possible that expectation of a 
larger devaluation of the rupiah may lead to high, possibly massive capital outflows where 
an attempt to sustain the exchange rate will deplete its reserves and create a balance of 
12Ramli reached the same conclusions when he summarized the economic condition 
for 1990 (1991, p.10). His way of explaining why the growing account deficit is a structural 
debt servicing problem is presented here. 
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payment crisis. The matter is serious because while its borrowing capacity is more limited 
than before, the GRI needs larger and larger official reserves to prevent the crisis. 
There are at least three policy implications that should be given much attention by the 
GRI. First, there should be a serious attempt to fix the economy's sources of vulnerability. 
Second, the GRI should design development and crisis rescue plans that do not increase its 
future.debt burden. If there is another debt crisis in Indonesia in the future, it would require 
a different solution than the other previous crises. The solution should be different because 
the economy is more open than before and debts are owed not only by the public but largely 
owed also by the private sector. Third, the GRI should carefully consider how a policy will 
affect the private sector ability to fulfill their debt obligation before it implements any policy. 
Those three policies are equally important and complement to each other. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF STABILIZATION AND REFORM 
POLICY: STANDARD AND STRATEGIC REFORM POLICIES 
The main purpose of this chapter js to present the derivation of the strategic reform 
policy for the Indonesian economy. The strategic policy is a modification of the IMF 
stabilization policy. The modification is needed to avoid certain effects of the standard IMF 
policy package. There are three parts of this chapter. Part one is theoretical background, 
assumptions and contradictions underlying the standard policy. The second part focuses on 
the strategic reform policy. The third part is a summary of the previous parts. It provides 
short comparisons and examples of the standard and the strategic policies. 
Part one is disseminated into five sections. Section one explains the theoretical 
background of the IMF policies and some policies that are traditionally included in the 
standard stabilization package of the IMF. This section is mostly taken from Cline (1983). 
Section two provides arguments from Cline, Anne Krueger and other prominent supporters 
of the policies regarding certain "inherent" contradictions among the components of the 
standard policy. Section three presents underlying assumptions of the policy to see the 
relevancy of using the standard policy in the Indonesian economy. Section four concerns 
credibility of the policy and section five illustrates experiences of some other countries that 
are considered relevant for designing stabilization policy for the Indonesian economy. 
Part two's contents are main components of the strategic reform policy. They are 
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presented with supporting arguments from Dornbusch (1983), Dernburg (1989), Vito Tanzi 
(Fani and de Melo, 1993) and some other known scholars. 
Standard Policy 
When a country has a short run current account I fiscal deficit or debt servicing 
problem, the government of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) member country can use 
a stand-by arrangement or other facilities of the IMF together with structural or sectoral 
loans from.the World Bank. When a member uses the IMF.facilities it may purchase a 
certain amount of U.S. dollars on related market terms with its own domestic currency 
(Schadler, 1995, p.3).1 The U.S. dollar is the only hard currency usable after the Mexico 
crisis in 1995-1996. These resources are "tied loans," because they are "reserved" by the 
IMF only for a country who agrees to implement certain stabilization and reforin policies. 
The IMF gives only a small amount of the loan after the country signs· an agreement and 
delivers the rest of the loan by fractions after the debtor takes certain steps of the adjustment 
program. In addition, the Bank will not deliver its program loans without IMF approval. 
The objectives of the IMF policy package are to improve the balance of payments and to 
i.nsure the resumption and I or maintenance of full external debt service (Rivera-Batiz, 
1994, p.308). In this study, the IMF policies are referred to as "standard" policies. The 
stand-by arrangement and extended fund facility are among the resources available for 
middle income countries (see Appendix B: Table 1 for the types of the resources). The IMF 
1The maximum amount of resources available after the crisis is SDR (special drawing 
rights) 34 bi_llion or about $48 billion (The World Bank, 1997, p.17). 
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stand-by agreements are secret and the statements regarding their content are limited to 
generalities (Mikesell, 1983, p.53).2 
Theoretical Background of the IMF Stabilization Policies 
The effects of the conditionality that the IMF imposes on the economic policies of 
different countries are usually measured on the basis of the IMF' s model (Lichtensztejn, 
1983, p.210).3 
The basic monetary model of the balance of payments has influenced IMF 
stabilization programs for years. Typically these programs contain clauses specifying limits 
for expansion of domestic credit (Cline, 1983, p.176). Orthodox stabilization theory 
focuses on excessive money creation and overvaluation of the exchange rate as the sources 
of inflation and balance of payments (BOP) deficits (Cline, 1983, p.175). The principal 
orthodox policy measures for achieving economic stabilization are a reduction in the rate of 
growth of domestic credit and devaluation of the exchange rate. The measures are 
formulated by J. Polak and known as the monetary approach to the balance of payments 
(MABP): In the Polak model, income equals money supply times velocity (by the quantity 
theory) and the money supply equals domestic credit plus international reserves.4 In 
equilibrium, this year's income equals last year's. The standard policy suggests zero 
2Diaz-Alejandro criticizes IMF secrecy and pleads that at least documents older than 
10 years be open to scholarly examination (Cline, 1983, p.205). 
3The IFis' conditionality is "the policies the IMF expects a member to follow in order 
to be able to use the Fund's general resources (Lichtensztejn, 1983, p.209). 
4The quantity theory: HV = PT, where H = money supply, V = velocity, P = price 
level, and T = transaction or real activity. 
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economic growth when there is a crisis. Therefore, this year's money supply must equal last·. 
year's. Any growth in domestic credit must, therefore, be offset by reduction in reserves 
to hold money supply constant. Reduction in reserves means a BOP deficit. Essentially, any 
expansion of domestic credit leaks abroad through a BOP deficit and reserve loss. 
Accordingly, a 1;30P deficit must be corrected by reducing domestic credit. The model 
transposes to a growth basis as follows: if domestic credit is growing too fast for consistency 
with real output growth (and velocity trend), reserve losses will result and stabilization can 
be attained by a reduction in the growth rate (rather than the absolute level) of domestic 
credit. BOP deficit is measured either by the· overall deficit in autonomous transactions 
( current account 1>lus capital l financial a~count) or credit in the accommodating transactions 
(Alawode, 1993, p.13). 
A more general version of the orthodox model of stabilization is designed to reduce 
inflation and a BOP (current account) deficit. The stabilization policies emphasize demand 
management by controlling inflation and the real exchange rate to correct short-term 
departures from equilibrium; usually departures precipitated by internal imbalances such as 
temporary loss of budgetary control. Fiscal stabilization policies are central to this effort 
(Edwards, 1989, p.255). The model involves a package of three instruments: exchange 
rate, money supply growth, and public budget deficit (Cline, 1983, p.176). In the orthodox . 
model, the fiscal deficit is reduced following the absorption approach. The trade deficit 
(exports minus imports) equals the investment-saving gap (I - S) plus the fiscal deficit 
(government spending - taxes). To the extent that the trade deficit corresponds to an 
investment-saving gap, there is no particular problem if foreign capital can be mobilized. 
But if the origin of the trade deficit is in excess government spending, domestic absorption 
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exceeds domestic output for reasons of excess current consumption, not capital formation, 
and the situation is remedied by reducing government spending or by raising taxes. The 
exchange rate component of the package is designed to address the trade deficit. Devaluation 
of the exchange rate should increase ~xports (as domestic producers receive more domestic 
currency per unit exported) and reduce imports (as consumers must pay higher prices for 
imports in domestic currency). The three traditional elements of the policy package are 
complementary. Any recessionary impact of reduced fiscal deficits, and of reduction in 
activity rather than price in response to. monetary deceleration tends to be offset by the 
stimulative effect of devaluation;s impact on the trade balance. That is, in the national 
accounts the drag of imports is reduced, and the contribution of exports is increased under 
the orthodox response of trade to devaluation. 
In recent years, the standard IMF approach embraces the need for special 
developmental measures in achieving structural adjustment by lengthening of IMF lending 
maturities (extended fund facility) and cooperating with the World Bank. They are 
sometimes referred to as the new orthodoxy. Over the years the IMF also included other 
measures to channel capital in and out of the countries easily, financial and investment 
sector liberalization. 
Reform or structural adjustment policies are deregulations to bring trade and financial . 
liberalization. 5 Interest, taxes. and sometimes foreign exchange or reserve requirements are 
used as the instruments. These are microeconomic programs, designed to have positive 
supply effects. Reformation policies deal with coordination, pace and sequence. 
Coordination refers to other policy instruments which must be changed in order to maintain 
5This section is mostly taken from Collier and Gunning, 1990, p.224. 
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policy compatibility: that is, sustainable balance of payments and fiscal positions. Pace 
refers to the speed of policy change. At one extreme, all remaining trade restrictions can be 
removed at once. For any slower pace the issue of sequence will arise: the choices as to 
which tariffs should be reduced first and whether quotas should be relaxed ahead of tariff 
reductions. A major new study on trade liberalization by Papageorgiou, Choksi and 
Michaely (1990), primarily in LDCs appears to be somewhat dismissive of the coordination 
problem (Collier and Gunning, 1990, p.224). It is generally believed that macroeconomic 
stabilization is required before any reform and that structural or real sector reform should be 
. undertaken prior to financial reforms and those reforms are intended to encourage saving and 
investment (Pangestu, 1996, p.34). In Indonesia, financial sector liberalization had 
proceeded real sector reform and in a reverse sequence and at a faster speed than 
recommended by the World Bank in the 1989 World Development Report (Pangestu, 1996, 
p.34). Some economists believe the credibility and sustainability of reforms is more 
important than the timing and sequencing of the reforms (Pangestu, 1996, p.35). 
With its stabilization and reform program the IMF tries to make sure that increases 
in government revenue are higher than increases in interest payment on the debts by 
ordering the authorities to unilaterally reduce domestic public expenditures and increase 
local interest rates through slower domestic credit creation. The following are the 
"standard" policies: (1) contractionary monetary policy: contraction of domestic credit 
creation; (2) contractionary fiscal policy: increase tax revenues, cut government spending: 
cut subsidies, sell unprofitable government enterprises and privatize state enterprises in 
general; (3) devaluation of debtor country's currency; (4) liberalization of trade: abandon 
any import restrictions as wellas export subsidies, adjust relative price: cut any non market 
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price mechanism; (5) liberalization of investment and financial. Those policies are 
"standard" because they are the typical policies suggested by the IMF to many deficit 
problem developing countries. In the 1980s Latin American indebted countries suffered 
hyperinflation and were desperate to maintain service on their debts. The economies had 
been forced to adopt austerity policies which have resulted in nearly a decade of slow growth. 
Inherent Contradiction within Policies I Objectives of the Standard IMF Package 
There are at least five contradictions within the standard policies. These are: 
1. Reducing inflation and reducing imports through devaluation 
The standard package was designed primarily to attack inflation but Cline and 
Krueger are well aware that the effects of devaluation are likely to be inflationary because 
devaluation raises the relative prices of tradables,. especially when supply. and demand 
· elasticities are low in the sector of nontraded goods and services. Considering anti-
inflationary measures per se, Anne Krueger maintains that, outside of a few exceptional 
cases, there typically has been some recessionary cost of reducing inflation. However, "if 
external finance can be arranged, increased imports can help reduce inflation while reducing 
the trade bias at the same time" (Cline, 1983, p.187). This dependence on increased 
imports for reducing inflation is contradictory to the expected orthodox trade response to 
devaluation, mentioned earlier by Cline, that is decreased imports. Also, it is important 
to note that, as pointed out by Krueger, the package suggests further dependence on foreign 
capital to support the economy after the adjustment period. It is possible that higher 
dependence will lead to higher vulnerability to external shocks which might pursue the same 
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problem with the one that triggers the debt crisis in the first place. In Mexico case, the 
vulnerability and the problem are always getting bigger. The scale of the problem is shown 
partially by the magnitude of the new loans (bail out money) needed. 
2. Eliminating trade bias and encouraging growth 
Slower growth is likely to accompany stabilization because of fiscal restraint and 
because correcting trade bias alters resource allocation (private agents tend to delay their 
investment). Output will fall in the sectors formerly favored by the bias while it may take 
some time for investment and activityto respond in the newly favored sectors, especially if 
economic agents do not consider the government's program to be credible. Krueger holds 
that such growth losses are usually much smaller than the longer-run growth gains achieved · 
by eliminating trade bias (note: if external financial arrangement exists). 
Cline recorded that the stabilization-growth trade off became more complicated in 
the 1970s because of the need for long run adjustment to a changed external environment 
(the oil shock and slower growth in industrial country markets) as opposed to simple . 
correction of internal dis-equilibria. 
3. Stabilization and possible worsening of income distribution 
Stabilization affects income distribution through its impact on real wages, 
employment level, and entitlements for the poor. Cline argues that even though adverse 
distributional consequences of 'stabilization may occur in practice, the standard theory does 
.. 
not provide an automatic justification for the, extent of real wage reductions that have often 
been observed in some of the more politically conservative stabilization efforts (1983, 
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p.192).6 Cline acknowledges that reduction in government spending hits social programs 
such as health, housing and social security, but he is certain that the reduction_ does not 
necessarily worsen the distribution of income. To support his view, he presented the case· 
of Peru. According to him high food prices may have helped low-income farmers and 
reduction of gasoline subsidies was almost certainly borne bythose in the upper portion of 
income distribution (Cline, 1983, p.192). 
4. Correcting balance of payments deficits and making less sustainable deficits 
This section is taken from Alawode (1997). Correcting the BOP deficit principally 
via monetary restraint is likely to be welfare reducing. BqP adjustment pursued via the 
compression of aggregate demand and recession cannot endure. A sustainable BOP position 
is impossible because a recession may constrain the production of exportables and make it 
more difficult to earn foreign exchange and service external debts. A sustained fall in 
outputs may even serve to reduc.e the demand for money making it difficult to restore the 
money market balance. If deficit countries continuously transfer capital to surplus countries, 
there is no amount of monetary restraint that· can restore BOP balance. A consistent and 
effective attack on BOP problems, therefore, requires sustained external financing and a 
reducti0n in debt-service obligations in order to lay the foundation for sustainable BOP· 
positions. BOP adjustment in deficit countries will be difficult if the burden of adjustment 
remains asymmetric with surplus countries unwilling to play their part in the adjustment 
process. Efforts to correct BOP deficits should look beyond monetary factors and consider 
6Cline argues that it is.theoretically possible to achieve external stabilization through 
devaluation without reducing real wages. Therefore, it should be possible to achieve 
stabilization without reduction of real wages by the full extent of devaluation. In other 
words, draconian reduction in real wages are not necessarily required for external 
stabilization (Cline, 1983, pp.192-95). · 
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tackling external debt problems and ensuring resource flows into deficit countries. · 
5. Taking loans for adjustment and ensuring credibility of the adjustment 
This section is taken from Collier and Gunning (1994) and is portrayed in Figure 3.1. 
A fundamental problem with taking the loan strategy is that it is likely to induce destabilizing 
speculation on the part of private agents within the economy. This uncertainty arises largely 
because of the aid. Private agents cannot tell whether the government is genuinely 
committed to liberalization, has already decided to take the aid donors for a ride, or has 
simply welcomed the money and deferred the agony of decision. A unilateral decision, 
whether supported by donor agencies or not, is liable to be time inconsistent.7 According 
to Mosley, if the government consider liberalization + aid are better than protection, and 
that protection is better than liberalization without aid, then temporary aid is liable to 
produce only temporary liberalization (Collier and Gunning 1994, p.224). Although this 
uncertainty is notimportant for the choice of whether to accumulate inventories of imports, 
it is extremely important for the choice of where to install fixed investment. As depicted in 
Figure 3.1, if the liberalization is maintained then the best strategy will be to invest in the 
export sector which will benefit from the exchange rate depreciation. The figure also shows 
that if instead the goverhmentaborts the liberalization, then the import-substitute sector will 
revert to being profitable. According to Dixit (1989), since once capital is installed it is at 
best costly to shift it between sectors, the uncertainty as to policy creates a premium on 
keeping options open by delaying investment and acquiring financial assets (Collier and 
7This inconsistency existed in the Indonesian economy. One lesson from dealing with 
the IMF is that deregulation and liberalization are needed to get new loans. Therefore, from · 
the debtor point of view, such as the ORI until 1996, the economy should have some sectors 
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Gunning 1994, p.226). These two private responses reinforce each other. If investment is 
deferred, the gains in real income from resource reallocation take longer to come through 
and so the post-aid exchange rate depreciation must be larger if it is to maintain policy 
compatibility. This, in tum, makes it less likely that the government will choose rather than 
abort liberalization. Further, if investment is deferred, it becomes typically easy to finance 
the accumulation of inventories of imports. Such inventories become the option-preserving 
asset which dominates. 
Underlying Assumptions of the Standard Policy 
The International Financial Institutions (IFls ), the World Bank and the IMF, policies 
are based on the following assumptions: (1) the country has an unacceptably high rate of 
inflation, (2) it is losing foreign exchange reserves, and (3) it has an unsustainable current 
account deficit. Conditions (2) and (3) will be represented in the computable general 
equilibrium model for this study. Based on the first assumption, the first and primary step 
in almost all stabilization programs is to reduce the primary (non interest) budget deficit.· 
Implicitly, it is assumed that the inflation was caused by monetization of financing excessive 
budget deficit. Any country that takes the IMF loans will be viewed as having excessive 
aggregate demand .and hyperinflation. Such an image is not helpful for credibility of the 
GRI. Inflation rate in the Indonesian economy was not unacceptably high compared to the 
inflation rates in the other indebted countries helped by the IMF (more than 100 percent). 
On average the rate was less than 12 percent during the last ten years, see Appendix A: 
Table 2. If the inflation happens during the crisis~ it is likely be caused by higher production 
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costs because of import prices. Therefore, considering the special way of the GRI in 
measuring Indonesian inflation rates (see Chapter I) and the acceptable rate of inflation 
Indonesia has before the crisis starts, the traditional primary step is not appropriate. 8 As part 
of its prudent macroeconomic policies, the GRI usually sets its investment expenditures as 
a residual of its revenues minus its consumption expenditures (GRE) and only as they can 
be covered by loans from the CGI. Forty perc:;ent or more of the GRE is budgeted for the 
debt amortization and interest payment. See Appendix A: Table 6 for an example of the 
GRI' s actual and budgeted revenues and expenditures. 
The IFis assume a stabilization policy can go together with a reform policy. They 
emphasize simultaneous application of the two policies. However, some economists, such 
as J. Sachs, believe that it is almost impossible to launch stabilization and liberalization on 
the same time. Sachs wonders why the country must be compelled to undertake the policy 
if the actions being recommended by the IFis ate really "desirable;' for the country?" (1989, 
p.277). For instance, if producer prices and I or subsidies are still permitted, developing 
countries would be able to stimulate exports and less dependent to external debt with its 
related problems. McKinnon also states that "the IMF and World Bank should not bribe 
developing countries into trade and financial liberalization, since bribestaking the form of 
capital inflows are themselves harmful to the liberalization effort"(Fry, 1995, p.301). Fry 
and some other economists argue that financial liberalization stimulates investment more 
than it stimulates saving. Therefore, the liberalization has been associated with excessive 
foreign capital inflows that decrease the exchange rate (domestic currency appreciates), 
8See Widodo (1990, pp.43 - 47) for information regarding the calculation of the 
consumer price index and the inflation rate. 
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depress exports and imperil monetary control. To prove whether such condition happens in 
Indonesia is beyond the objective of this study. 
Credibility of the Standard Policy 
According to Rivera-Batiz, the evidence about the IMF success is ambigucms and 
the "IMF sponsored reforms often did not help in reestablishing confidence and interest rate 
stability because their short-term focus prevented investors from believing that government 
policies would not be reversed in the near future" (1994, p.313). See Appendix B: Table 
2 for the IMF' s success records in sponsoring its policy package.9 
According to Dernburg, the standard policy has. a shock treatmeritnature, such that 
. if the government follows the advice to accompany devaluation with absorption reducing 
policy, the economy may have nasty recession with heavy unemployment (1989, p.255). 
In return, the IMF may succeed in getting the country out of its chronic payment deficit 
even though its austerity programs is inconsistent with employment and growth objectives 
of the developing country (Dernburg, 1989, p.255). 
· Experiences of Other Countries 
The following examples are a destabilizing error from Peru case 1978 - 79 (mostly 
9Indonesia was considered as one of the success stories of the IMF. According to 
Payer, the success was that of the multinational corporations and of Japan. For example, 
. through the IMF Japan secured ''the assurance that Indonesia will continue to export its 
petroleum and timber fo serve the needs of the 1 apanese economy rather than its own'' ( 197 4, 
p.91). 
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taken from Dell 1983) and a creative stabilization and reform policies implemented by the 
government of Malaysia (Chanders, Robless and Teh, 1981). The experiences of the two 
countries are relevant for this study for two reasons. (1) Indonesia has diversified exports 
but is susceptible to a volatility of the price of one of its commodity ( oil I gas). (2) Indonesia 
has the need to insulate the poor from external shocks and to avoid another social clash 
between native Indonesians with Indonesian Chinese (Schwarz, 1994, pp.98 - 132; Hill, 
1994, pp.32 - 4; Hill, 1996, pp.109 - 10). 
In the Peruvian case, the source of imbalance was a temporary and reversible factor-
the low price of copper. The cost to Peru in lost output and investment was out of all 
proportion to the magnitude of the external problem that had been encountered. Peru was 
compelled to negotiate for an IMF stand-by arrangement in the third quarter of 1978 and had 
to accept stringent obligations to deflate the economy-less severely than the unrealistic 
agreement of December 1977 had provided. Yet if one examines the balance of payments 
projections agreed upon as a basis for the stand-by negotiations, it is immediately apparent 
that, had the negotiators known that the price of copper would recover from $0.58 a pound 
in July 1978 to $0.90 a pound in March 1979, they would have realized that that fact alone 
would come close to restoring external balance without any cutting down of the economy at 
alL By April 1979, the Peruvian BOP was so strong and the inflow of capital so massive 
that the international press was reporting the country's inflation-inducing surplus of dollars. 
In the Malaysian case, "its government pursued a whole battery of measures designed 
to help insulate the poor from external shocks" (Cline, 1981, p. 235). The country had 
barely emerged from the 1969 outburst of major racial conflict when it was· shaken by 1972 -
1975 world cycle of inflation and recession. The government response was to moderate the 
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pace of inflation and alleviate its impacts in order to eradicate poverty among all Malaysians 
and to restructure Malaysian society so that identification of race with economic function 
would be reduced and eventually eliminated. Such strategy required a rapid pace of 
economic growth to prevent any group from experiencing any loss or sense of deprivation 
in the process. The government's dilemma was to control inflation without upsetting its 
program to help the poor. Because of such dilemma the policies and measures adopted by 
the government followed a middle.course. They came to be designed more as a series of 
measured response to the situation as evolved, rather than a set of preemptive strikes, so as 
to avoid over reaction. They are ainied at moderating the impact on aggregate demand of 
export earning fluctuations through monetary and fiscal action; expanding the availability 
and reducing the cost of key supplies of domestically produced and imported goods; 
controlling the prices of basic consumption and investment goods and alleviating the impacts 
of inflation on the poor (Chanders, Robless, and Teh, 1981, p.219). In addition the Bank 
increased its maximum borrowing and minimum lending rates and raised interest rates on 
fixed and saving deposits to introduce a modicum of restraint on credit expansion and to 
encourage saving. 
There are two important notes from the Peruvian case (Dell, 1983, p.43). First, it 
is alarming that such a country can find itself compelled to endure lasting damage to its 
economy because of circumstances that are reversible and because of inability to mobilize 
BOP support on a scale sufficient to avoid such damage. Second, it is disquieting that the 
economy of a country such as Peru-which among developing countries has relatively . 
diversified exports-can still be at the mercy of the volatility of a single commodity. An 
important lesson from the Malaysian experience is that "adjustment to external shock can be 
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carried out in a way that minimizes adverse impacts on the poor" (Cline, 1981, p.235) 
Strategic Reform Policies 
Even though they have standard adjustment programs, the IFis acknowledge that 
each country should be considered as having unique pre adjustment conditions which deserve 
different policies. They also emphasize the advantage of the government's involvement in 
designing the program from the beginning as well as willingness to solve the program as 
needed. Before the signing of the conditionality, the IMF sends a team to discuss the 
necessary solution for the country.10 Therefore, when the GRI faces another external shock, 
it can choose to implement its own unique programs without having to be worried of being 
viewed as challenging the IMF. Moreover, the Bank states that "conditionality is 
unnecessary when the borrowers deliver all reforms up front"(Jayarajah and Branson, 1995, 
p.258). Another economist, Vito Tanzi, who was also an official of the Fund, stated that 
the Fund should be ready to relax its fiscal conditionality and require less fiscal adjustment, 
provided that efficient, growth enhancing measures were being concurrently introduced 
(Fani and de Melo, 1993, p.12). 
An alternative adjustment and reform policy would require correct identification of 
the sources of inflation and mobilization of social consensus. The identification and the 
mobilization are needed to slow down and ultimately halt the struggle between social groups 
1°However, because the crisis may has just developed, it is possible that the "panic" 
debtor country is not ready to discuss more unique I appropriate programs at the negotiation 
time. It is more concerned with the magnitude of the loans from the IFis compared to that 
from other possible sources. 
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to safeguard I change their respective shares of real income. It is a policy which does not 
involve very large reduction in real income, or no reduction at all. Lessons learned from the 
past adjustment policies by other highly indebted countries imply the need to counter the 
slow down of the growth rate which is caused by the fall in investment, deficient demand, 
and negative effects on productivity created by distortionary trade policies. 11 The fall in 
investment can be caused by terms of trade deterioration, high interest rates, cutbacks in 
public investment, and disincentive effects of debt overhang besides the sharply reduced 
external financing flows. 
Components of the Strategic Reform Policy 
The following sections discuss six components of the strategic policy. The main 
components of the policy are: (1) social consensus, (2) multilateral adjustment, (3) 
promotion of exports, (4) counter cyclical fiscal policy, (5) expansionary monetary policy, 
and (6) debt reduction. Multilateral adjustment is practiced when the burden of adjustment 
is distributed equitably and efficiently among countries. The components are considered 
suitable for a developing country (Indonesia) which has acceptable inflation but has to deal 
with twin deficits and unemployment problems. The country has abundant natural resources 
but their extraction depends largely on the initiatives and capital from abroad. 
nsee Fisher (1988) for the post reform conditions of the highly indebted countries. 
For the Indonesian economy "the need to affect adjustment without a cut in investment is a 
key adjustment challenge for the 1990s"(Chhibber, 1989, p.10). 
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Social Consensus 
There are three reasons why getting a social consensus before implementing austerity 
measures is important. First, it is most likely that any austerity measures are not popular 
domestically. Implementing the austerity policy is more difficult when the government is 
politically no longer popular. Second, there is usually insufficient enthusiasm for a 
stabilization policy (Dornbusch, 1983, p. 229). Third, there is also a possibility of 
"adjustment fatigue"where the electorates in the debtor country do not believe that more 
adjustment will bring them relief from declining per capita incomes so that they are not likely 
to support the austerity program (John Shilling, comments to Cline, 1989, p.194). The 
fatigue is possible to exist because the GRI has been implementing restraining fiscal policies 
combined with contractionary policies every single time its current account deficit get worse, 
since 1976. According to Dornbusch: 
we therefore have to look to ways of shaping a broad social consensus supportive of 
stabilization .... this means, of course that incomes policy is the cornerstone of 
effective, socially acceptable conditionality. Effective stabilization is, above all, 
not a technical issue but a political one."(1983, p.229). 
He is certain that when incomes policy is assembled in a social consensus on the need for 
stabilization, then "there is every reason even to apply shock treatment: simultaneous and 
immediate, credible moves to rectify the entire disarray"(Dornbusch, 1983, p.229). 
According to Dornbusch, such policy includes "a combination of changes in real prices, 
fiscal and public sector sanitation, cuts in absorption, wage controls, and sharing rents, but 
it also includes, as advantage, a full employment and growth policy"(1983, p.229).12 
12"Such a package is much harder to engineer than 5 percent growth in the money 
supply, but unless we have the optimism and confidence to try, we might as well be 
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Multilateral Adjustment 
Doing multilateral adjustment is more reasonable than doing the unilateral one 
because there are many uncertainties surrounding a country in the end of 1990s.13 Those 
uncertainties, noticeably, are the interdependency among countries, huge capital movement 
and volatility of financial markets. The political difficulty discussed previously is higher 
when the burden of adjustment is not distributed equitably and efficiently among countries 
and when the shock comes often. 
The following facts illustrate such difficulty. First, as evidenced from 42 countries 
being surveyed by the World Bank; four of the countries dropped their fiscal tightening 
programs because they experienced severe social unrest when the programs were introduced. 
The four countries then financed their expansionary fiscal policies with internal borrowing. 
At the end of the adjustment period, the economies had inflation rates less than 15 percent 
and succeeded in preventing higher inflation rates.14 The second example is taken from 
Denburg from the U.S.A. (1989). In 1985-1987, the U.S. was experiencing a large trade 
deficit and the dollar was appreciated. The world economic growth was sluggish, so all 
around lowering of interest rates seemed desirable. The G-5 finance minister meeting in 
1987 produced a promise of coordinated actions to lower world interest rates and bring down . 
the dollar (Dernburg, 1989, p.468). However, the promise was not delivered because the 
plumbers" (Dornbusch, 1983, p.229). 
13Unilateral adjustment is implemented when only the country that shocked more 
from sudden changes in the international environment has to adjust. 
14The World Bank only had data on three of the countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Pakistan 
and the Philippines. The latter had the highest rate of inflation, 15 percent (Jayarajah and 
Branson, 1995, p.120). 
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the dollar (Dernburg, 1989, p.468). However, the promise was not delivered because the 
countries were then persuaded by the U.S. to raise foreign interest rates. Instead of pursuing 
a more restrictive fiscal policy unilaterally, the Reagan administration asked the other G-5 
countries to pursue the expansionary fiscal policies. Such policies would narrow interest rate 
differentials, reduce the inflow of capital, and depreciate the dollar. But previously the 
Reagan administration complained that the IMF was being too soft in its lending conditions 
to developing countries (Cline, 1983, p.207). 
According to Dell, sharing the burden and responsibility of adjustment was put in 
the terms by some of the industrial countries that are now most insistent in pressing for 
unilateral adjustment by deficit developing countries (Dell, 1983, p.23). In 1973, the US 
proposed a new system that was designed "to apply equivalent incentives for adjustment 
evenhandedly to all countries" (Dell, 1983, p.22). The following is the US view of the 
shortcoming in the adjustment process: 
If countries on both the deficit and the surplus side of a payment imbalance follow 
active policies for the restoration of equilibrium, the process is likely to be easier than 
if the deficit countries try to bring about adjustment by themselves. Deficit countries 
would in any case be unable to restore equilibrium unless surplus countries at least 
followed. policies consistent with a reduction of the net surplus in their payment 
position (Economic Report of the President 1973, pp.124-5, as quoted from Dell, 
1983, p.22). 
Dell insisted that the concept of unilateral adjustment-with one group of countries at best 
neutral toward, and at worst frustrating the adjustment process of other group-is not a 
system. He also reminded that there is a pressing need for the IMF to reconsider its position 
in this basic issue (Dell, 1983, p.44). More importantly, in the case of external shock the 
IMF has an obligation to do all it can to assist a member that is suffering the effects of events 
beyond its control or of injurious policies pursued by other members (Dell, 1983, p.29). 
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Promotion of Exports 
Relying on export growth is the longer term solution for Indonesia (Poot, et al, 
1992), like for most indebted countries (Edwards 1989). A study by Wing Thye Woo 
identified three factors that were responsible for Indonesia's lower debt service ratio relative 
to Mexico's in 1985 (Woo and N asution, 1994 ). Those were concession airy loans, prudent 
management of the maturity structure and high export orientation. Woo found thatthe export 
orientation explained 31 points of the 57 percentage point difference while the 
concessionairy interest rates and the currency composition of the debt played only a minor 
role, less than 6 percentage points (Woo and Nasution, 1994, p.126). 
The rupiah will be weaker when the crisis happens. The depreciation has a twofold 
impact. It may increase export revenue but will certainly increase total debts and debt 
services in rupiahs. When there is no large and volatile movements of capital, it is safe to 
assume that under flexible exchange rates, the rate adjusts automatically to balance the 
current account. The external balance will take care itself. The GRI might just let the rupiah 
find its equilibrium rate and use its resources to add growth opportunities in the economy 
instead of adding higher future debt burden to sterilize the economy. Other countries may 
consider such devaluation as "beggar - thy - neighbor" policy since it is taken below full 
employment. They may also devalue so that the world economy could suffer competitive 
depreciation. When there is a large and volatile capital movement, the GRI has to face the 
external balance the same time it faces its internal balance problems. Should then the GRI 
implement a large sterilization policy, the kind that is seem possible with huge additional 
loans such as with the IMF loans? In this regard, it is important to consider the fact that the 
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IMF policy to give only a small part of the loan at a time actually suggest the same thing, 
limited stabilization and more of the reforms. Therefore, whether the economy faced 
volatile or small capital movement, limited stabilization of the rupiah is the only affordable 
option. 
A devaluation affects private investment through several channels (Chhibber and 
Dailami, 1993, p. 132). First, a devaluation alters the real supply price of capital goods. 
Second, it affects the real price of imported inputs which are used in conjunction with 
capital goods to produce output. Third, it has an impact on the teal product wage and 
thereby affects profitability and investment. Fourth, it produces changes in real income 
which affects the demand for domestically produced goods. Finally, a devaluation affects 
nominal and real interest rates which in tum have an impact on investment. The short run 
and long run effects of a devaluation on private investment can go in opposite direction. The 
short run negative effects appear largely due to contractionary demand effect of a devaluation 
and to the higher costs of imported inputs into production. However, as the economy 
responds through higher exports to increased competitiveness, "the long run benefits of 
devaluation far outweigh the short-run contractionary costs" (Chhibber and Dailami, 1993, 
p.132).15 
Since the GRiis supposedly committed to liberalization, letting the rupiah depreciate 
and supporting the usage of alternative inputs and technology are the only ways available to 
discourage imports. These solutions were based on those taken by the U.S.A. when it had 
a substantial current account deficit and the dollar was weak. In 1974, many other 
15Concluded in the studies by Solimanto A. (1990), and by Chhibber and Shafik 
(1990). 
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developed countries were struggling to recover from major recession and attempting to adjust 
to the damage done to their economies by the rocketing of oil prices. The U.S. agreed to 
slow inflation and reduce oil imports to reduce demand pressures while the other developed 
countries agreed to pursue expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.16 Such agreement was 
signed in Rambouillet, France, in 1977. The U.S. and the other developed countries also 
switched to alternative energy for its production. According to Rambouillet arrangement, 
the surplus country should become the locomotive of the world economy by expanding its 
internal demand. If the deficit country expands its demand, its current account deficit 
enlarges (Dernburg, 1989, p.257). 
Countercyclical Fiscal Policy 
Lower aggregate demand will naturally accompany any economic crisis but budget 
deficit reduction is the sine qua non of the IFis package. Is fiscal restraint helpful for the 
economy? According to Taylor, most governments share at.least four economic goals: (1) 
to maintain socially acceptable levels of capacity utilization and growth, (2) to keep inflation 
down to a rate tolerable in terms of the country's own history of price increases and social 
defenses against them; (3) to alter wealth and income distributions in line with the regime's 
ideological predilections and political constraints; and (4) to maintain a degree of self 
reliance in trade and external financial relationships (1993, p.71). Therefore, the 
helpfulness of the restraint policy will be judged by its relation to the achievement of the 
16Based on the percentage of total trade over GDP, compared to the U.S. economy, 
the Indonesian economy is more open and dependent on its government involvement in the 
economy and on the supports from the other economies. 
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above goals. 
First, "not all deficits are irrational and not all add to aggregate demand" (Taylor, 
1993, p.71). The WIDER analysts observe that output contraction follows immediately 
upon imposition of fiscal restraint (Taylor, 1993, p. 72).17 Therefore, the full capacity use 
of goal number (1) is sacrificed. If austerity persists, growth is not rapid either. The reason 
is that fiscal contraction has no built in means to assure robust investment demand. Private 
investment stagnates for at least two reasons. First, the standard reason is that accelerator 
mechanism will not operate while economic activity is being held down. The IFis' 
experience shows that temporarily no investment is to be. expected in the adjustment period. 
It is hard to expect enthusiasm of any investors when the economy has less aggregate 
demand. One way to build the enthusiasm of the domestic and global capital owners and to 
prevent the fatigue is by implementing fiscal policy that ensures rapid growth in the post 
adjustment period. The second reason is that there are structural complementarities between 
public and private investments. "Some public infrastructures such as education, roads, .... are 
essentials inputs into private production "(The World Bank, 1995, p.102).18 With regards 
to the income distribution, fiscal austerity often involves scaling down social service 
activities such as education and health, as well as cutting back food subsidies and similar 
programs. Typically the results are regressive and hurt the poor. 
Second, in reality, fiscal reduction is not effective for cutting inflation (see also 
Cline 1983). The GRI implements some kind of staple food buffer stock (rice and flour), and 
subsidies for the prices of sugar, medicine and oil to prevent insufficient provision and 
17WIDER: World Institute for Development Economic Research. 
18The infrastructure development will be discussed in point fourth of this section. 
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volatile price movement. Unlike many developed countries, there are no unemployment 
benefits to help those who become poorer from bad economic conditions. 19 Such subsidies 
are usually among the first items likely to be cut in the IMF package.20 However, to slow 
the inflation rate, the subsidized prices should not be stopped or reduced significantly until 
the economy improves. Such improvement is when there is no reason to worry about staple 
food I oil sufficient provision and when there are enough firms to import them without 
possibility of charging monopoly prices. Otherwise, the welfare of many Indonesian people 
is held down from the monopoly of the government to more commercial-profit oriented 
private monopolist. There will be more people who can not afford to buy the staple foods 
without the subsidized prices. It is easy to predict that with increased local oil prices many 
other product prices as well as the transportation cost to deliver many of the products to the 
remote areas where more poor people live will increase immediately because most of their 
productionuse oil instead of other sources of energy. The costs for delivering many of the 
products to the remote areas where more poor people Ii ve or for public transportation in cities 
will also increase immediately with increased oil prices. In this relation, erasing buffer stock 
policies or the oil subsidy would easily trigger a higher than manageable inflation rate. 
Besides, most of the staple food and oil are imported and theoretically the public deficits do 
not have inflationary impacts when additional public loans were used for increasing the 
provision of goods and services in the domestic market. 
Third, increased interest rates and appreciated currency through a contractionary 
19No medical care, food stamps or homeless shelters either. 
20Such as in Peru case, see Cline (1983), and the World Bank already suggested it 
(TEMPO Interactive, 17/02 - June 25, 1997). 
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policy are believed to be able to prevent large capital outflows.21 However, the tendency of 
capital flows can be easily triggered by any uncomfortableness of the capital owners. The 
capital stays in one place only as long as there is growth opportunity. The capital may be 
parked abroad the minute its owners detect any sign of austerity in the domestic market. 
Besides, if domestic investment is not strong, the repatriated capital meets no local demand. 
Fourth, reducing the fiscal deficit will also cause much larger reduction in output and 
private investment in Indonesia because many government investment projects are 
complementary to private investment. Accordingto Marrison and Schwartz, recent studies 
on productivity growth have focused on public infrastructure and its impact on growth and 
productivity (1996). They construct a model of firm behavior using the applied production 
theory based on cost function and then apply it to state-level data for U.S. manufacturing. 
Their study finds that the infrastructure investment provides significant returns to 
manufacturing firms and augments growth. But they summarize that the net benefit of 
infrastructure investment may or may not be positive, depending upon the social cost of 
infrastructure investment and the relative growth rates of output and infrastructure. The 
WIDER studies argue that increased public capital formation in developing countries crowds 
private investment in. The public capital formation did not increase interest rates in financial 
markets along orthodox lines; There is increasing evidence from the Bank's cross-country 
studies that points to the importance of a complementary role of public investment, 
especially in areas where there are large externalities to such investment (1994). Those areas 
are physical infrastructure involving public goods, natural monopolies or large capital 
21Domestic real interest rate = foreign real· rate of interest plus expected rate of 
depreciation. ·Nominal domestic interest rate = domestic real interest rate plus expected rate 
of inflation. 
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investment such as "road and telecommunication networks, power distribution, urban water 
supply and large irrigation system ... "(The World Bank, 1994, p.104). The budget for such 
investments should not be cut, instead it should be fostered in the adjustment period to 
ensure rapid growth afterwards. According to the World Bank, under supplying these 
services can retard sustainable growth. The World Bank also states that as global 
competition intensifies, the ability to compete successfully in the world market will depend 
even more on efficient logistical services, such as adequate roads, ports, shipping, air 
freight, services and telecommunications (1994, p.104). ·Reducing fiscal deficit will also 
cause much larger reduction in output and private investment. If the private investment is 
thereby held dowti, growth prospects are doubly dimmed-by austerity itself and its effects 
on capital formation. Since rapid export growth is crucial to successful recovery from any 
shock, new government investment should go to export industries or into infrastructure that 
indirectly foster exports. The very last thing Indonesia needs for attracting foreign capital 
before the AFTA's globalization era is going into recession. The recession will extend 
investment pause because it prolong the time needed by the investors before making 
decision. 
Expansionary Monetary Policy 
According to Little, as capital mobility become high, like in Indonesia, the scope 
for separate exchange rate and monetary policies is limited (1993, p.250). An intervention 
designed to depreciate the currency would inevitably increase the money supply as 
sterilization has little effect. The exchange rate could only be depreciated by a policy of 
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monetary expansion or appreciated by a policy of monetary contraction. While monetary 
policy could be targeted on the exchange rate, perhaps with the aim of either stabilizing the 
nominal rate or the real rate, it could not at the same time be targeted directly on domestic 
inflation or short term output, or some combination of the two. Furthermore, fiscal policy 
would then also be tied down, except in so far as nonbank sources of government finance 
are developed. 
There is a trade off between using a contractionary monetary policy to stabilize the 
exchange rate; that is preventing further depreciation of the rupiah or an expansionary one 
to support a fiscal policy. In the latter, monetary and fiscal poli~ies are directed to provide 
stability of output production by providing liquidity credit to the private sector. Such 
policies lead to an increasing exchange rate. The depreciation has twofold impacts. It may 
increase export revenue but will certainly increase total debt and debt services in rupiahs. 
A contractionary monetary policy increases interest rates. Neo-structuralists have 
emphasized that, . given wages and capital, higher real interest rates lead to higher prices or 
transitory inflation.22 Dornbusch points out two other ways in which increased financial 
· interest rates have a more adverse effect to the supply side compared to that of the transitory 
. .· . 
effects (1983, p.227). First, nominal demand given, higher interest rates will not increase 
prices and lower output but will reduce profit rates. There also could be less busi1'ess 
opportunity with the same profit margin in the domestic market I for domestic entrepreneurs 
22PQt-l=awlt (l+x)(l+NIR) where P= output prices, wl= wages, X=profit margin, 
NIR=nominal interest rates. PQt=awlt (l+x)(l+RIR) where RIR real interest rates 
(Dornbusch, 1983, p.227). 
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and ultimately lead to bankruptcy of many small businesses. 23 The n~w rate makes servicing 
debts more difficult for the private sector especially since their ability to service the debts is 
already weakened by the depreciation. It makes the cost for borrowing too high and there 
is not enough market to s~ll the product with its adjusted price. With the repayment problem, 
even big businesses do not have access to borrow from abroad anymore. They need liquidity 
from the domestic banking to pay for their debts and for importing the needed intermediate 
inputs. Otherwise, they have no sources to acquire foreign currency, so they operate under 
. . 
full capacity of their machines, downsize their ·employees, sell their assets and.most 
regretfully let their export market taken over by firms from other countries, Meanwhile, 
even with out the IMF sponsorship, with more liberalization foreigners can own majority 
shares in local companies and can locate their businesses in small towns where many local 
firms are relatively very weak compared to multinational corporations. And as credibility 
of the economy or its currency value gets lower, foreigners can buy domestic firms cheaply, 
even the best ones, because their stock prices plunged. In other words, domestic firm was· 
either bought by foreigners or had to compete with foreign firms in its worst condition. 
According to Dornbusch, high real interest rates effect employment and output adversely 
because firms currently hire labor have to look at the discounted marginal product of labor 
in all industries, such as agriculture and construction Where there are gestation lags (1983, 
p.227);24 The implication of this calculation is that, in the short run with given capital and 
the productivity of labor, higher real interest rates on financial capital lead to a decline in 
23When many of their customers are unable to pay, the banks can go into bankruptcy. 
Such bankruptcy is not helpful to the economy. 
~hat means firms look at real wages wl/[P1+ 1/(1 +NIR)] = wl1 (1 +RIR)/Pr 
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employment.25 Significantly higher than inflation interest rates contribute to existence of 
moral hazard because only investors with high certainty to fail would like to borrow money 
while those who are afraid of losing their assets will prefer not to.26 
Indonesia's labor force grows by at least two percent each year.27 In a normal 
situation, at least four million out of almost 200 million Indonesians need to find jobs each 
year.28 The number is certainly higher with more people losing jobs from probable 
downsizing during the standard adjustment program. It is likely that foreign companies I 
managers may prefer to recruit non Indonesians for their newly bought firms because the 
education level of the Indonesian people is still low compared to that of the people from 
Phillippines and other neighboring countries.29 Industries with less local contents 
(manufacturing industries) will suffer more than those with less imported inputs (farm 
industries). Unemployment in urban areas where most manufacturing factories are located 
will increase while at the same time people from small cities look for job in bigger cities. 
Such urbanization will augment related social problems, including increase crime rates. By 
a rough estimate, the economy needs to have 4 percent growth to avoid any "uneasiness" 
25Dombusch argues that the foremost task of stabilization, on the supply side, is to 
create employment and to raise productivity of capital, not to make financial capital 
expensive. The positive real interest rates binge is, in his judgment, a very misdirected and 
poorly founded wing ofthe free market school(Dombusch, 1983, p.228). 
26The creditors do not practice prudent lending policy because the interest rates may 
already cover the possibility of unpaid loans and because they believe the IMF will help them 
get paid anyway. · · · 
27Discussed in Chapter 1. 
28The population will be more than 200 millions in the year 2000. 
29High educated Indonesian people will prefer to work for foreign companies to get 
dollar denominated salary or to wait longer before they find "appropriate" jobs. The results, 
large brain drain and high unemployment rate among educated Indonesians. 
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from people who lose or can not find jobs. 30 It is important to avoid making small scale 
industries loose their chances to survive. Informal and family owned industries are always 
the last resorts for those lost jobs in the formal sector. They can transfer non tradable to 
tradable with labor intensive technology. As the rupiah decreases its real value, export 
opportunity for those commodities might be improving. Therefore, the monetary policy 
should channel affordable credit for the small local firms with potential exporting capability 
otherwise the depreciation I external shock will only add nothing but more debt burden. 
Debt Reduction 
In the short run, the economy faces a double transfer problem. Resources must be 
transferred abroad to service external debt, but first the public sector must obtain the 
required foreign exchange from the private sector (Fani and de Melo, 1993, p.9). In other 
words, when the private sector is "sick," the public sector has difficulties in collecting 
revenue I foreign exchange. There are two alternatives before asking the creditors to reduce 
Indonesia's debt burden. The alternatives are either to make more internal borrowing or to 
recall repatriated capital. Until the end of 1987, 99 percent of the total debts was foreign 
debt, therefore, there is a room for the GRI to do internal borrowing. The internal 
borrowing is made either through money creation, regulate reserve requirement, credit 
rationing to control domestic interest rates or borrowing from banks at market rate, and sales 
of government bonds in dollars or in rupiahs (Husain and Diwan, 1989, p.95 -114). The 
3°Estimated by the author, considering the need to provide jobs for new comers to 
job markets, for those who previously work unpaid and for those unemployed since the 
previous years (excluded those unemployed from recent downsizing). Another factor 
implicitly considered is the need to produce enough to service external debts. 
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GRI already tried the first two alternatives. The reserve requirement was raised in 1992. 
However, servicing domestic public debt is often more expensive than servicing foreign debt 
because the interest cost of the first continues to exceed the cost of the latter and its real cost 
increases with further depreciation.31 
Reflows of flight capital to the highly indebted countries may also help fill their 
external financing gap. However, the conditions under which flight capital finds it way back 
are not necessarily conducive to the financial stability of the country. Those willing to bring 
back their capital will require higher risk premiums, which results in high economy wide 
real interest rates. They choose to keep the assets in a highly liquid form and do not always 
invest in the expansion of productive capacity. When there is any possible indication of 
political or economic uncertainty, these financial assets leave the country, accentuating 
financial destabilization. Domestic investment by residents also face expropriation risk. The 
IMF conditionality and its acts as debt collector for international banks made them lend their 
money without appropriate judgment and encouraged capital flight because loans from 
outside the country are more likely to be paid. Capital flight might be lessened if saving in 
the country is as safe as placing funds. abroad. If this expropriation asymmetry and uncertain 
economic environment persist, there is little hope for substantial reflows of flight capital in 
the near term. Unless the country is able to reduce debt overhang, economic uncertainty and 
stabilizethe economic environment, there is very little hope for significant inflows of capital 
(Khan and Haque 1985). 
31The real cost increases for several reasons. First, the value of the loans in terms of 
foreign currency decreases with further depreciation. Second, interest rate on the internal 
borrowing is usually increased following a depreciation even though the rate is already 
higher than that on the external borrowing. Third, the real value of the loans in domestic 
currency also decreases when the depreciation is accompanied by higher inflation. 
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With the present economic condition (discussed in Chapter II), especially high 
accumulation of short term loans and dependence on foreign capital, it is perhaps very hard 
to avoid the need for asking for debt rescheduling or may be even for a debt reduction when 
a crisis comes. Adding more loans is not recommended because it will add higher burden 
in future. It also will discourage private sector because they are expected to pay higher taxes 
to cover the debts. Besides, the loans will only come with higher interest and more 
(implicit) conditionality.32 
The real magnitude of the debt is considered less importantthan its relative size, debt 
I GDP ratio. There are three ways to reduce the relative size or to increase debt 
sustainability. Those are: (1) increase growth rate of the economy, (2) reduce the primary 
deficit, and (3) restructure the debts to reduce the stock and interest rates on the debts. 
In most cases, . reducing the primary deficit is a must. The long run dynamic of 
budget deficits is such that the growth of revenues must exceed the average interest rate paid 
on the outstanding debt as long as the government run primary deficit (Little, 1993, p.319). 
The GRI took adjustment loans in 1986. It decreased its relative debt burden through 
growth and reduction of the primary deficit. Real public expenditures stagnated after 1982 
and even declined from 1985 and 1987 (Thorbecke, 1992a, p.108). According to 
32It is rational to expect that over the years the IMF may find that it becomes more 
difficult for it to ask private creditors for helping "no longer good debtor" or for the 
governments of the United States, Japan, Germany and other big countries to get approval 
from their peoples for funding the efforts to rescue the "competitors" unless the IMF 
convince them that the payback is guaranteed and "huge." It also rational that with more 
loans in addition to weakened local private sector the debt ridden economy become more 
vulnerable to external forces and is likelyto be sicker when faces another shock. Mexico is 
the best example, it needed larger and larger debts for its crises. Gunboats are the 
borrower's best friend because only when "larger exogenous penalty can be imposed" will 
creditors lend more (Cline, 1995, p.140). 
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Thorbecke, the relative burden (debt service ratio) was increased from only 6 percent in 
1980 to 34 percent in 1988 with an almost 7.5 percent annual growth rate of the economy 
from 1980 - 1988 (1992a, p.109). 
The third way to reduce debt is by debt restructuring, reduction of the debt stock or 
interest rate relief. The 1980s debt crisis brought a distinct new stage characterized by 
external debt reduction (Silvina Vatnik, comments, 1989, p.17 5). Vatnik predicts that 
voluntary debt reduction will form an important part of debt negotiations. 33 Reduced interest 
on existing debt instruments, has not so far been put into practice as another type of debt 
reduction (Hussain and Mitra; 1989). The reduce interest rate option is attractive from the 
debtor's point of view as they receive substantial relief in cash flow. As reduced interest is 
tied to economic performance, the fear of moral hazard is also, to a large extent, 
neutralized. A case by case approach to interest reduction negotiated in the framework of 
an agreed structural adjustment program can make a significant dent if the accounting and 
tax rules are modified to strengthen the incentives for the commercial banks. The present 
tax and accounting rules in the U.S.A. do not provide any incentive for the banks to agree 
to reduction in interest rates. A variant of reduced interest rates that is attractive analogous 
to warrant attached to bond. issues. If the country's major exports commodities register an 
upward swing relative to the threshold, the creditors participate in the gains proportionately 
and the interest rate reduction earlier is brought closer to the market rate in accor~ance with 
the country payment capacity. In their review on the adjustments experience of highly 
33See Husain and Mitra (1989) for debt reduction measures. The measures are 
classified as: (a) exchange of foreign debt against domestic assets (debt equity conversion; 
· (b) exchange of foreign assets against another foreign assets at discount; (c) debt buy backs; 
and (d) debt servicing reduction through reduced interest rates (Husain and Mitra, 1989, 
p.206). 
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indebted countries, Little and other authors suggest that servicing debt and doing the 
stabilization at the same time would be much easier when the deficit is financed by interest 
relief (Little, 1993, p.398; Echengreen and Portes, 1989, p.75 ). 
All transactions classified as debt reduction are also liability reductions. Debt equity 
swaps only reduce liability to the extent that the swap occurs at less than face value. There 
are other alternative or menu options but John Shilling suggested that in analyzing debt 
reduction and guarantee options, greater consideration should be given to alternatives that 
reduce debt service or cash"'.'flowburden in the short term than to debt reduction instruments 
that may have a short-term cash-flow cost or little cash-flow benefit (John Shilling 
(comments), 1989, p.195). The existing rules and precedents were set to facilitate new-
money flows. It is prejudged that the credit enhancement or the resources for debt buy backs 
provided by the IFls would not be sufficient to make a significant difference in the larger 
debtor countries. The Brady initiatives, announced in March 1989, depart significantly 
from the existing debt strategy. They allowed the use of financial resources of the 
International Financial Institutions in support of debt and debt service reduction in countries 
pursuing strong adjustment policies. It was inspired by Mexico's condition which ran 
primary surplus but had a very high debt services. 
Another factorto be considered for giving debtrelief is the tendency of a very large 
stock of debts to act like a high marginal tax on successful adjustment (Sachs, p.277). 
According to Sachs: 
''Two counterintuitive propositions could be true when a country is deeply 
indebted:"Good behavior'' (such as a higher investment rate) can actually reduce 
national welfare, by increasing the transfer of income from the debtor country to 
creditors; and explicit debt relief by creditors can increase the amount of actual debt 
repayment by improving the incentive of the debtor country to take the necessary 
adjustment" (1989, p.277). 
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Many observers have cautioned debtors that a moratorium or default may offer 
macroeconomic benefits in term of scope for deflationary policies but it may also have 
macroeconomic costs in term of disruptions to export and capital market access. Exporters 
may encounter difficulties in obtaining trade finance or suffer retaliatory trade sanctions 
(Eichengreen and Portes, 1989, p.74). It is also recognized that debt reduction, beyond a 
certain limited scale, would impose additional financial costs on the commercial banks. In 
turn, it may cause a higher average rate of inflation universally. 
Lindert and Morton state that "partial debt write-downs can work, and have worked, 
in a variety of ways;' (1989, p.233). They explain how some economies are helped by debt 
reduction. According to the authors, the coming of foreign investors to Brazil was not 
discouraged by her debt servicing records (Lindert and Morton, p.233). They also noticed 
that the Mexican economy became more attractive to foreign capital after it stopped paying 
its debts (Lindert and Morton, p.233). Mexico was theri asked to join Canada and the U.S. 
in the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
When a private debt repayment problem happens, the Indonesian economy can not 
lose more and may be even gain from "admitting'' its "credit unworthiness."34 It is because, 
with the AFT A liberalization schedules and the reforms jmplemented by its members, there 
will be investment pause anyway. Besides, countries seeking for any debt reduction are 
considered as having defaults even if they only ask for some rescheduling measures for the 
private debts. 
34There is not much incentive for being a good borrower except that of receiving more 
"support" to become a larger debtor. The ORI did not get any "other than the access to larger 
and more expensive loans reward" for being a good payer or for its efforts in the previous 
adjustment while countries with· bad report card of debt servicing (17 high indebted 
countries, including Mexico and Brazil) enjoyed some kind of debt reduction. 
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Summary 
In order to prevent a severe investment pause and heavy unemployment as well as to 
help the private sector and create growth opportunity, a deficit country with low inflation 
rates and primary surplus should consider to plan a modified version of the standard 
adjustment policy. 
In this study, the alternative policy is called the strategic reform policy. It is based 
on a genuine commitment to strengthen domestic economy's condition. It stresses the 
importance of a Countercyclical fiscal policy as the key to reconciliation of growth and debt 
within reasonable inflationtargets (Ahmed and Chhibber, 1989, p.47). The strategic reform 
policy for the Indonesian economy prescribes measures to prevent severe unemployment in 
the recession and to strategically nurture the economy's local strength for its· long term 
benefit. The Indonesian economy has low inflation rate and the GRI should not jeopardize 
the future of the whole economy when faces a debt crisis. In addition, the policy should be 
implemented only after the government gets social support and in a situation where countries 
share the burden of taking the necessary adjustment. Among the necessary adjustment is the 
government should restraint itself from taking huge loans from the IMF or from other sources 
and should start the austerity policy with a reduction in its personnel expenditures. More 
importantly, the government should prevent export constraint and should try to adopt a debt 
reduction scheme when the crisis comes. Table 3.1. provides comparison and examples of 











COMPARISON AND EXAMPLES OF THE STANDARD 
AND THE STRATEGIC REFORM POLICIES 
Standard Reform Policy Strategic Reform Policy 
Based on donor consensus Based on domestic social consensus 
- start with reductions in government - start with reduction in government 
subsidies (* put priority on cutting food operational expenditures (* reduction 
and fuel subsidies) in government personnel 
expenditures)· 
Unilateral adjustment Multilateral adjustment 
- need huge public borrowing for - surplus countries help by buying 
government intervention in foreign rupiah, open their economies for 
exchange market Indonesian commodities 
- surplus countries at best neutral 
Procyclical fiscal policy{fiscal Countercyclical fiscal policy (fiscal 
restraint)** expansion)** 
* decrease health and education * increase health and education 
subsidies subsidies 
* increase tax rates to compensate loss * increase government income by 
of government income from giving more firms a chance to survive 
liberalization so they will be able to pay taxes 
Contractionary monetary policy Expansionary monetary policy 
* increase interest (discount) rate (supporting to fiscal policy) 
* decrease credit creation * decrease interest (discount) rate 
* increase credit creation 
Fulfill debt obligation Include debt reduction scheme 
- cut other government expenditures in * reduce interest payment on public 
order to fulfill debt obligation debts 
- rescheduling of private debts 
Promotion of imports to decrease Delay cut on government subsidies on 
inflation (assumes the country has staple food and on fuel to control 
unacceptably high inflation when the inflation (assumes the country has low 
crisis starts) inflation when the crisis starts) 
Promote recession and does not mind · A void recession and heavy 
heavy unemployment or a possibility to unemployment plus promote exports 
lose export market to increase ability to service debts 
* = An example of the program which is included in the simulation. 
- = An example of the program which is not included in the simulation 
** = with regards to the expenditures other than those for principal and interest payments 
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CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION OF RELATIONSHIPS IN THE COMPUTABLE 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
A COE model is a general equilibrium system derived from micro and macro 
economic theories. It assumes that the economy is in equilibrium, Equations in the model 
should reproduce base run data of the social accounting matrix (SAM) as a model solution. 
Parameter values of the equations in the model are crucial. Slight changes in some of the 
parameters may influence results. Some of the parameters are either taken from previous 
studies or calibrated. The calibration procedure is the process of solving the model for 
parameters using benchmark or base year values of endogenous and exogenous variables 
(Koh, 1991 ). Once parameters are calibrated, the model equations are solved simultaneously 
for the endogenous variables given values of the exogenous variables. There are several 
steps in building a computable general equilibrium (COE) model. The first one is to 
understand the SAM. The next step is to distinguish exogenous and endogenous variables 
in their relationships in the SAM then try to build a COE model by representing those 
relationships with a system of equations. 
Organization of this chapter follows the steps needed in building the COE model. 
Section one is an introduction to the SAM structure with variables to be used later in the 
equations. Section two focuses on 63 main relationships in the model. The last section 
compares the model solution with data from the SAM. 
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Understanding SAM Structure 
The SAM provides data that are organized as a consistent framework of transactions 
for a particular year in an economy. There is a certain way in reading a SAM. Each row of 
the SAM represents receipt accounts while each column represents expenditure accounts. 
The respective rows and columns have to balance. For instance, the summation of 
households total income from working as labor, renting its resources as factors of 
production, and from receiving transfers from other households, firms, government and the 
rest of the world, in row three '" Table 4.1, should be equal to their total expenditures in 
column three. A summary of the contents of the SAM table (12 x 12) is displayed in Table 
4.1. For example, production activities are disaggregated into 22 sectors ( i = 1 to 22) with 
each sector producing only one commodity (m =1 to 22). The production activities are 
summarized in column six (6) where value added is disaggregated into accounts representing 
industry purchases of capital and labor (row 1, 2 column 6) and raw materials (row 8, 9). 
Institutions (households, firms and government) pay part of the factor incomes back to 
households in the form of dividends, interest, and rent. The purchases of capital and labor 
are then translated into factor incomes (row 3, col.1 and row 3, 4, 5 col.2). Columns of the 
capital account (10) record domestic and imported capital investment, while rows (10) 
record savings from various institutions as well as from the rest of the world. Purchases of 
commodities from abroad are recorded in row 12 - column 9 as imports of goods and 
services including cost, insurance and freight (cit). The total imports in customer prices is 
shown in row and column 9, total. 
In the discussion, variables displayed in the SAM are to be referred to with names 
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TABLE4.l 
STRUCTURE OF INDONESIA SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX, 1990 
Factor of Production Institutions 
Expenditures 
Labor Non Labor Households Companies Receipts 
1 2 3 4 5 
Factors of labor 1 
Production 
Non Labor 2 
Institutions Household 3 Allocation Allocation Current Transfer to 
of labor ofnonlabor transfer households 
income to income to between 
Households Households households 
Companies 4 Allocation Current 
of non labor transfer 
income to between 
Companies companies 
Government 5 Allocation Direct tax Direct tax 
of non labor from from 
income to . households companies 
Government 
Production Sector 6 
Trade and Transportation 7 
Margin 










Capital Account lO Household Retained 
saving earning 
Net Indirect Tax 11 
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TABLE 4.1 Continued 
Expenditures Factor of Production 
Labor Non Labor Institutions Companies 
Receipts 1 2 3 4 5 
ROW Account 12 Labor Profit to Transfer Debt interest 
income to ROW from 
ROW household to 
· ROW 
Total Total labor Total non Total Total 
expenditures labor household companies 
expenditures expenditures expenditures 
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TABLE 4.1 Continued. 
Institutions Production Trade margin and 
Expenditures sector Transportation 
Receipts Government cost 
5 6 7 8 
Factors of labor 1 Value added 
Production payment to 
labor 
Non labor 2 Value added 
payment to no 
labor 








Government 5 Transfer between 
government 
Production Sector 6 
Trade margin and 7 
Transportation cost 
Commodity Domestic 8 Govt. Current Raw material Trade margin and 
expenditures on purchases of Transportation 
domestic comm. domestic goods cost 
Imported 9 Govt. Current Raw material 
expenditures on purchases of 
imported comm. imported goods 
Capital Account 10 Govt. Saving 
Net Indirect Tax 11 
ROW Account 12 Govt. Debt 
services (interst 
payment) 
Total Total Total input cost Total trade 




TABLE 4.1 Continued 
Commodity Capital account 
Expenditures 
Domestic Imported Comm Receipts 
Comm. 
8 9 10 11 
Factors of labor 1 
Production 
Non labor 2 
Institutions · Household 3 
Companies 4 
Government 5 
Production Sector 6 Production cost 
Trade margin and 7 Trade margin Trade margin 
Transportation cost and and 
Transportation Transportation 
cost of domestic cost of imported 
commodity commodity 
Commodity Domestic. 8 Investment on 
domestic capital 
goods 
Imported 9 Investment on 
imported capital 
goods 
Capital Account 10 
Net Indirect Tax 11 Net indirect tax Import duties 
minus subsidy and tax minus 
subsidy 
ROW Account 12 Import of goods 
and services in 
cif 
Total Total cost of Total costof Gross accumulated 
domestic imported expenditures 
commodity commodity 
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TABLE 4.1. Continued 




Factors of labor 1 Labor income from Income of factor of 
Production ROW production (labor) 
Non labor 2 Non labor income Income of factor of 
from ROW production (non 
labor) 
Institutions Household 3 Transfer from · Household income 
. ROW to 
households 
Companies 4 Transfer from Companies 
ROW to incomes 
companies 
Government 5 Government revenue Transfer from Government 
from indirect tax ROW to income 
government 
Production Sector 6 Export of goods Revenue from 
and services in fob domestic 
Trade margin and 7 Trade margin and 
Transportation cost . transportation .cost 




Imported 9 Total import 
( customer price) 
Capital Account 10 ROW saving Gross accumulated 
expenditures 
Net Indirect Tax 11 Total indirect tax ,. 
ROW Account 12 net capital Total revenue on 
transaction to and current account 
from ROW and ROW account 
Total Total indirect tax Total revenue on 
current account 
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TABLE4.2. 
VARIABLE NAMES FROM INDONESIA SAM 
5 "6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
.. 
35 36-57 58/9 6():.81 8:2-103 104 105 106 
VAL YLFROW YL 
VAK YKFROW YK 
GTH ROWTH HY 
' 
GTF ROWTF FY ~ .. 
GTG TI ROWTG GR 
Q Q 
,. 
.MTD MTM MT 
,. 
··" 
GCD ODIN MIT ITO X'.SD DD 
GCM DMIN ITM MD 
GS ., ROWSV SAVTI.. 
., ·-·· 
TIO TIM TI 
GOS MGS ROWREV 





















INDONESIA SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX, 1990 (Rp BILLION) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
17-23 24-33 34 35 36-57 58-59 60-81 
94,027.08 
104,570.02 
· 49,808'.87 5,130.12 242,74 5,723.37 
43,207.88 1,296.71 
1,937.79 1,997.80 21,121.26. 3,724.01 · 
359,115.32 
30,575.13 
117,736.97 14,348.63 128,651.83 40,108.53 
9,539.94 1,154.15 31,866.58 
24,085.95 19,667.51 12,010.00 
9,204.50 
10,773.95 7,519.83 · 4,555.00 















I 11 3,064.94 
12 50,045.73 
Total 62,644.73 
Source: SNSEI, p.23. 






















shown in Table 4.2. The names begin or end with H, F, G or ROW are related to 
transactions done by I to households, firms, government or rest of the world 
correspondingly. Consumption and investment are shortened by C and I , such that HC 
stands for household consumption. Other variables· are referred with abbreviations that are 
closest to their full names. For examples, VAL for value added, DIN for demand for 
intermediate inputs, etc. The complete names for the variables and parameters are provided 
in Appendix C: Tables 1 to 3. When necessary, explanation about relationships in the 
model specifies locations in the SAM table of the variables involved; Magnitudes of the 
base run variables. are displayed in Table 4.3 .. 
Relationships in the CGE Model 
The model is designed to specify the relationships in the real and financial sectors. 
Overall, the model will show how prices of commodities, nominal interest and nominal 
exchange rates affect the current account balance and the fiscal deficit. A researcher will be 
able to determine the impacts on these two accounts of any changes in the world price of 
imports or in the exchange rate. The capital market is assumed to be imperfect such that a 
relative version of purchasing power parity is appropriate.·for calculating changes in the 
expected rate of devaluation and domestic interest rates. There can be simultaneous changes 
in the exogenous variables as well as in various policy instruments, such as tax rates, 
exchange rate and government consumption. The following are equations that represent the 
relationships integrated.in the CGE model. Variable and parameter names are listed in 
Appendix C: Tables 1 to 3. The equations are numbered in the order of their appearance 
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in the program (Appendix D.l). Those equations with numbers arid letters explain either the 
derivation of the equations shown in the program or relationships between one equation with 
another which are shown also in the .program. Therefore, those equations with numbers and 
letters themselves are not shown explicitly in the program because they explain the numbered 
equations shown before or after them; Subscripts i and j are shown in the equations to 
indicate sectoral (row and column) 'while superscripts h, g or others refer to the agents. The 
. . . . . 
subscripts i and j are not shown in the text to helpreaders understand the variables used in 
the program. The program is.in GAUSS language. The main program is presented in 
Appendix D. l. · 
Production Function · 
The production technology is represented by a production function or functional form 
with implied assumptions about factor substitutability. The choices of technology depend 
on data and level of aggregation available (Dervis, de Melo; Robinson, 1982, p.141). To 
allow flexibility in modeling behavioral features at different levels of production, a two or · 
three level nested production function is used. The COE framework can accommodate a 
wide variety of technology specifications. · At level one,. the Leontief functional form which 
. . 
implies no substitutability among factors is mostly adopted to represent fixed coefficient of 
primary (capital) and composite intermediate inputs used (Budiyanti, 1996, p.39). At the 
second level, constant elasticity of substitution (CES), constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET), Cobb-Douglas (CD) or constant ratios of elasticities of substitution (CRESH) 
functional forms are appropriate to capture the elasticity of substitution among primary 
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factors. At the third level, substitutability between different skills of labor can be modeled 
either by CD, CES, or CRESH. 
Following·a model in Thorbecke (1992a, p.227), the CES function is used in the 
labor and capital relationships in the production, but without further specification of labor 
skills. Sectoral outputs (Q) are produced by labor and capital in Equation 4.1 where 
sectoral labor (W) and capital (KD) substitute for one another with constant sectoral 
elasticity of substitution (cr). The magnitudes of the sectoral elasticity of substitution 
determine the responsiveness of capital demand to changes in the relative price of labor 
brought about by trade and exchange rate policy or exogenous events (Dervis, de Melo, 
Robinson, 1982, p.222). 
Production Function in the Long Run. In the CGE model by Thorbecke and team, 
the long run production function is influenced by past cumulative government investment· 
and regulation, as well as by current government investment ( 1992a, p.227). The model for 
this study simplified such relationship further by assuming the government total investment 
( GINV) is the only variable to influence the long run production function. The regulation 
in the Indonesian economy is not seen as another determinant since the GRI is willing to treat 
foreign investors the same way it treats domestic investors. Equation 4.2 shows the long run 
production function. 
Considering what variables influence the GINV, Equation 4.2 pictures a reality of the 
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dependence of the Indonesian economy to external borrowing for financing its growth. See 
Equation 4.35 for details of the government investment. 
Equation 4.2 is based on Equations 4.2a and 4.2b. 
LK gi (4.2a) <I\ = ai GINV 
where at is calibrated as 
. <l>~K 
(4.2b) a.c' = - 1-
1 GINV 
Domestic Sales 
The decision regarding how many outputs will be imported or produced domestically 
is mirrored through an Armington function, that is by applying the CBS function. The 
Armington assumption is an important assumption that is implied in most CGE models. It 
states that consumers do not view domestic and imported goods as perfect substitutes. When 
they are perfect substitutes, the economy may specialize narrowly in few commodities only. 
Outputs that are produced domestically and sold in the domestic market are referred to as 
domestic sales ( DS). Equation 4.3 shows that the choice between the domestic and imported 
commodities (DS and MGS) is based on the relative prices in those markets and 
substitubility of the commodities as specified by the elasticity of substitution ( p~ ). 
~( 1-oM] ( PM J ]1 'P~ (4.3) DS1 = MGSl fl;'' PD: 
where o~ is the share parameter.( 0 < o~ < 1), PM are sectoral prices of imported 
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commodities, and PD are sectoral prices of domestic commodities. Values of the share 
parameters are presented in appendix D.2. 
Demand for Intermediate Inputs 
Expenditures for composite ( domestic and imported) input materials ( DINii) are inter 
industry transactions. Their magnitudes are proportional to the sectoral outputs (Q). The 
sectoral demand of the total intermediate goods (DIN) is ussually defined as a summation 
of the inter industry transactions . 
. (4.4a) DINi = L DINii 
j 
. where DI~i is a proportion ( a.~IN) of the sectoral outputs ( Q ). · This relationship is shown 
in Equation 4.4b. 
DIN (4.4b) DINii = a.Ji Qi 
The total expenditures for intermediate inputs ( DIN) is also total value of the outputs minus 
total value added of the primary inputs (labor and capital). The total value added (VA) is a 
certain proportion of the total output (see Equation 4.14). · Therefore; the relationship 
between the demand for interinediate inputs arid the sectoral production, as shown in 
Equation 4.4c, can be summarized as one minus the proportion of value added times the . 
sectoral outputs. 
VA (4.4d) DINi = ( 1 - a.i ) Qi 
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DIN (4.4) DINi = a; Qi 
The demands for imported and domestic intermediate inputs are derived demands of 
output. They depend on their relative prices as well as the elasticity of substitution ( pf IN) 
between the sectoral demand of intermediate imported goods (DMIN), and sectoral demand 
of intermediate domestic goods (DDIN). The relationship between them is based on 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) assumption. It is shown in Equation 4.5a.1 The CES 
· assumption implies that the domestic and imported inputs of the production imperfectly and 
smoothly substitute for each other. The elasticities of substitution ( pf IN) are taken from Lee 
(1993, p.76) and their magnitudes are provided in appendix F. 
DIN DIN DIN I ~ ] -1/p. (4.5a) DINiDIN = <l>fIN oi DMINi P; +. (1-ofIN) DD/Ni P; . 
(4.5c) clIN = 1 
1 DIN 1- Pi 
DDJN_DIN [( 1-o1!IN)( PM.)] DIN (4.5d) I = I __ I CJ; 
DMJN_DIN 31:IN PDi 
I I 
[ DIN ( )] 
0- PM. DIN 
(4.5) DMIN. = DDIN. (. 1 ) -. 1 . CJ; 





= (sectoral) intermediate input efficiency parameter ( cpfIN > 0) 
= the (sectoral) share parameter ( 0 < of IN< 1) 
. . 
1The inter industry relationship between domestic and imported inputs is as shown 
in Equation 4.5b. 
DIN DIN Pi ·. i Pi [ DIN DIN]-I/ DIN (4.5b) DINii = <I>ii oii DMINii + (1-oi) DDINji 
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crf1N = elasticity of substitution (sectoral) 
DIN DIN P; = the (sectoral) substitution parameter ( - 1 < P; * 0 ) 
PM; = the price of imported commodities of sector i 
PD; = the price of domestic commodities of sector i 
Indonesia has minimum wage laws that states sectoral minimum wages ( WL) are set 
with considerations of the general price index ( GP[), changes in labor productivity and 
other regulations. The GP! is defined in Equation 4.6 as a summation of the proportional 
values of sectoral consumption by household and government ( HC and GC) to their total 
consumption. 
m 
(4.6) GP!= L 
i 
(HC. + GC.) 
I I PC. 
m I 
L (HCi + GC;) 
i 
The wage laws prevent the labor market from determining wage rates freely (Thorbecke, 
1992, p.222). By setting sectoral minimum wages, the model does not assume that each 
labor is paid the same regardless of his I her skill but that the individual labor receives at 
least the minimum wages and that those who work in one industry have different minimum 
wages than what workers in the other industries may have. The minimum sectoral wages is 
shown in Equation 4.7. ( l pWL DS. (4.7) WL; = GP!( l + CPQ) awL 1 + -' 
LD; 
CPQ is a change in output prices ( PQ) represented by changes in sectoral farm food prices. 
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a WL and ~ WL are a constant and a share parameter related to changes in labor productivity. 
The productivity of labor is related to a proportion of sectoral domestic outputs to sectoral 
demand oflabor (DS I LD). Equation 4.7 is a simplification of Equation 4.7a (Thorbecke, 
1992, p.228). 
WL WL dDS ~ ( ) 
WL 
(4.7a) WLi = GPl 01 ( 1 + CPQ )rLi 1 + LD/ 
There are three different elasticities in Equation 4.7a. First, price level elasticity of the 
sectoral wages (a~L). Second, elasticity of the sectoral wages to changes in sectoral 
equilibrium prices ( afL). The elasticities are assumed as positive one. Third, elasticity of 
the sectoral wages to labor productivity ( afL). dDS I LD is an estimate for the rate of 
increase of labor productivity. 
It is assumed that the firms hire labor with profit maximization objectives. Equation 
4.8 is derived from the value added function.2 
L 
a.PN.Q. (4.S)LD. = 1 . 1 1 
I WL. 
I 
PN is sectoral net prices or per unit value added, Q is sectoral output production and a7 is 
2Each of the valued added function is specified using the Cobb Douglas (CD) 
function for deciding a composition of factor production to be used (Negash, Lee and 
Schreiner, . 1994, p.23). 
L K 
VA a; a; (4.14b) VAi = cpi LDi KDi 
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· the contribution of labor to total value added of production. 3 
Total employment (WT) is a ·summation of sectoral demand of labor and is 
responsive to changes in the relative prices of factors. This relationship is shown in Equation 
4.9; 
(4.9) LDT= I: wj 
i 
Equations 4.8 and 4.9 imply that a trade policy that simulated more labor . intensive 
production activities ma:y increase employment and outputs (Dervis, de Melo, Robinson, 
1982, p.213). 
Equilibrium for labor market happens when total supply of labor (LST) is equal to 
total demand for labor and a number of unemployed people ( UNEMP 1 ). The relationship 
is presented in Equation 4.10. 
(4.lO)LST= LWi + UNEMPJ 
i 
Magnitude of the labor supply is given so that the number of unemployment is a residual 
between the supply and total demand of labor. 
. . 
The model defines unemploym~nt rate ( UNEMP2) as a percentage ofJabor supply 
(LST) that is unemployed. This is given byEquatio~ 4.11. 
(4.11) UNEMP2 = 100 UNEMPJ 
. LST 
3The SAM provides division of labor by skills into six categories for each of the 22 
industries but with out further information on the numbers of labor in each skill category . 
. Since.this study concerns with provision of jobs in general, skill categories a:re not applied 
in the COE model. 
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Capital 
Remuneration and sectoral demand for the capital (RK and KD respectively) are 
also determined by profit maximization.4 They are shown in Equations 4.12 and 4.13. 
Sectoral payments received by the capital owners are sectoral composite value added minus 
payments to the labor divided by sectoral demand of capital (4.12). 
· (PN. VA. - WL..LD.) (4.12)RK. = . · 1 1 1 1 
I KD. 
I 
Sectoral capital demand (KD) is assumed as a constant proportion of output production. 
(4.12a) KD; = 0.09 Q; 
· · K · L We assume constant returns to scale so that a.; is 1 minus a.; . Contribution of the capital 
( a.f) is defined in Equation 4.12b. 
K L (4.12b) a.; = 1 - a.; 
Capital market is in equilibrium when total demand for capital is equal to total supply, 
of capital (KST). 
(4.13) KST = L (0.09 Q;) 
i 
Value Added Function 
The value added of production (VA) is a fixed proportion of the total outputs (Q). 
4Details on the derivation is in the calibration section, Equations 4.14b - 14f. 
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The relationship is shown in Equation 4.14. 
VA (4.14) VA; = a; Qi 
The sectoral value added is a summation of sectoral value added contributed by the 
labor and capital (see 4.14a). 
(4.14a) VA;= VAL;+ VAK; 
Sectoral value added of the labor (VAL) and sectoral value added of the capital ( 
VAK) are calculated from the amount paid to each factor ( WLand RK) times the number 
of factors employed ( LD and KD) in the production. The sectoral value added of the factors 
are reflected in Equations 4.15 and 4.16. 
(4.15) VAL;= WL; LD;f l,000,000 
(4.16) VAK; = RK; KDi / 1,000,000 
The multiplication of WLandRK has to be divided by a million because WLandRK are 
denoted in Rp. thousand while VAL is in Rp. billion. 
Capital is owned by households,. firms and government. Their respective incomes 
are assumed to be proportional to sectoral composite value added of capital. See Equations · 
4.16a to 4.16c. 
(4.16a) YKH = (akh) L VAKi 
i . 
(4.16b) YKF = (a.lif) L VAKi 
i . 
(4.16c) YKG = (a.kg) L VAKi 
i 
YKH, YKF and YKG are respective households, firms and government incomes as 
capitalist. The proportions of capital owned by the institutions are shown as· akh, a.'if and akg. 
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Household Income and Expenditure 
Household income is a summation of factor incomes and transfers from I between the 
three institutions and from rest of the world. Households receive incomes mainly from 
selling their resources as labor ( VAL)and capital I YKH (see Equation 4.16a). They also 
get transfer payments from other households (HTH), firms (FTH), government ( GTH) and 
rest of the world (ROWI'H). GTH is actually government subsidies for health and 
education. The ROWI'H is converted to rupiah when_it is included to the total household 
income (HY). 
(4.17) HY= L VALj + YKH + HTH + FTH + GTH + ER ROWI'H 
.i 
Households spend their incomes on consumer goods and services· (household total 
consumption I HCT), on saving (HS), on transfers to other households (HTH), · and on 
paying taxes ( TH). Equation 4.18a shows components of the total household expenditures 
(HEXP) and that the expenditures equal income (HY). 
(4.18a) HEXP = HCT + HS + HTH + TH = HY 
The households have to pay taxes at a certain rate and they decidetheir saving by 
considering nominal interest rates. Household disposable income (HYD} is defined in 
Equation 4.18. 
(4.18) HYD = (1 - htx) HY 
where htx is household income tax rate. 
The magnitude of transfer among households (HTH) is ussually assumed as given. 
Therefore, in the model the household total consumption expenditure (HCT) is a residual 
100 
of disposable income ( HYD) minus saving (HS) and transfer payments to other households 
(HTH). The household total consumption is shown in Equation 4.19. 
(4.19)HCT=HYD-HS-HTH 
The household total consumption can also be viewed as a summation of sectoral 
consumption demand. Sectoral share of household consumption (S/) is then used to 
calculate sectoral consumption (HC) in Equation 4.20b. 
(4.20a) HCT = L PC; HC; 
i 
S.h HCT 
(4.20b)HC; = - 1--
PC; 
Equation 4.20b is written in a different way in the program, see Equation 4.20. 
h (4.20) PC; HC;= S; HCT 
Firm Income and Expenditure 
· Companies collect revenues from various sources, but mainly from capital ( YKF I 
4.16b ). As in the household case, the companies also receive and transfer among themselves 
(FTF) and from abroad (ROWI'F). Firm income (FY) is determined in Equation 4.21. 
(4.21) FY= YKF + FTF + GTF + ER ROWI'F 
Firm's disposable income (FYD) is shown in Equation 4.22, where fix is the rate of firm 
income tax. 
(4.22) FYD = (1 - fix) FY 
The firm has to pay direct taxes ( TF), transfer to their subsidiaries or other firms 
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(FTF), households (FTH), and an interest on external debt (FDS). The latter is affected 
by interest rates in the rest of the world and the exchange rates. Equation 4.22a contents' are 
the above items of the firm expenditures (FEXP). 
(4.22a) FEXP = TF + FTF + FTH + FDS + FS 
where TF is ( 1 - fix ) FY. Equations 4.22 and 4.22a are used for determining the firm 
saving function in Equation 4.33. 
Government Accounts 
As shown in Chapter Il, cautions are needed when reading statements or statistics 
about the Indonesian economy because of certain terminology used by the government of 
Indonesia. For example, balanced budget rule is "served" but the ORI uses its own 
terminology such that it considers itself always having a balanced budget. Its statis~cs show 
that, each year, not only it borrows from the public but also uses savings and an excess of 
planned over actual budget at the end of the fiscal year (in Indonesian: sisa anggaran 
. . 
pembangunan I SAP) to show a balanced budget. In addition, there are also reserves (in 
Indonesian: cadangan anggaran pembangunan I CAD).·.. The reserves is assumes in this 
study as a certain amount ·of foreign currency used only for stabilizing the rupiah (see 
Appendix A: Table 6). The ORI has four accounts.for its expenditures and revenues, 
those are routine expenditure and routine revenue, development expenditure and 
development revenue accounts. Appendix A: Table 6 lists items in the accounts and their 
magnitudes for 1990 to 1995. Among items in the development expenditures are project I 
investment expenditures ( GJNV) and a fund reserved for stabilization of the rupiah (RESV). 
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The difference between domestic revenue and routine expenditure is recorded as government 
saving. The GRI uses this saving to finance its planned investment (see explanation for 
Equation 4.35). When the planned investment budget is larger than its saving, the GRI 
asked for loans in the CGI meeting and elsewhere as necessary. According . to this 
terminology, the budget is balanced as long as the GRI covers its total expenditures with 
the external borrowing. Therefore, the budget deficit is actually the GRI' s development 
expenditures minus its saving. Because the GRI's main creditor is the CGI, most of the 
deficits are represented by magnitude of the new loans from the CGl(IGGI loan). The loans 
are recorded in the capital account of the Indonesian balance of payments. They actually are 
also used for covering current account deficits and prevent a depletion of reserves. Foreign 
capital inflows in terms of private borrowing, direct investment and portfolio investment 
are other items used to fill the saving-investment gap. 
Government Income. The GRI has two separate accounts of its revenues, the 
government routine and development revenues. However, in order to show the importance 
of new public loans as one source of development finance such separation is not used in the 
CGE model for this study. Instead, the revenues are categorized as domestic and total 
revenues ( GDR and GR). 
The government domestic revenue ( GDR) comes from inter government transfer 
( GTG ), direct taxes paid by households and firms, indirect taxes ( TI SUM) and grant from 
other countries (ROWTG). This is reflected in Equation 4.23. 
(4.23) GDR = YKG + GTG + htx HY + ftx FY + TISUM + ER ROWTG 
An important source of government domestic revenue comes from exploration of oil by 
foreign companies which uses substantial imported inputs and capital. In reality, oil exports 
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are limited by the quota from OPEC. Oil revenue will be larger with the depreciation of the 
rupiah or increases in the world price of oil. In this model the oil revenue is assumed to be 
a part of government capital .income (YKG) and considered as a function of national 
productivity because the world prices are assumed constant. A better model should be able 
to treat the oil revenue as a function of changes in the exchange rate. Rates of taxes paid by 
households and firms are represented by htx andftx, where htx times HY and fix times FY 
· are government direct tax income from households ( TH}, and from private firms or state 
enterprises ( TF). The GRI has been reforming the tax system since 1984 and introduced the 
value added taxi~ 1985. The value added tax has. become the GRl's third most important 
sources of revenues after the revenue from oil and gas and the personal income tax. The 
GDR will increase with any increases in either the tax rates or households and firms 
incomes. Equations 4.24-26 present components of the total indirect taxes ( TIS UM), those 
are indirect taxes on domestic, exported and on imported products ( TID and TIM). 
--·-(4.24) TID; = idxi (PD; DS; + ER PWX; XSD;) 
·--(4.25) TIM; = timr; (ER PWM; MGS;) 
(4.26) TISUM = L ( TIDi + TIM;) 
i 
where idx and tmrare sectoral indirect tax rates on domestic and imported commodities 
respectively. PWM and PWX: are sectoral prices of imported and exported commodities in 
foreign currency ($). 
The government total revenue ( GR) is specified as government domestic revenue 
( GDR) plus public loans ( GDEBT}, see Equation 4.27a. 
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(4.27a) GR= GDR + GDEBT 
At least 30 percent of the total revenue comes from new loans. The model assumes the ORI 
continues its prudent macroeconomic policy to only add debt in a certain proportion of its 
saving and to use the debt for investment in infrastructure (Equation 4.31). 
Government Expenditures. The ORI applies the balanced budget rule which means 
total government expenditures ( GEXP) must equals its total revenue ( GR). This equality 
is presented in Equation 4.27b. 
(4.27b) GEXP = GDE + GRE = GR 
The ORI grouped its expenditures into two separate accounts, the government development 
expenditures ( GDE) and the government routine expenditures ( GRE). 
The routine expenditures ( GRE) are supposedly composed by items shown in 
Equation 4.27c. 
(4.27c) GRE = GTH + GTF + GTG + GCONS + ER GPRINCPL + WLG + ER GDS 
where GTH and GTF denote total government transfer to households and firms. GTH Is 
mentioned earlier when explaining Equation 4.17. The SAM data indicate that GTF is zero. 
Forty percent or more of the total revenue is allocated for servicing debts ( GPRJNCPL and 
GDS). With any large depreciation of the rupiah the portion for servicing debts will be 
higher. The government debt services ( GDS) is a payment for interest on previous 
government debts. Theoretically, the GDS is an endogenous variable, a function of total 
previous public debts, foreign interest rate as well as the exchange rate. However because 
data on public debts is not fully known, it is safer and still fit to serve the purpose of this 
study to assume that magnitude of the GDS is exogenously determined and it changes with 
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any movementin the exchange rates. The interest payment ( GDS) is an item in the routine 
expenditures as well as in the current account balance. In the simulation, GDS will be 
smaller when the GRI applies its debt reduction scheme and will increase with a depreciation 
of the rupiah. Transfer between governments ( GTG) also shows up in Equation 4.24. 
Equation 4.27c is then redefined because the SAM does not have data on the salary for 
government employees ( WLG) and payment of principal loans ( GPRINCPL ). The payment 
of principal loans is not shown in the SAM table because it is not considered a current 
account item. However to represent its magnitudes and importance in determining 
government investment, GPRINCPL will appear latter as a component of government 
development expenditures (Equation 4.29a). Equation 4.27c is rewritten as: 
( 4.27) GRE = GTH + GTF + GTG + GCT + ER GDS 
This study assumes that the government total consumption expenditures ( GCT) is actually 
a summation of material purchases ( GCONS) and the government personnel expenditures 
( WLG), see Equation 4.28. 
(4.28) GCT = WLG + GCONS 
Payment to government employees (an operating cost of government represented by WLG) 
is the next largest single item in the routine expenditures after payment on the principal of 
the debt. In its attempt to reduce spending, the GRI can continue to offer an "early pension" 
plan to its employees like it did to those in the Telecommunication department, and make 
operation cost more efficient by combining some of its departments, like it did with the 
department of industry and trade on December 6, 1995. Such policies will be represented 
by a cut in WLG. 
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It is assumed that the government has fixed share of sectoral expenditures (S/). The 
government sectoral expenditures ( GC) are shown in Equation 4.29. 
(4.29) PC; GC; = S/ GCT 
In the GRI macroeconomics policy, the usage of a certain amount of foreign currency 
to stabilize the rupiah ( RESV) is included as a part of its development expenditures ( GDE). 
(4.29a) GDE = GINV + ER GPRINCPL + L (CHS)+ RESV 
i 
Other components of the GDE are government investment expenditures (GJNV), principal 
payments on public debt ( GPRINCPL) and changes in capital stocks ( CHS).5 
It is assumed that the development expenditures equal government development 
revenues ( GDevR). 
(4.29b) GDE = GDevR 
(4.29c) GDevR =GS+ GDEBT 
Equations 4.29a to 4.29c show that the development expenditures ( GDE) is financed by the 
government saving ( GS) and external borrowing ( GDEBT) and that the new loans may be 
reserved for intervention in the foreign exchange market for supporting the value of the 
rupiah (RESV) and for government investment expenditures ( GINV). 
Government Primacy Sml)lus I Deficit. The non interest or primary surplus I deficit 
(PRIMS) is the gap between the government tax revenue and its total expenditures before 
paying the interest on public debt. The economy has a primary surplus even if the principal 
5The changes in capital stocks is defined as the difference between a summation of 
rows 8 and 9 with a summation of columns 8 and 9 of the SAM table, see Table 4.2 and 
Equation 4.29d. 
(4.29d) CHS; = DIN; + HC; + GC; + IT; + XSD; - Qr MGS; 
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payment is assumed as not yet included in the routine expenditure. Since the GRI balances 
its saving with external loans for financing its development expenditures, the surplus comes 
from the difference between tax revenues with the routine expenditure ( GRE) minus interest 
payment (GDS). This is reflected in Equation 4.30. 
(4.30) PRIMS = htx HY+ fix FY+ TISUM - ER GPRINCPL - (GRE - ER GDS) 
The government revenues from household and firm income taxes and from transactions of 
domestic, exported and imported commodities(T/SUM) are presented earlier in Equations 
4.18, 4.22 and 4.26. 
Government Debt. It is recorded in other government publications and in most 
Indonesian media that the GRI received loans from the CGI and some other institutions I 
countries in 1990, but the loan is not shown in the SAM. The magnitudes of the ROWSV 
is too small for representing total debts made by public and private because it is not much 
larger than the new debts from the CGI for that year .. The CGI's project loans requires 
rupiah financing, that is for every US$ or Yen borrowed there should be some rupiah 
available. The availability of the rupiah is shown by the government saving ( GS). 
Therefore, the magnitude of the government debt depends on its saving. Proportions of the 
local and foreign financing can be negotiated. It changed with changes in the capability of 
the GRI to accumulates saving. It was about 80 percent in the beginning of the IGGI 
formation, it was approximately 40 to 60 percent since the 1980s. The proportion was 
higher when the economy was in bad condition. The study assumes that when the economy 
in debt crisis the GRI will get CGI loans whether it signs agreement with the IMF or not. 
The study also assumes that the GRI can acquire additional debt at least 70 percent of its 
saving. Therefore, government debt for the current year ( GDEBT) is defined as a fixed 
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proportion of the government saving ( GS). 
(4.31) GDEBT = 0.7 GS 
Saving Functions 
In the Indonesian SAM, magnitudes of the savings are not based on the real data but 
on differences between revenues and expenditures. In the CGE model the household saving 
is a positive function of disposable income (HYD) and the nominal domestic interest rate 
(NIR). HYD is discussed previously, see Equation.4.18. 
(4.32) HS= a~s ~YD(l + NIR)~·] 
where a~s is elasticity of saving to interest rates and disposable income (household) and a~s a 
constant term in household saving function. Equation 4.32 shows that the HS increases 
with higher disposable income or higher interest rates. 
Corporate saving ( FS) is a residual of the firm revenue and expenditures, · as shown 
by Equation 4.33. The equation is derived from Equations 4.22 and 4.22a. 
(4.33) FS = FYD -FTF -FTH-'-FDS 
The FS is the fund available for investment, it is also called as retained earnings. 
Government saving (GS) is actually its current surplus, that is the difference between 
its total domestic revenue ( GDR) and the government routine expenditures ( GRE). 
(4.34) GS = GDR - GRE 
GS is the main fund available for government investment expenditures. It can become larger 
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only when the ORI reduces its non interest routine expenditures ( GTH, GCONS, WLG) 
or when the ORI pays less interest payment on its external debts ( GDS). 
Investment Functions 
There are two kinds of sectoral investment, sectoral investment conducted by the 
private sector (]BF) and sectoral government investment (]BG). 
The sectoral government investment (]BG) depends on the magnitude of the 
government total investment ( GINV). GINV is defined in Equation 4.35 as an endogenous 
variable influenced by the magnitude of public saving ( GS) and its ability to attract debt 
(GDEBT). 
(4.35) GINV = GS + GDEBT - ER GPRlNCPL- L (CHS) - RESV 
i 
Equation 4.35 suggests that with its limited domestic resources, the government can invest 
more only if it manages to save more or when the government does not spend its resources 
(RESV) fot covering the current account deficit. In other words, a reduction in the 
investment expenditure is more likely to happen when the government does not get enough 
debts to finance its planned investment or when the rupiah needs to be stabilized. To 
simplify the matter, this study assumes that the ORI gets loans ( GDEBT) in a fixed 
proportion of its saving, · see Equations 4.29a to 4.29c for references. The sectoral 
investment by the government (!BG) is acquired from multiplying an illustrative government 
sectoral priority S; 8 by sectoral composite prices (PC) and the government total investment 
(Thorbecke, 1992a, p.232). The relationship is shown in Equation 4.36. 
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(4.36) !BG; = S/ PCi GINV 
The investment by the firms is a function of gross domestic product ( GDP) and the 
nominal rate of interest (NIR). Formula for the investment by the firms ([BF) is shown in 
Equation 4.37. 
(4.37) /BF. = aip [ GDP l af 
1 1 ( 1 + NIR) 
where af is a slope coefficient in gross domestic product (GDP) in investment on domestic 
product function and af is a constant term in investment on domestic product function. The 
gross domestic product(GDP) is defined in Equation 4.37a as a summation of sectoral value 
added (VA), indirect taxes and trade I transportation margins on domestic and imported 
commodities( TID and TIM ). 
(4.37a) GDP.= VA.+ TID. + TIM. I I I I 
Therefore, any changes in the price of capital ( RK), sectoral wages ( WL) or tax treatment 
and the nominal interestrate (NIR) will cause changes in the investment by the firms ([BF). 
Total investment (IT) is defined as a summation of the investment by the firms and 
by the government ([BF and1BG), see Equation 4.38. 
( 4.38) !Ti = IBFi + IBGi 
Rest of the World Saving. When the economy is investing more than the resources 
it has (HS, FS, and GS), it uses some resources that belongs to other countries. Total 
investment (IT) is defined in Equation 4.38. The foreign resources are referred to as rest of 
the world saving (ROWSV) or the saving investment gap. It is depicted in Equation 4.39. 
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Equation 4.39 is also known as the saving investment balance. 
(4.39)ROWSV = LIT; - L(FS +HS+ GS) 
i 
The ROWSV is considered as the amount needed to cover the deficit in the current account 
because the economy is in equilibrium. This closure is shown in Equation 4.39a. 
(4.39a) CAB = FS + HS + GS - L /Ti 
i 
Equation 4.39a shows the fact that government policies that affect saving and investment 
decisions, such as the rates of interest, will influence the magnitude of the CAB. 
Rest of the World Accounts 
The model used for this study acknowledges four components of rest of the world 
accounts: the trade balance ( TRB), current account balance ( CAB), capital account balance 
(CA) and the official transaction account; The latter is better known as the balance of 
payments or changes in the official reserves (BOP), a summary of the rest of the world 
accounts. 
Trade Balance. Trade balance is a summation of total value of exports and imports. 
There are two variable names for imported commodities in SAM data, Table 4.2. The first 
one is for import demand (MD), the other is for imported goods and services (MGS). 
MD is a summation of all the expenditures on foreign products by different agents, those 
are imported intermediate inputs (DMIN) and consumption of imported products by 
households (HCM) and government ( GCM), plus the investment with imported commodity 
(!TM). MD is located in row 9, column total of the SAM table (Tables 4.1 atid 4.2) and is 
presented in Equation 4.40a. 
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(4.40a) MD.= DMIN. + HCM. + ITM. + GCM. 
I I I I I 
MGS is in row 12, column 9 of the SAM table. MGS is presented in the model by 
Equation 4.40 as total value of imported commodities bought from abroad. Equation 4.40 
shows that MGS is a residual of total values of commodities available for intermediate input 
(DIN), household and government consumption (HCand GC), investment (IT) and 
exports (XSD) minus the values of total commodities produced by the economy (Q). 
changes in the capital stocks ( CHS) and total indirect tax paid to the government ( Tl). 
MGS can also be shown as the, value of imports without import taxes (TIM) and trade I 
transportation margin on imported commodities (MTM) which are involvedwhen delivering 
them to the customers ( 4.40b ). Equations 4.40b shows that MGS is smaller than MD. 
(4.40b) MGSi + TIMi + MTMi = MDi 
Export supply is equal to the demand from the rest of the world for Indonesian 
products because it is assumed that the Indonesian economy is small and open. The export 
supply is referred to as XSD and shown in Equation 4.41. Equation 4.41 shows that the 
choice between domestic and rest of the world markets is based on the relative prices (PD 
and PX) in those markets and transformability in the production as specified by the elasticity 
. s 
of transformation ( ai ). 
[( 1-6~)· ( PX) 1-af (4.41) XSDi = DSi <>f I PD: 
The sectoral elasticity of transformation taken from Lee (1993, p. 7 6) and the transformation 
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parameter ( p:) is calibrated sectoral share parameter (see appendix D.2). 
Trade balance is total value of exports (XSD) minus total value of imports (MGS). 
It is shown in Equation 4.42. 
(4.42) TRB =ER~ ( PWXi XSDi - PWMi MGSi) 
I 
Current Account Balance. The current account balance ( CAB) is actually the trade 
balance minus factor payment to abroad (ROWFAC), and interest payments by the 
government ( GDS) and private debtors (FDS). 
(4.43) CAB = TRB - ROWFAC - ER GDS - ER FDS 
where ROWF AC is net factor paymentto abroad, a difference between payments to factors 
(capital) to abroad (YKTROW) with that from abroad ( YKFROW). The ROWFAC is shown 
in Equation 4.44. 
(4.44) ROWFAC = YKTROW - YKFROW 
In the SAM data, ROW receives payments for its capital ( YKTROW), and from 
interest on public and private loans (GDS and FDS) and goods and services bought by the 
Indonesians (MGS). Revenue of the rest of the world (ROWREV) is shown in Equation 
4.45a. 
(4.45a) ROWREV = YKTROW + ER GDS + ER FDS + L PWMi MGSi 
i 
Rest of the world pays for using factors ( YKFROW) and buying commodities ( XSD) from 
the Indonesian economy. Rest of the world also gives credits (ROWSV) and transfers money 
to the economy (ROWTR). 
(4.45b) ROWEXP = YKFROW + ROWTR + L PWXi XSDi + ROWSV 
i 
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The transfers (ROWI'R) are paid to the households (ROWI'H), firms (ROWI'F) and 
government (ROWI'G). They are presented in Equation 4.45. 
( 4.45) ROWI'R = ER ( ROWI'H + ROWI'F + ROWI'G ) 
Equation 4.45c shows that the rest of the world account is balanced when total revenue 
receives by the rest of the world (ROWREV) equals its expenditures (ROWEXP). 
(4.45c) ROWREV = ROWEXP 
Capital Account. The capital account is not specifically mentioned in the model. 
There are four components of the capital account. Those are new loans received by the 
private sectors (FDEBT), new loans made by the Indonesian government ( GDEBT), rest 
of the world investment ( ROW/NV) and payments of the principals of previous loans owed 
by public and private sectors (PRINCPLT). 
A deficit country needs to amortize their previous debts and to pay the principals 
(PRINCPLT) on the public as well as private loans ( GPRINCPL and FPRINCPL ). 
(4.46) PRINCPLT = ER ( GPRINCPL + FPRINCPL) 
As a debtor country, Indonesia needs foreign resources (ROWCIAIM) to cover the 
current account deficit ( CAB) and to pay for the principal of the loans (PRINCPLT). 
ROWCIAIM is defined by Equation 4.47. 
(4.47) ROWCIAIM = PRINCPLT - CAB 
Balance of Payments. The model for this study defines balance of payments (BOP) 
the overall deficit I surplus of the economy. Equation 4.48 shows BOP as a residual of a 
combination of new debts made by the government and by the private sectors ( GDEBT and 
FDEBT) with foreign (direct) investment (ROW/NV) minus the deficit in the current 
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account and payments for the principals ( ROWCLAIM). FDEBT is treated as an exogenous 
variable and ROWINV is also an exogenous variable. 
(4.48) BOP = GDEBT + FDEBT + ROWINV - ROWCLAIM 
Equation 4.48 suggests balance of payments deficit I surplus when BOP is negative I 
positive. There are two components in the official reserve: interest and non interest bearing 
assets. Among the non interest bearing assets are monetary gold, special drawing rights, 
foreign currencies and export checks. The interest bearing assets are checks, call accounts, 
time deposit and other notes. For simplicity, it is assumed in the model that all of the assets 
are non interest bearing. The BOP is needed to prevent a depletion of the reserves which 
can lead to a bankruptcy of the economy. ''The country cannot run deficits for ever because 
it will run out of foreign currencies to be depleted nor can they afford BOP surplus 
forever ... "(Dombusch and Fisher, 1994, p.166). 
The basic solution strategy used in the model is to reduce the entire model into sets 
of excess demand equations for factor and product markets. In other words the solution 
problem is to find a set of equilibrium prices. The prices are determined endogenously and 
are defined at producers' prices in order to distinguish trade and. transportation margins, 
tariffs, and indirect taxes which are included in the market prices that results in all markets 
clearing. 
Domestic prices. Domestic prices (PD) will be the standard for calculating net prices 
(PN), general price index ( GP!) and composite prices (PC). The latter is then used to 
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calculate equilibrium prices (PQ). The sectoral domestic prices are set as ones in the base 
run. 
Export Prices. The model assumes that Indonesia is an open economy and that the 
economy is too small to influence the world prices of its commodities. Therefore, the 
Indonesian economy faces the world prices of exports ( PWX) and imports ( PWM) as given. 
The GRI charges indirect taxes to domestic outputs whether they are to be sold in the 
domestic market (DS) or abroad (XSD). idx is the indirect tax rate on those commodities. 
In addition, delivery of the outputs to the final consumers includes trade and transportation 
margins for the domestic outputs (MTD). mtdr is the related margin rate on the 
commodities.6 The export prices faced by the domestic consumers are shown as PX. 
ERPWX; 
(4.49) PXi = ( · 1 ) 1 + idx1 + mtdri 
Eguilibrium Prices. The prices that equalize total demand and the availability of the 
commodities (PQ) are defined in Equation 4.50. 
PC .. (DIN. +HC. + GC. +IT.-CHs.)·+PX.XSD. -PM.M.GS. -TI. (4.50) PQ. = , , , , , , , , , . , , 
I Q. 
I 
Net Prices. Net prices (PN) are used for calculating the value added of factors of 
production, they are unit prices paid to labor and capital after the payment for intermediate 
inputs. 
DIN (4.51) PN; = PQ; - a; PC; 
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Import Prices. The GRI charges indirect taxes on· imported commodities and 
delivery of the commodities involves trade and transportation margins for the imported 
outputs (MTM). timr and mtmr are the respective rates of the import tariff and trade I 
transportation margin.7 The prices faced by the consumers (PM) are the world prices of 
imported commodities times effective rate of exchange rates ( ERE), see Equations 4.52 and 
4.52b. (4 52) PM. = ER PWM. ( 1 + timr. + mtmr.) 
' I I I I 
The effective exchange rate is "the price of foreign currency inclusive of all taxes imposed 
on its purchases" (Dervis, de Melo, Robinson, 1982, p.195). 
(4.52b) ERE;= ER ( 1 + timr; + mtmr;) 
Price of Capital Goods I Services. The price of capital goods I services ( PK) depends 
on sectoral investment by origin (IT) and the composite prices (PC). 
(4.53) PK = ~ (IT; I~ IT;) PC; 
Price of Composite Goods I Services. Composite goods and services ( QC) are 
defined as domestic and imported commodities ( 4.54a). Their prices are simply derived from 
a division of their values with their quantities (4.54b). 
(4.54a) QC; = DS; + MGS; 
( PD.DS. +PM.MGS.) ( 4.54b) PC. = 1 . 1 . 1 1 
I QC; 
fu the program PC is multiplied with degrees of freedom ( df) to equate the numbers of 
equations in the model with its related degrees of freedom so that solutions can be found. 
7 (4.52a) MTM; = mtmr; (ER PWM; MGS;). 
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. . (PD.DS. + PM.MGS.) (4.54) (dj) PC. = 1 . 1 1 1 
I . . QCj. 
Monetary Sector 
The monetary sector is included as an attempt to capture a simple interaction between 
money and the real sphere of the economy. According to Dervis, de Melo and Robinson: 
An addition of monetary behavior equations to the model has a great advantage of 
extending the field of application pf the CGE models from the analysis of problems 
of industrial strategy protection, and trade policy to problems of inflation, 
"Keynesian" imbalances between aggregate supply and demand, and short-run 
stabilization policy".(1982, p.151). 
In this model we assume that real balance which is defined as money demand divided 
. . . 
by the general price index (MOD I GPI). The demand increases with higher gross national 
product( GNP) and decreases with higher nominal interest rate (NIR). The relationship is 
shown in Equation 4.55. 
(4.55) MO~ = mm[( GNP) a~oo EXP afooNIR] 
gpz GPI. 
The re$pective magnitudes elasticities of real money balances to real income and to interest 
rate ( a.f0D and a.:0D) are 1.2711 and (-) 0.005575. The magni~de of real money balance 
multiplier (mm) is acquired from a calibration (0.0043481051). EXP is 2.7182818. 
The monetary approach to. the balance • of payment suggested that total external 
deficit, which is sometimes referred as fiscal deficit ( dNF A), is financed by changes in the 
high-powered money (dHPM) and changes in total claims on public sector, private 
enterprises and individuals (domestic credit creation I dDC). In the model, dN.FA is 
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represented by balance of payments (BOP) while dDC is exogenously determined. The 
relationship is shown in Equation 4.56a. 
(4.56a) dNFA = BOP = dHPM - dDC 
dDC is the change in the central bank's extension of domestic credit (Dornbusch and 
Fischer, 1994, p.615). For the base run data, the magnitude of dDC is simply taken from 
1989-1990 consolidated balance sheet of monetary system (BPS, 1991, p.350). As a way 
of representing an·increasing or decreasing growth of domestic credit creation, the model 
changes dDC value higher or .lower. The change in high power money ( dHPM) is 
additional money supplied for the current year. It is shown in Equation 4.56b. 
(4.56b) dHPM = MOS ~ MOSlag 
where MOS is money supply for the year and MOSlag is money supply from the previous 
year. From Equations 4.56a and b, the money supply is then represented as a function of 
changes in the domestic credit creation (dDC) and last year money supply, see Equation 
4.56. 
(4.56) MOS = MSlag + dDC - BOP 
In the equilibrium, the supply should be equal to its demand. This equilibrium is 
shown in Equation 4.57. 
(4.57) MOD = MOS 
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Rates of Inflation, Exchange and Interest 
The domestic inflation rate is defined as a percentage changes in the general price 
index ( GPI). The definition for domestic inflation rate ( DOMINF) is presented in Equation 
4.58. 
(4.58) DOMINF = (GP! - GPilag) 
. GPilag 
' 
The formula for the GP! is presented in Equation 4.6 and the GPilag is assumed as one. 
As a standard in the literature of the theory of trade, the exchange rate is defined as 
the price of U.S. dollar in rupiah (how many rupiah to get one U.S. dollar).8 The study 
assumes a fixed exchange rate economy because it is not possible to consider a "foreign 
exchange gap" or a "binding" foreign exchange constraint in a flexible exchange-rate model 
(Dervis, de Melo, Robinson, 1982, p.288). In the flexible exchange rate model foreign 
exchange always equals its supply. This study recognizes that in the Indonesian economy 
a foreign exchange shortage becomes an ''almost absolute constraint on growth in the sense 
that even if domestic savings were available in sufficient amounts to allow an increase in 
investment, the absence of the req1:1~,9" complementary foreign exchange makes such an 
increase impossible" (Dervis, de Melo, Robinson, 1982, p.288). 
The alleged foreign exchange gap is reflecting an overvalued exchange rate, in other 
words the rupiah is actually over valued in the base run. The exchange rate at the base run, 
ER(O), is indexed as one. It is assumed that the rupiah is expected to depreciate by 15 
81n the standard IMF practice, the exchange rate is defined as the dollar price of local 
currency (Dervis, de Melo, Robinson, 1982, p.184). 
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percent (expected depreciation of the rupiah = dERO = 0.15 ). The expected change in the 
price of importables d PWM is zero in the base run. The model will accommodate any 
changes in both expectations. However, the price of importables is assumed constant during 
model simulations. When there is a devaluation the expected fate of depreciation (EdER) 
will decrease, see Equations 4.59a to 4.59b.9 
(4.59a) dER = a1 (ER - LO) 
where a 1 = 1, therefore, Equation 4.59a is.rewritten as Equation 4.59. 
(4.59) dER = ER - 1.0 
(4.59b) EdER = dERO - dER 
It is assumed that the market for currency is not a perfect market because the ORI 
often intervenes directly or indirectly to influence the price of rupiah. Therefore, the model 
is based on the relative purchasing power parity where the world price of importables 
( d PWM) and expected rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate ( dER) have effects 
on domestic interest rate. The influence goes through expected rate of depreciation of the · 
real exchange rate ( dRER) that is the expected rate of real exchange rate minus the current 
real exchange rate. The decreases I increases in the world price of importable ( d PWM = 
dPWMbar) is then added to the present price of importable to form the expected changes in 
the real exchange rate (dJIBR), see Equations 4.60a and 4.60. 
9It is possible that the relationship between a devaluation and the expected rate of 
depreciation represented by a 1 is negative. That happens when government's credibility is 
low or when the devaluation is read by the public as a sign of the government's failure to 
defend its currency, therefore, stimulates more depreciation. However in this study the 
credibility is not a problem and a.1 is simply assumed as one. 
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(4.60a) dRER = a2 (d PWMi )+ a3 (dERO - dER) 
wherea2 anda3 are assumed as ones for simplicity. 
(4.60) dRER =d PWMi + (dERO - dER) 
According to the relative version of purchasing power parity, domestic real interest 
rate equals to the world rate of interest (RIRF) plus inflation from rest of the world and 
changes in the world price of importable. Assuming that the capital market is perfectly open, 
the domestic real interest rate (RIR) is foreign interest rate (RIRF) plus expected changes 
in the exchange rate (4.61a). 
(4.61a) RIR = RIRF + dRER 
The nominal interest rate ( NIR) is formed as a summation of the world interest rate 
( RIRF) with imported inflation ( dRER ), domestic inflation rates ( DOMINF) and adjusting 
nominal interest rate (NIRO). The adjusting nominal interest rate (NIRO) is a discount rate 
from the central bank to other banks. NIRO is zero at the base run. The GRI can set NIRO 
to a certain positive or negative number. 
(4.61) NIR = RIRF + dRER + DOMINF + NIRO 
Therefore, when the rupiah is over valued, an expectation of depreciation formed and as 
long as the rupiah is not devalued the domestic real rate of interest will have to increase by 
the percentage of dRER. The NIR decreases when expected rate of depreciation diminishes 
(as actual devaluation takes place). In addition, the GRI can increase the nominal rate as 
part of its monetary policy. The governor of the Bank of Indonesia sets NIRO to a certain 
positive number to make the interest rate significantly higher than the inflation rate to prevent 
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capital flight or it sets NIRO to a certain negative number when the Bank wants the interest 
rate lower in order to encourage growth. 
GNP and Growth 
Gross national product ( GNP) is defined as a summation of labor and capitalist 
incomes, those are their value a.dded (VAL and VAK) plus indirect taxes ( TID and TIM) 
after net factor payment to abroad (ROWFAC). The payment abroad is showed earlier in 
Equation 4.44. 
(4.62) GNP = L ( VALj + VAKj + TIDj + TIMj) - ROWFAC 
i ' 
The performance of the economy can be measured by the level of growth of the 
GNP, which is measured as a percentage changes in the GNP. 
(4.63) GROWTH = 100 ( GNP - GNPlag) 
GNP lag 
Calibration 
Calibration plays an important role in building the model. Most of the parameters 
in the model is calibrated with the exception of the elasticity of substitution and elasticity of 
transformation which are taken froni,Lee (1993, p.76). 
The following is step by step (b to f) calibration of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function to get the contribution of labor ( a.7) and to determine the sectoral demand of labor , 
(W). The steps are shown by Equations 4.14b to 4.14f, where U is the profit function 
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which firms are assumed to maximize. 
oQ. WL. (4.14c)--1 =·-·-1 =MPL. 
awi PN; 1 
. WL; L (4.14d)MPL.LD. = -W. = a1• Q. 
I I PN. I I 
I 
L WL.LD. (4.14e) a. = 1· 1 
I PNi Qi 
L 
a.PN.Q. 
(4.14" LD. = 1 1 1 
'.I) I WL. 
I 
The calibration forms for the CBS and CET functions are the same. Both functions 
have constant elasticity of substitution I transformation that are exogenously determined. 
The CBS functions are used in Equations 4.1, 4.3, and 4.5. The CET function is used in the 
export supply function (in Equation 4.41). 









s P;- 1 
= output sector i 
= output efficiency parameter cpf > 0 
. s 
= the share parameter O < O; < 1 
=.supply of sector i for export 
= supply of sector i for domestic sales 
= elasticity of transformation. 
s P; s = the transformation parameter ( - 1 < P; *O) 
Based on cost minimization: 
. Minimize PX.XSD. + PD.DS. 
I I I I 
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where PX; = the prices of exported commodities in domestic currency 
PD; = the prices of domestic commodities 
Solving the first order condition yields: 
DS [ ( 1-o5] ( PX ) 1-af (4.41b) __ i = -f _. _i 
XSD; 0. PD; 
I 
Equation 4.41 b shows that the proportion of outputs sold in domestic market to those sold 
in the rest of the world market i~ determined by the relative prices in those markets and 
transformability in the production as specified by the elasticity of transformation. Using the 
initial values for XSD, DS, PD, PX, and the exogenous values of the elasticity of 
transformation (or substitution, in the case of CBS function), the value of the share 
parameter (of) can be· obtained. The above equations are rearranged into Equation 4.41c. 
. 1 -of [ ( PX;) ( DS; )·] u af (4.41c) - = - --
0~ PD; XSD; 
I . 
In tum Equation 4.4 lc is utilized to calculate the shift parameter ( cpf) as shown by Equations 
4.41d to 4.4lg .. 
s s (4.41d) P; = l - 1 / a; 
(4.41.f) of = 11 (1 + of;) 
(4.41g) cpf = QJ [ of xsv( + (1-0:)vs{] i,ps 
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Model Solution 
The final steps in building the CGE model are to load data and translate the equations 
into a computer language. The benchmark year for the study for the simulations is 1990 and 
this study uses the Non Linear System (NLSYS) from GAUSS as the main software to solve 
the equations simultaneously. A solution from the model is shown in Table 4.4. It is shown 
in Table 4.4. that model solution precisely replicates the base run condition. With such a 
precision, the calibration in the model is likely to be correct and the model itself is valid and 
should be ready for some simulations. 
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TABLE4.4. 
MODEL SOLUTION FOR SELECTED ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
(Rp BILLION) 
SECTORAL DOMESTIC OUTPUT= Q Base SAM CGE 
Solution 
Sector 
!Farm food crops 28510.70 28510.696 
2Non food farm crops 7281.43 7281.4355 
3Livestock 8828.30 8828;3014 
4Forestry and hunting 3474.37 3474.3741 
5Fishery 4689.78 4689.775 
6Non metallic mineral 25310,14 25310.149 
70ther mineral 3065.43 3065.4302 
8Food, beverages and tobacco 35298.07 35298.049 
9Textile, apparel and leather 47156.23 47156.235 
lOWood and wood products, and construction 13984.44 13984.435 
1 lPaper product 20962.82 20962.821 
12Chemicals, chemical products, petroleumrefinery and basic metal 40365.52 40365.504 
13Electricity, gas and water supply 4487;62 4487.6318 
14Wholesale and retail trade, transportation support and storage . 30874.61 30874.611 
15Restaurant 12028.01 12027.991 
16Lodging 2146.18 2146.1817 
17Land transport 11017.22 .11017.223 
18Water, air transport, and communication 8892.87 8892.8794 
19Bank and Insurance 11420.34 11420.341 
20Real estate and services 9476.41 9476.417 
21Administration, defense, education, health, social services, film and 18347.00 18346.948 
recreation 
22Personal and household services 11497.83 11497.742 
TOTAL 359115.32 359115.32 
128 
TABLE 4.4 (Continued) 
SECTORAL TOTAL INVESTMENT= IT Base SAM CGE 
Solution 
Sector 
lFann food crops 186.45 186.45 
2Non food fann crops 180.15 180.15 
3Llvestock 57.85 57.85 
4Forestry and hunting 17.16 17.16 
5Fishery - 24.35 -24.3499 
6Non metallic mineral 2792.50 2792.50 
?Other mineral 51.70 51.70 
. 8Food, beverages and tobacco -5.5999 -5.5999 
9Textile, apparel and leather 35806.04 35806.044 
lOWood and wood products, and construction 153.07 153.07 
1 lPaper product 22917.45 22917.453 
12Chemicals, chemical products, petroleum refinery and basic metal 1553.69 1553.6902 
13-21Electricity and others 0.00 0.00 
22Personal and household services 1103.84 1103.8373 
TOTAL 64789.9501 64789.9547 
SECTORAL EXPORTS =XSD Base SAM CGE 
Solution 
Sector 
!Fann food crops 222.95 222.9499 
2Non food fann crops 1085.52 1085.5167 
3Livestock 32.23 32.2299 
4Forestry and hunting 91.26 91.26 
5Fishery 344.61 344.61 
6Non metallic mineral 13269.84 13269.846 
?Other mineral 79.94 79.94 
8Food, beverages and tobacco 4064.89 4064.8901 
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TABLE 4.4 (Continued) 
SECTORAL EXPORTS = XSD Base SAM CGE 
Solution 
Sector 
9Textile, apparel and leather 6621.42 6621.42 
1 OWood and wood products, and construction 5968.68 5968.6801 
1 lPaper product 1931.60 1931.60 
12Chemicals, chemical products, petroleum refinery and basic metal 15175.12 15175.113 
13Electricity, gas and water &upply 0 0 
14Wholesale and retail trade, transportation support and storage 221.59 221.5899 
15Restaurant 530.49 530.49 
16Lodging 580.49 580.4894 
17Land transport 15.37· 15.37 
18Water, air transport, and communication 872.05 872.0483 
19Bank and Insurance 1818.82 1818.82 
20Real estate and services 38.59 38.5899 
21Administration, defense, education, health, social services, film and 269.63 269.6307 
recreation 
22Personal and household services 53.56 53.5643 
TOTAL 38242.24 38242.2357 
SECTORAL IMPORTS = MGS Base SAM CGE 
Solution 
Sector 
lFarm food crops 632.82 632.8197 
2Non food farm crops 105.53 105.5296 
3Livestock 60.02 60.0199 
4Forestry and hunting 31.50 31.50 
' 
5Fishery 1.77 1.77 
6Non metallic mineral 2259.60 2259.60 
?Other mineral 307.65 307.6501 
8Food, beverages and tobacco 1302.65 1302.65 
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TABLE 4.4 (Continued) 
SECTORAL IMPORTS= MGS Base SAM CGE Solution 
Sector 
· 9Textile, apparel and leather 37.77 · 37.77 
lOWood and wood products, and construction 2599.68 2599.68 
1 lPaper product 23330.13 23330.13 
12Chemicals, chemical products, petroleum refinery and basic metal · 12317.40 12317.394 
13Electricity, gas and water supply 0.02 0.02 
14Wholesale and retail trade, transportation support and storage.· 261.62 261.6199 
15Restaurant 367.31 367.3104 
16Lodging 592.08 592.0794 
17Land transport 120.9 120.9 
18Water, air transport, and communication 1010.05 1010.048 
19Bank and Insurance 980.22 980.2199 
20Real estate and services 1175.31 1175.3091 
21Administration, defense; education, health, social services, film 1587.09 1587.0943 
and recreation 
22Personal and household services 964.61 964.6889 
TOTAL 49214.09 49214.164 
SECTORAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION= GC Base run CGE Solution 
Sector 
!Farm food crops 0.00 0.00 
2Non food farm crops 21.03 21.03 
3Livestock 0.31 0.3094 
4-8Forestry and others 0.00 · 0.00 
9Textile, apparel ·and leather 588.44 588.4414 
lOWood and wood products, and construction 87.65 87.6525 
1 lPaper product 812.082 812.0817 
12Chemicals, chemical products, petroleum refinery and basic metal 528.299 528.299 
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TABLE 4.4 (Continued) 
SECTORAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION= GC Base SAM CGE Solution 
Sector 
13Electricity, gas and water supply 179.25 179.2498 
14Wholesale and retail trade, transportation support and storage 48.64 48.64 
15Restaurant 615.60 615.5993 . 
16Lodging 355.48 355A803 
17Land transport · 149.58 149.58 
18Water, air transport, and communication 512.85 512.8509 
19Bank and Insurance 412.59' 412.59 
20Real estate and services 224.989 224.9897 
21Administration, defense, education, health, social services, film 10174.97 10174.946 
and recreation 
22Personal and household services 586.85074 586.8545 
TOTAL 15298.61074 15298.5945 
SECTORAL HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION= HC Base SAM CGE Solution 
Sector 
lFann food crops 14867.847 14922.50 
2Non food fann crops 1660.2779 1673.37 
3Livestock 4977.5468 4986.00 
4Forestry and hunting 530.012 532.39 
5Fishery 4505.6465 4507A5 
6Non metallic mineral 0.00 0.00 
?Other mineral 1.3716 1.3716 
8Food, beverages and tobacco 32998.595 32998.579 
9Textile, apparel and leather 435.3105 435.3104 
lOWood and wood products, and construction 5268.22 5268.2236 
1 lPaper product 6165.2943 6165.2991 
12Chemicals, chemical products, petroleum refinery and basic metal 6838.934 6838.934 
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TABLE 4.4 (Continued) 
SECTORAL HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION= HC Base SAM CGE 
Solution 
Sector 
13Electricity, gas and water supply 1361.91 1361.8794 
14Wholesale and retail trade, transportation support and storage 185.33 185.33 
15Restaurant 10440.26 10440264 
16Lodging 1130.56 1130.5606 
17Land transport 3521.81 3521.8029 
18Water, air transport, and communication 3577.40 3577.3586 
19Bank and Insurance 4705.32 4705.3171 
20Real estate and services 6144.348 6144.352 
21Administration, defense, education, health, social services, film and 8880.5284 8880.5283 
recreation 
22Personal and household services 6542.6704 6542.7859 




This chapter presents the results of policy simulations using the CGE model. There 
are three parts of the chapter. The first part introduces variables defined as targets or 
,• -
instruments related to the simulated policies. The policies are (l)devaluation of the rupiah, 
(2) liberalization of trade, (3) austerity, ( 4) standard reform policy, and (5) strategic reform 
poli~yi The second part is divided into five subsections, each of the section reports impacts 
J • 
of a certain policy and discusses the target and instrument variables for the policy. The last 
part of the chapter provides conclusions regarding the strategic reform policy compared to 
the standard one. 
Target and Instrument Variables 
' ' 
Target Variables 
In this study, target variables are defined as variables that are used to measured the 
effects of a simulated policy. There are eleven (11) target variables: (1) trade balance 
(TRB). (2) current account balance (CAB), (3) rest of the world's claim (ROWCLAIM), 
(4) balance of payments (BOP), (5) demand for money (MOD), (6) government primary 
. surplus (PRIMS), (7) government investment (GINV), (8) domestic inflation rates 
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(DOMINF), (9) nominal interest rates (NIR), (10) unemployment (UNEMPl), and (11) 
gross national product (GNP).1 Their magnitudes are shown in Table 5.1 and each of the 
variables is explained below in order. 
Four of the target variables are closely related to each other. First, trade balance 
(TRB) is total value of exports minus total value of imports. It is affected by domestic prices 
of export and import commodities which in tum are influenced by the exchange rate (see 
Equation 4.42 in Chapter IV). The economy has a trade surplus of Rp4,242.92 billion.2 
Second, current account balance (CAB) is the trade balance plus total interest payments 
from the government and the private sectors (see Equation 4.43). The deficit in the current 
account is Rp9,046.49 billion. Changes in the current account do not always move in the 
same direction as changes in the trade balance. For example, · a devaluation increases the 
trade surplus but also increases total interest to be paid on foreign debt. If increases in the 
interest payment are larger than the increases in the trade surplus then the deficit in the 
current account increases instead of getting smaller. Third, rest of the world's claim 
(ROWCLAIM) is the accumulation or total assets owned by the rest of the world for 
exporting commodities and lending money to Indonesians. The restofthe world's claim is 
much larger than the deficit in the current account because ROW CLAIM is the deficit in the 
current account plus total principal payments (see Equation 4.47). Fourth, balance of 
payments (BOP) is not the same as the magnitude of the current account balance. The 
payments is a summation of current account balance and capital account, which is the same 
1TRB is written as TRB in Chapter IV. 
2The magnitude in the base run does not reflect perfectly the magnitudes stated in 
Chapter II because data used for the CGE model in this study is Indonesian 1990 .SAM. 
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as the rest of the world's claim plus incoming capital (refer to Equation 4.48), The model 
assumes incoming capital as well as interest and principal payments are fixed but are 
influenced by the exchange rate. The rest of the world's claim and the deficit in the balance 
of payments are presented to show the burden of the economy due to previous debts made 
by the public as well as by the private sectors. The rest of the world's claim shows 
dependence of the economy to the rest of the world because the economy is balanced only 
when the rest of the world's claim is covered by incoming capital from abroad. The rest of 
the world's claim is 7 times the trade surplus. Such a huge rest of the world's claim 
indicates also the importance of the Indonesian economy to its trading partners' economies. 
The Indonesians have to send more.than 10 percent of their GNP abroad. The economy can· 
not afford to have a severe recession, with zero or less than four percent growth rate. The 
study predicts that the other economies whose claims need to be paid will feel the negative 
effect of the recession experienced by the Indonesian economy. 
Demand for money (MOD) is another target variable, especially in the standard 
policy where the objective is to have a certain growth of money to slow down inflation. 
Money demand is a positive function of gross national product and the general price index. 
The· model . assumes equilibrium exists in the monetary sector so that demand for money 
equals the supply of money. The latter is derived from supply of money from the previous 
year plus changes in domestic credit creation (dDC) and the balance of payments (see 
Equation 4.55). Therefore, the demand for money is expected to increase with increases in 
domestic credit creation, balance of payment deficits, domestic inflation rates, and gross 
national product. 
Two other target variables are related to government expenditures. These are 
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government primary surplus (PRIMS) and government investment (GINV). The 
government primary surplus is a residual of total government routine revenue minus total 
government expenditures excluding the interest payment (see Equation 4.30). Sources of the 
routine revenues are direct and indirect taxes, such as income taxes paid by households and 
firms and indirect taxes on domestic and imported commodities. Among various routine 
expenditures are government purchases of materials (GCONS) and personnel expenditures 
(WLG) as well as subsidies for health and education (GTH). It is important to note that the 
economy has a primary surplus and the formula for determining the primary surplus already 
covered the principal payment.3 The government investment is total government revenue 
available for investment after including new loans as additional source of revenue. The 
government investment can be seen as a growth opportunity provided by the government. 
The investment fund falls when the government has to pay a higher principal payment or 
when the government needs to spend more money (RESV) to sterilize the economy (see 
Equation 4.35). The sterilization cost is larger when there is larger incoming capital, which 
in this model is assumed to be constant. 
Two other target variables are the domestic inflation rate (DOMINF) and the nominal 
interest rate (NIR). In Equation4.58 domestic inflation rate is defined as percentage changes 
in the general price index, while the nominal interest rate is defined in Equation 4.61. as 
nominal foreign interest rate plus domestic inflation and adjusting nominal interest rate 
(NIRO). 
The rest of the target variables are the number of unemployment (UNEMPl) and 
3It is important because usually the standard policy is suggested for countries with 
primary deficit. 
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gross national product (GNP). The unemployment is a different between total supply with 
total demand of labor (Equation 4.10). The gross national product is a summation of total 
value added and total indirect taxes. The number of unemployment and gross national 
product are likely to go in an opposite direction. An increase in the gross national product 
may come from more usage of labor and capital or more activity which.can be taxed (see 
Equation 4.62). Another variable that influences the gross national product is factor payment · 
to abroad which increases with an increased exchange rate. 
Instrument Variables 
Instrument variables are controllable variables that are used for influencing the target 
variables. The variables are controllable because their magnitudes are determined by the 
policy maker (government). There are eleven instrument variables: (1) government 
purchases of materials (GCONS), (2) government subsidy for health and education (GTH), 
(3) government personnel expenditures (WLG), (4) government interest payment I debt 
services (GDS), (5 and 6) tax rates on household income and on firm income (htx and ftx), 
(7 and 8) sectoral indirect tax rates on domestic and on imported commodities (idx and timr), 
(9) adjusting nominal interest rates (NIRO), (10) exchange rate (ER), and (11) changes in 
credit creation (dDC). Some instruments such as the exchange rate and indirect tax rates 
have direct or indirect impacts on most of the target variables, while others only have 
impacts on a few targets. One of the policy simulated ( devaluation of the rupiah) uses only 
one instrument while the other four policies use two or more of the instruments. The 
magnitudes of the instrument variables are shown in Table 5.1. Each of the instruments will 
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be explained below. 
Four of the instruments are components of government expenditures, those are 
government purchases of materials, government subsidies for health and education, 
government personnel expenditures (salary and wages for government employees), and 
government interest payment. These four variables have direct negative impacts on the 
government primary surplus I deficit (PRIMS) and on the government investment 
expenditures (GINV). Reduction of government interest payment is only implemented in the 
strategic policy when the government prefers to reduce the payment instead of taking larger 
loans with higher obligations because the economy faces the crisis. 
Four other instrument variables have positive relationships with government income. 
These are tax rates on household and firm income (htx and ftx), sectoral indirect tax rate on 
domestic commodities (idx), and sectoral indirect tax rate on imported commodities (timr). 
Increases in household and firm income tax rates (htx and ftx) are actualized in the austerity 
and standard policies to compensate reduction in government revenue after the government 
decreases indirect tax rates on domestic and imported commodities in its attempt to liberalize 
the economy. In the strategic policy, the government does not increase the tax rates when 
the economy faces recession. The government helps the economy with its strategic policy 
to avoid prolonged recession so that it can expects larger tax incomes from more survived 
firms. 
The adjusting nominal interest rate (NIRO) is set by the government in order to 
influence capital flows. The adjusting rate affects the nominal interest rate for saving and 
investment. In a crisis or pre crisis situation the IMF usually asks the debtor country to 
increase the nominal interest rate in order to prevent large capital flight out of the country 
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and to prevent further depreciation of its currency.4 In this study NIRO is set as zero at the 
base run. It is changed to positive 0.02 percent in the standard policy and to negative 0:02 
percent in the strategic policy. The 0.02 percent is used because the study assumes the next 
crisis happens when the rupiah devalues by at least 25 percent and there will be at least 0.5 
percent additional reduction or increases in the nominal interest rate for every 25 percent 
devaluation of the rupiah .. The strategic policy is based on the assumption that high interest 
rate can not prevent capital outflow but it will only endanger the survival of many of 
previously healthy firms. The death of those firms will cause heavy unemployment and will 
need strong government sector ~o lead the economy later on. Those two conditions are to be 
avoided especially since it is not possible to expect a strong government when its maneuver 
ability is already weakened by its external debt obligation. 
The other two instruments are the changes in domestic credit creation (dDC) and 
exchange rate (ER). In the base run, the domestic credit is reduced by Rp2,570 billion from 
its previous magnitude, therefore, an increase of credit (monetary expansion) is represented 
with smaller number following the negative sign (-2,560). As mentioned earlier, the ER 
has impacts on most.of the target variables because it affects sectoral domesti.c prices of 
imported and exported commodities, on the magnitudes of interest and principal payments 
with their related impacts on the external accounts (trade and current account balances, rest 
4A recent example of the usage of the significantly higher than inflation: nominal 
interest rate is in the present debt crisis experiencing by the Indonesian economy. During 
March - July 1998, nominal interest rate in Indonesia was set around 55 percent and the 
highest rate reached was 67 percent Such a high rate made a huge additional public and 
private banks' debts to domestic savers and prevented potential invertors from.taking new. 
loans. Even if such a high rate could prevent more capital flight, the high interest rate also 
contributed to more severe recession because more people chose to save than to use their 
money for productive activity. 
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of the world's claim and balance of payments), and on factor payment to abroad 
(ROWFAC). The latter is a component in calculating gross national product. 
TABLE5.1 
TARGET AND INSTRUMENT VARIABLES IN THE BASE RUN 
Target variable Reference* Magnitude Instrument variable Magnitude 
Trade balance (TRB) 4.42 3,242.92B Government purchases of 7,400.71B 
materials (GCONS) 
Current account balance 4.43 (9,026.49)B Government subsidy for 5,723.37B 
(CAB) health and education 
(GTH) 
Rest of the world's Assets 4.47 26,447 .859B Government personnel 8,102B 
(ROW CLAIM) expenditures (WLG) 
Balance of payments 4.48 (6,275)B Government debt services 4,555B 
(BOP) (GDS) 
Demand of money (MOD) 4.55 23,819B }lousehold income tax 1.2% 
rate (htx) 
Primary surplus (PRIMS) 4.30 3,016.972B Firm income tax rate (ftx) 42%. 
Government investment 4.35 13,791.7B Sectoral indirect tax rate Appendix 
(GINV) on domestic commodities E: Table 1 
(idx) 
Domestic inflation rate 4.58 2% Sectoral indirect. tax rate Appendix 
(DOMINF) on imported commodities E: Table 1 
(timr) 
Nominal interest rate 4.61 26% Adjusting nominal 0.0 
(NIR) interest rate (NIRO) 
Unemployment 4.10 4,579,658.3 Changes in domestic (2,570)B 
(UNEMPl) credit creation ( dDC) 
Gross natl. product (GNP) 4.62 201,250.619B Exchange rate (ER) 1.1 
Note: 
B = Billion Rp. 
* = Equation number in Chapter IV 
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Simulations 
The CGE model explained in Chapter fourth is used for conducting five simulations. 
The simulated policies are (1) devaluation of the rupiah, (2) liberalization of trade, {3) 
implementation of austerity policy, ( 4 and 5) standard reform and strategic reform policies. 
The first simulation shows how certain· variable influences the rest .of the variables in the 
model. The oth~r four simulations show impacts of simultaneous changes in some variables 
to the economy. The impacts are seen by comparing results of one simulation with condition 
in the base run and with results from simulations of the other policies. Simulations four and 
five are done with one percent increase in the indexed exchange rate (ER=l.01). The study 
does not mean to tell that a crisis happens when the rupiah depreciates by one percent. As 
mentioned earlier~ the study assumes when a crisis is fully developed the exch~nge rate will 
increase by at least 25percent. A study by Thorbecke and his team uses ER=l.20 (1982a). 
However, the ER=l.01 is used to enable us to see more· clearly the basic component as well 
as the basic impacts of each of the policy for every percentage changes in the exchange rate. 
In other words, we can multiply the chartges from the simulations by 25 times to see the 
impacts ofER=l.25 (with the relevant elasticities). 
The following sections discuss the simulation results and various instruments used 
and targets affected in each of the simulations. The presentation of the policy is helped by 
a table that shows magnitudes and direction of changes in the target and instrument variables. 
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Devaluation of the Rupiah 
There are four important reasons to simulate a devaluation of the rupiah. First, it is 
very likely that the rupiah is currently overvalued. Such conclusion is taken from the fact 
that economy has always been experiencing current account·deficits since 1966 (except in 
three years). Second, as they are preparing their economies to reap benefit from the AFT A, 
it is possible that the AFTA member countries will devalue their.currencies, such·as done 
by the Republic of China in 1994. Third, or more importantly, depreciation will happen 
naturally whenever there is art external shock to the Indonesian economy. Fourth, devaluing 
the domestic currency is one of the IMF standard policies. The devaluation is also a 
component in the strategic reform policy. 
We simulate a devaluation by changing exchange rate (ER) from 1.0 in the base run 
to a higher indexed number. When ER is 1.01 or higher, on one hand imported prices in 
rupiah (PM) are higher because more rupiahs are needed to get one U.S. dollar, on the other 
hand exported prices in rupiah (PX) are also higher because exporters acquire more rupiah 
from the same amount of dollars.5 It is expected that a devaluation will bring higher surplus 
in the trade balance because sectoral imports ·(MOS) are lower while sectoral exports 
increase. For this study, several simulations are conducted to see impacts of one to five 
5There are 22 sectors in the model: (1) farm food crops; (2) non farm food crops; 
(3) livestock; (4) forestry and hunting; (5) fishery; (6) non metallic mineral; (7) other 
mineral; (8) food beverages and tobacco; (9) textile, apparel and leather; (10) wood and 
wood products, and construction; (11) paper product; (12) chemicals, chemical products, 
petroleum refinery, and basic metal; (13) electricity, gas and water supply; (14) wholesale 
and retail trade, transportation support and storage; (15) restaurant; (16) lodging; (17) land 
transport; (18) water, air transport, and communication; (19) bank and insurance; (20) real 
estate and household service; (21) administration, defense, education, health, social 
services, film and recreation; (22) personal and household services. 
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percent devaluation (ER=l.01 to ER=l.05). Results from simulating five percent 
devaluation are presented in Table 5.2. Details of the results are discussed below. 
As expected effect of the devaluation on trade balance is positive. Table 5.2 shows 
that the devaluation increases trade surplus significantly (71.3 percent) and decreases current 
account deficit by 21 percent. Devaluation also has an impa,ctthat changes the sectoral 
demand of commodities from abroad as well as the sectoral supply of commodities to abroad. 
The changes are presented in Appendix E: Table 2. 
The devaluation has positive effects on inflation (DOMINF). The inflation rate 
increased by 39 percent. Increased inflation rate happens when there are positive changes 
in the general price index (GPI)~ Increase<i price index is caused by raising sectoral prices 
of composite goods I services (PC). The chain effects can be summarized in two steps. 
First, equilibrium prices increased because post devaluation's increases in sectoral exports 
(XSD) and sectoral export prices in rupiah (PX) are higher than the increase in sectoral 
rupiah import prices (PM) times the sectoral imports of goods and services, and because the 
new sectoral output production (Q) is lower.6 Second, sectoral composite prices (PC) 
increases because the summation of the value of domestic sales with the value of imported 
commodities divided by the new amount of the composites (DS + MOS) is higher. That 
happens because lower sectoral imports of goods and services reduces. sectoral domestic sales 
(DS) which, therefore, .. reduces the sectoral composite goods I services, but increased 
sectoral import prices increases the ratio of outputs sold in the domestic market to goods and 
6Lower sectoral demand for labor causes lower sectoral production, see explanation 
of the impacts of devaluation on employment level. 
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services imported. 7 
Another effect of the devaluation is on employment level (UNEMPLl ). It increased 
by 31.1 percent. Higher general prices bring about higher sectoral wages which in turn 
reduces sectoral demand for labor (LD). However, interestingly, total demand for labor 
(LDT) is higher. Higher total demand for labor happens because there is a very high 
increases in the demand for labor for personal and household services (sector 22). This effect 
deserves special attention because it is found also in the four other simulated devaluation 
(ER=l.02 to ER=l.05). One possible reason is that with the devaluation of the rupiah 
domestic sales is very low but there are more people (from the rest of the world) who can 
afford to buy the services of the Indonesians in the personal and household sector. 
Other effects of the devaluation are decreases in government revenue and primary 
surplus because changes in additional indirect tax revenue from more export activity is less 
than the contraction of import tax revenue (TIM) following lower sectoral imports. As a 
consequence, the government has less ability to acquire new debts and finance its planned 
investment. The government primary surplus (PRIMS) and investment (GINV) decreased 
by 34.9 and 10.2 percent correspondingly. 
The above results can be seen in Table 5.2. In shorts, results shown in the table 
indicate that a devaluation will improve the external and internal balances. However, as 
shown by a higher domestic inflation rate (DOMINF) in Table 5.2, the devaluation also 
brings about an increased inflation rate. The balance of payments, current account and trade 
7The ratio of sectoral domestic sales I sectoral imports of commodities (DS I MGS) 
increases with increased sectoral import prices (PM), see Equation 4.3. Decreased MGS 
times increased prices of imported commodities (PM) plus multiplication of prices of 
domestic commodities (PD) and DS causes sectoral prices of composite goods I services 
(PC) to increase (Equation 4.54b ). 
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Figure 5.1. Balance of Payments, Current Account and Trade Balances 
in the Base Run and After the Devaluation 
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TABLE 5.2 
RESULTS OF A FIVE PERCENT DEVALUATION OF 'I'HE RUPIAH 
Target variable New Direction Instrument New Direction 
magnitude of change variable magnitude of change 
(% change) 
. 
Trade balance 5,555.61B Increase Government NON Constant 
(TRB) (71.3) purchases of materials 
(GCONS) 
Current account (7,127.06)B Decrease Government subsidy NON Constant 
balance (CAB) (21) for health and 
education (GTH) 
Rest of the world's 2,5419.49B Decrease Government NON Constant 
Assets (3.9) personnel 
(ROW CLAIM) expenditures (WLG) 
Balance of (5,907.54)B Decrease Government debt NON Constant 
payments (BOP) (5.9) services (GDS) 
Demand of money 23,451.54B Decrease Household income tax NON Constant 
(MOD) (1.5) rate (htx) 
Primary surplus l,963.76B Decrease Firm income tax rate NON Constant 
(PRIMS) (34.9) (ftx) 
Government 12,380.72B Decrease Sectoral indirect tax NON Constant 
investment (GINV) (10.2) rate on domestic 
commodities (idx) · 
Domestic inflation 2.78% Increase Sectoral indirect tax NON Constant 
rate (DOMINF) (39) rate on imported 
commodities (timr) 
Nominal interest 21.78% Decrease Adjusting nominal NON Constant 
rate (NIR) (16.2) interest rate (NIRO) 
Unemployment 3,156,360.8 Decrease Changes in domestic NON Constant 
(UNEMPl) (31.1) credit creation (dDC) 
Gross natl. product 199,093.14B Increase Exchange rate (ER) 1.05 Increase 
(GNP) (1.1) 
. . .. Note: B = Billion Rp. NON= the magmtude 1s the same hke 1t 1s m the.base run (no changes) 
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Liberalization of Trade 
It is important to simulate a liberalization of the ecoriomy because as ari AFT A 
member the government of Indonesia has to follow the AFT A's liberalization schedules, and 
because liberalization is another basic component of the standard reform policy. · 
Instruments for the liberalization policy are indirect tax rates on domestic and 
imported commodities (idx ~d timr). Based on the SAM data, import tax rates are very 
low. Most of them are even less than 1 percent and they are lower than the rates suggested 
by the AFTA schedules, see Appendix E: Table 1. In the simulation, the initial rate are 
brought even lower to see the impact of such changes on the government budget. The new 
rates are presemed in Appendix E: Table 1. With the liberalization, 10 sectors are 
completely liberalized and only 5 other sectors have import tax rates higher than 2 percent. 
Those sectors are farm food crops (2.5 percent), textile (3.5 percent), wood and wood 
product (8.7 percent), paper product (9.4 percent) and chemical sectors (4.67 percent). 
Appendix E: Table 1 presents the tax rates after and before the liberalization. The effects of 
· the liberalization are presented in Table 5.3. 
Liberalization of trade has a direct effect on government domestic revenue (GOR). 
The revenue is composed of.direct and indirect tax incomes. The indirect tax revenue will 
decrease when the government reduces the indirect ax rates and there is no compensating 
increases in the taxable amounts of goods I services. Since the government receives less 
income from liberalizing trade, there is fewer resources for its primary surplus (PRIMS). 
The government investment (GINV) is lower than it is the base run. 
Liberalization of trade has direct effects on export and import prices in rupiah (PX 
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and PM). The sectoral export prices (PX) are supposed to be higher while the sectoral 
import prices (PM) are supposed to be lower with less indirect taxes. 8 However, those 
effects are partly lessened by the fact that those prices are also influenced by trade and 
transportation margins on the related exported or imported commodities (mtdr or mtmr). 
As the results, the export prices increase in 14 sectors, stay the same in the other 6 sectors 
and decrease in the remaining 2 sectors while the import prices are lower only in 10 sectors 
but stay the same in the other 12 sectors. Since exports are higher and imports are lower in 
many sectors, the economy has a slightly higher trade surplus (0.03 percent). Ceteris 
paribUs, the increasecl. surplus of the trade balance elevates current account deficit by 0.003 
percent and reduces the overall external burden (ROWCLAIM) by 0.001 percent. 
Among the indirect effects of the liberalization of trade is an improvement in the 
employment level (UNEMPL decreases). The effects of liberalizati,on on export and import 
prices, which are explained earlier, bring mixed consequences on sectoral equilibrium 
prices (PQ) and on sectoral composite prices (PC). The consequences are higher sectoral 
equilibrium prices in 11 sectors and higher sectoral composite prices in 12 sectors, but both 
prices are lower than they were in the base run for the rest of the economy. In short, the new 
sectoral PC deflates the general price index which then cuts.the sectoral.wages (WL) and 
increases the sectoral demand for labor (LD) in 18 sectors.9 The new sectoral demand for 
8From Equations· 4.49 and · 4.52: PX. = ER PWX. / ( 1 + idx. + mtdr.); and 
I I. I I 
PMi = ER PWMi ( 1 + timri + mtmri)where PXi and PMi are sectoral export and import 
prices in rupiah; PWXi and PWMi are sectoral world prices of exports in dollar, ER is 
exchange rate; idxi and timri are indirect tax rates, and mtdri and mtmri are trade and 
transportation margins on the related exported and or imported commodities. 
9The sectoral demand for labor decreases in the following sectors: (1) electricity, gas 
and water supply; (2) land transport; (3) water, air transport, and communication; and (4) 
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labor causes higher total demand for labor (LDT). 
The deflationary effects of the liberalization which decreases the domestic inflation 
and nominal interest rates (DOMINF and NIR) do not curtails the demand for money because 
the liberalization is followed by an increase in gross national product (GNP). The increase 
in the GNP happens because higher number of employment increased value added (VAL) 
and because of the additional value added is larger than the reduction in the indirect tax 
revenue.10 
Table 5.3 shows that overall the liberalization causes increases in trade surplus, 
employment, the demand for money,.and in the gross national product (GNP). The table 
also presents decreases in the external burden (ROW CLAIM), inflation and nominal interest 
rates (DOMINF and NIR). However, percentage changes in. those target variables are very 
small. Changes in the unemployment level (0.24 percent) and in the inflation and nominal 
interest rates (0.25 and 0.38 percent) are much more significant compared to changes of the 
other targets. 
bank and insurance. Those sectors are the ones that recently welcome foreign workers the 
most compared to other sectors in the Indonesian economy. 
10Gross national product is a summation of the sectoral value added of labor and 




RESULTS OF LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE 
Target New Direction Instrument New Direction 
variable magnitude of change . variable magnitude of change 
(% change) 
Trade balance (TRB) 3,244.04B Increase Government NON Constant 
(0.03) purchases of 
materials (GCONS) 
Current account (9,026.2)B Decrease Government subsidy NON Constant 
balance (CAB) (0.003). for health and 
education (GTII) 
Rest of the world's 26,447.57B Decrease Government NON Constant 
Assets (0.001) personnel 
(ROWCLAIM) expenditures (WLG) 
Balance of payments (6,276.9)B Increase Government debt NON Constant 
(BOP) (0.03) ' services (GDS) 
Demand of money 23,820.9B Increase Household income NON Constant 
(MOD) (0.008) tax rate (htx) .· 
Primary surplus 3,0l3.69B Decrease Firm income tax rate NON Constant 
(PRIMS) (0.1) (ftx) 
Government 13,786.0lB Decrease Sectoral indirect tax Appendix Decrease 
investment (GINV) (0.04) rate on domestic E: Table 
commodities (idx) 1. 
Domestic inflation 1.995% Decrease Sectoral indirect tax Appendix Decrease 
rate (DOMINF) (0.25) rate on imported E: Table 
commodities (timr) 1. 
Nominal interest rate 25.99% Decrease Adjusting nominal NON Constant 
(NIR) (0.38) interest rate (NIRO) 
Unemployment 4,568,628.3 Decrease Changes in domestic NON Constant 
(UNEMPl) (0.24) credit creation (dDC) 




An austerity policy which includes fiscal and monetary restraints is designed to 
improve the current account balance. The austerity policy is the main component of the 
standard policy. 
Instruments for this simulation are government personnel expenditures (WLG), 
government purchases of material (GCONS), income tax rates (htx and ftx) and changes in 
domestic credit creation (dDC). The expenditures are reduced and tax rates are increased to 
alleviate deficits in the current account and government budgets. 
Magnitude changes in the instruments for the austerity and standard policies are 
determined with the following considerations. First, it is assumed that there is going to be 
25 percent or more depreciation of the rupiah when the crisis develops. The exchange rate 
is not an instrument of the standard policy but the changes of the other instruments are 
assigned for each percentage of the depreciation. Second, Rp 10 billion change in the credit 
emission is based on the statistics published by the GRI which stated there was Rp251 billion 
change after 1983 devaluation (BPS, 1992, p.365). For convenience, in the study domestic 
credit creation is changed by RplO billion higher than it is in the base run instead of by 
Rpl0.04 billion. Third, changes in the magnitudes of government expenditures are based 
on the fact that every year the GRI took new debts from the IGGI which at least Rp200 
billion larger than the loan taken a year before (BPS, 1995, p.452). In anticipation of the 
next crisis, it is expected that the new loan will be at least Rp625 billion more than it was 
the year before the crisis, arbitrarily three times of the usual additional loans for every 25 
percent changes in the value of the rupiah. Therefore, total changes in government revenues 
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and expenditures should be at least Rp25 billion for every percentage changes in the value 
of the rupiah. Fourth, the Rp25 . billion is allocated to various government accounts 
according to the likely "cut" priority of the IMF. With such priority, the reduction in the 
government subsidies for health and education (GTH) is larger than the reduction in the 
government material purchases (GCONS) and in the government personnel expenditures 
(WLG). The reduction in the expenditures is accompanied by a small percentage increases 
in household and firm income tax rates.11 Results of the simulation is shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 shows that with its fiscal and monetary restraints, the government saves 
more (PRIMS increases) and its ability to create growth (GINV) is higher. The primary 
surplus and the government total investment increases by 7 .82 and 2.94 percent respectively. 
Table 5.4 also shows that contrary to what we expected, the austerity policy causes 
a significantly lower trade surplus and a higher current account deficit than they are in the 
base run. Changes in those variables (5.89 and 2.3 percent) are slightly smaller when there 
is no monetary restraint, however they are still in the direction that is not expected. One 
possible cause of the reduction in the trade surplus is from a combined effects of decreased 
firms' and household disposable incomes to increased unemployment which then together 
decreases spending by the private sector. The households and firms have less disposable 
incomes after the government increases the rates of their income taxes. The unemployment 
number increased by 3.2 percent. Larger unemployment numbers is partly caused by 
increases in the composite prices. Thirteen sectors experience higher composite prices which 
11It is arbitrarily assumes that the increased tax rates will have Rpl to 2 billion 
positive impact on government income, therefore, the GRlcan plan Rp26 billion expense 
curtailment (higher public expenditure cut than in the strategic policy). 
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then have negative impacts on total demand for labor. Therefore, the austerity policies are 
detrimental to the external and internal balances. 
With exchange rate constant changes in the current account, rest of the world's claim 
and balance of payments are directly related to changes in the trade balance. 
TABLE 5.4 
RESULTS OF AUSTERITY POLICY 
Target New Direction Instrument New Direction 
variable magnitude of change variable magnitude of change 
(%change) 
Trade balance 3,052:04B Decrease Ciovernmentpurchases 7,389B Decrease 
(TRB) (5.89) of materials (OCONS) 
Current account (9,234.6)B Increase Ciovernment subsidy 5,710B Decrease 
balance (CAB) (2.3) for health and 
education (CiTH) 
Rest of the world's 26,655.96B Increase . Ciovernment personnel 8,099B Decrease 
Assets (0.79) expenditures (WLCi) 
(ROW CLAIM) 
Balance of (6,315.86)B Increase Ciovernment debt NON Constant 
payments (BOP) (0.65) services (CiDS) 
Demand of money 23,849.86B Increase Household income tax 1.3% Increase 
(MOD) (0.13) rate (htx) 
Primary surplus 3,252.8B Increase Firm income tax rate 42.5% Increase 
(PRIMS) (7.82) (ftx) 
Ciovernment 14,197.72B Increase Sectoral indirect tax NON Constant 
investment (2.94) rate on domestic 
(CilNV) commodities (idx) 
Domestic inflation 1.98% Decrease Sectoral indirect tax NON Constant 
rate (DOMINF) (1) rate on imported 
commodities (tirnr) 
Nominal interest 25.98% Decrease Adjusting nominal 0.0 Constant 
rate(NIR) (0.08) interest rate (NIRO) 
Unemployment 4725,981.1 Increase Changes in domestic (2,580)B Decrease 
(UNEMPl) (3.2) credit creation ( dDC) 




The standard policy is basically tightened fiscal and monetary policies to increase 
more revenue for servicing the debts. It is an austerity policy which is accompanied by 
devaluation of the rupiah, liberalization of trade and increases in the adjusting nominal 
interest rate (as well as large borrowing). The standard policy is aimed at decreasing the 
current account deficit and influencing the decision for saving and investment. 
The instruments for the standard policy are the same with those used for the austerity 
policy with additions of increases in the exchange rate, decreases in the indirect tax rates and 
in~rease adjusting nominal interest rate. The formula for nominal interest rate (NIR) in this 
study allows us to makethe NIR significantly higher than inflation rate, that is by changing 
NIRO from zero to a number considered relevant. It is assumed that th~ GRI may increase 
the nominal interest rate by 0.5 percent for every 25 percentage changes in the rupiah's value 
to prevent more capital flight. 12 For the standard policy simulations, the adjusting nominal 
interest rate is changed to 0.02 such that the nominal interest rate increases by 0.5 percent for 
every 25 percentage changes in the rupiah's value. The standard policy simulated here is 
only one of some possible combination of various instrument usually used in the IMF 
standard policy. Changes in magnitudes of the other instruments are assigned the same way 
as we assigned those assigned for the previous three policies. 13 
12However, as explained in Chapter N, the study also acknowledges that the initial 
and considered normal expected rate of depreciation (dER) is 15 percent. Such expectation 
is shown in the CGE model by differences in the nominal interest rate in Indonesia (NIR) is 
· 24 percent while the real interest rate abroad (RIRF) is 9 percent. 
13The changes are assigned for every one percentage changes in the exchange rate; 
are done like they are in the austerity policy; and with a reduction in the indirect tax rates 
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Results of the standard policy is presented in Table 5.5. Since the standard policy is 
a combination of the three previous policies - the one percent devaluation of the rupiah, the 
liberalization of trade and the austerity policies, itis expected that the results of its simulation 
will reflect combined effects of the three previous policies. Therefore, whenever possible, 
in order to avoid having unnecessarily complicated explanation, results of the standard 
policy are explained in certain order. The results carried on from devaluation effects will be 
presented before we explain those from the liberalization of trade and from the austerity 
policies. Percentage changes inthe target variables are explained later when we compare the 
results with those from the strategic policy (see Table 5.7). 
After the.simulation, import and export prices increase in all sectors. Imports of 
good I services decrease in all but seven sectors while exports increase in seven sectors~ 
These sectors are (1) farm food crops, (2) non farm food crops, (3) livestock, (4) textile, 
apparel and leather, (5) wood and wood products, (6)constniction, and (7) restaurant and 
real estate and services. The sectoral exports decrease in the other 15 sectors. The total 
value increase in exports is larger than the total value increases in the imports so that there 
is higher trade surplus (TRB. increase) and less current account deficit (CAB decrease). 
However, the additional surplus of trade is less than the increases in the principal debt 
payments from the devaluation so that there are more external burden (ROWCLAIM 
increase). 
Some other results of the standard policy are changes in the prices of composite 
commodities (PC) and other prices. The composite prices increase in 15 sectors and decrease 
in the other 7 sectors because of higher prices of imported and exported commodities (PM 
like has been done for the liberalization policy. 
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and PX). Equilibrium prices (PQ) are higher in 18 sectors but become lower in the other 4 
sectors. Net prices (PN) increase in 13 sectors but decrease in the rest. The overall changes 
in the prices are represented by increases of the general price index. 
The higher general price index causes higher inflation and nominal interest rates 
(DOMINF and NIR increase). As a consequence of raising nominal interest rates, demand 
for money is lower. The new general price index also increases sectoral wages (WL) in 19 
sectors. The other three sectors that experience lower wages are (1) electricity, gas and 
water supply, (2) lodging, .and (3)water, air, and communication. 
The simulation also.shows more mixed results, among them are decreased sectoral 
demand of labor in the 13 sectors that experiences increase net prices and increased demand 
of labor in the rest of the economy. Contrary to our expectation, the unemployed number 
(UNEMPLl) decreases after such changes in the demand of labor. 
The following are results from the liberalization. On one hand, the government has 
less indirect tax revenue (TISUM) because indirect tax rates on domestic and imported 
commodities are cut when it liberalizes trade. On the other hand, the government receive 
more direct tax by increasing direct tax rates (htx and ftx) as other components of the 
standard policy. The i.ncrease in direct tax revenue is smaller than the reduction in the 
indirect tax revenue, as a result the gross national product (GNP) is lower than it is in the 
base run. 
With its austerity policy, the GRI is spending less and receiving more which then 
enable it to have more primary surplus (PRIMS increase) so that it can invest more {GINV 
is higher). 
It is important to acknowledge that the simulation results do not show socio-political 
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consequences of decreased on health and education (GTH) or from increased oHprices (as 
part of the reduction in GCONS). Decreases in the oil and the other subsidies have direct 
positive impacts on the rate of inflation after they cause higher general price index; The 
consequences not reflected in the table are less social entitlement (education, health, food 
and transportation) for the poor and political unrest becau&e of the overall increases in the 




Target New Direction Instrument New Direction 
variable magnitude of change variable magnitude of change 
(% change) 
Trade balance 3,480.09B Increase Government 7,389B Decrease 
. (TRB) (7.31) purchases of materials 
(GCONS) 
Current account . (8,901.57)B Decrease Government subsidy 5,710B Decrease 
balance (CAB) (1.38) for health and 
education (GTH) 
Rest of the world's 26,497.16B Increase Government 8,099B Decrease 
Assets (11.24) personnel 
(ROW CLAIM) expenditures (WLG) 
Balance of (6,277.2)B Increase Government debt NON Constant 
payments (BOP) (351) services (GDS) 
Demand of money 23,811.2B Decrease Household income tax 1.3% Increase 
(MOD) (0.33) rate (htx) 
Primary surplus 3,057.12B Increase Firm income tax rate 42.5% Increase 
(PRIMS) (1.33) (ftx) 
Government · 13,945.88B Increase Sectoral indirect tax · Appendix Decrease 
investment (1.1) rate on domestic E: Table 
(GINV) commodities (idx) 1 
Domestic inflation 2.81% Increase Sectoral indirect tax Appendix Decrease 
rate (DOMINF) (40.5) rate on imported E: Table 
commodities (timr) 1. 
Nominal interest 27.08% Increase Adjusting nominal 0.02 Increase 
rate (NIR) (4.15) interest rate (NIRO) 
Unemployment 4,313,364 Decrease Changes in domestic (2,580)B Decrease 
(UNEMPl) (5.81) credit creation ( dDC) 
Gross natl. product 201,243.76B Decrease Exchange rate (ER) 1.01 Increase 
(GNP) (0.003) 
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Strategic Reform Policy 
The strategic reform policy relies on counter cyclical fiscal policy and its supporting 
monetary policies. The fiscal. policy is designed to prevent a severe recession and heavy 
unemployment. The fiscal policy is supported by an expansionary monetary policy. The 
strategic policy is also aimed at decreasing the current account deficit and avoiding 
increasing more public debts. The underlying priorities of the policy are to provide more 
jobs for the Indonesians and to provide a timely much needed good foundation for smaller 
government by helping healthy domestic companies survive the nextcrisis and by trimming 
the government size. As is the .standard reform policy, the strategic reform policy is 
implemented together with liberalization of trade and with I when there is a devaluation of 
the rupiah. 
The instruments for the strategic policies are: (1) government personnel expenditures 
(WLG), (2) government subsidies on health and education (GTH), (3) government debt 
services (GDS), (4) adjusting nominal interest rate (N]R.O), and (5) domestic credit creation 
(dDC). 
The magnitude changes in the instruments for the strategic reform· policy is 
determined with the following considerations. First, as in the previous last two policies it 
is assumed that there is going to be more than 25 percent devaluaticm when the crisis comes 
and the changes are assigned for each percentage of rupiah's value. Second, domestic credit 
will altered by RplO billion. The changes in the credit creation (dDC) is based on the 
statistics published by the government as explained previously in the section about the 
standard policy. Third, changes in the magnitudes of government accounts are based on the 
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same consideration used for the standard policy. However, allocation of the changes is 
much different than the one applied for the standard policy. In the strategic policy, cutting 
the government subsidies on health and education is not a priority. There are two strategic 
components in the strategic policy. These are the objectives of not to jeopardize the future 
of the economy and to reduce operational cost of carrying public services. In this relation 
fiscal restraint will be implemented on the largest government spending items. Among the 
largest items are the government personnel expenditures (WLG), material purchases 
(GCONS), and the government payments on debts (GPRINCPL and GDS) because together 
they are more than 80 percent of the total public expenditures. Between the four items the 
cut will be applied more to the personnel expenditures (WLG) and interest payment on 
public debts (GDS ) than to the other spending. The reduction in the personnel expenditures 
is smaller than that in the interest payment on public debts because the latter is sent abroad 
while the changes in the the personnel expenditures have direct impacts on domestic 
economy. Reducing the personnel expenditures is also a way of reducing the government 
size. It can be done through wage freeze for at least three years. Such action had been done 
in 1986 - 1988. Some other ways of reducing the government size and its consequence to 
public expenditures are through unifying of some government departments, giving early 
pension for many of current government personnel or conducting no more recruitment. In 
the study the money saved from curtailing the government personnel expenditures is 
allocated to increase the government subsidies on health and education (GTH) and the 
interest payment is reduced by the full amount, Rp25 billion. As its strategy, the GRI 
prefers to reduce the interest payment instead of taking huge borrowing or reducing its 
subsidies on health and education. The subsidies are important for the long term 
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competitiveness of the economy. It is hard for the GRI to accept a social consensus nor to 
be considered rationale by its people if the GRI plans a development policy or a rescue plan 
that increases external debts but reduces entitlement of the poor at the same time. It is also 
considered an irony to have much larger debt burden but to have also more poor people in 
a country blessed by rich natural resources like Indonesia. For many Indonesians it is easy 
to understand the rationale of taking loans when they are cheap but it is hard for those people 
to see the rational of taking more loans when the loans are expensive. The underlying 
assumption of the strategic policy is that the socio-economic price to be paid later as a 
consequence of not paying the debt obligation in full is less than the price of taking more 
debts with· its conditionality. In this relation we can imply that the design of the standard 
policy assumes that the socio-economic price to be paid later as a consequence of less 
entitlement of the poor is less than the price of not fulfilling debt obligation. 
Compared to the instruments used in the standard policy, the direction of the 
monetary policy and changes in the government subsidies on health and education in the 
strategic reform policy are different. The other differences are large reduction in the 
government personnel expenditures with no compensating increases in the rates of household 
and firm income taxes. 
Results of the strategic policy are presented in Table 5.6. Descriptions of the results 
will be presented in certain order. Since the strategic reform policy includes the devaluation 
of the rupiah with the liberalization of trade, the effects of the two policies are presented 
before the presentation of the effects of the fiscal expansion and its supporting monetary 
policies. Percentage changes in the target variables are explained later when we compare the 
results with those from the standard policy (see Table 5.7). 
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The new indirect tax rates and the devaluation of the rupiah cause the import and 
export prices (PM and PX) to increase in all sectors. With the new prices, demand for goods 
and services from abroad decrease in all but 7 sectors and the exports increase in only 4 
sectors (forestry and hunting; fishery; nonmetallic mineral; and other mineral) .. However, 
the increase of exports are more than enough to cover the leakage from additional imports 
and increase debt liabilities. Table 5.6 shows that there are a higher trade surplus (TRB 
increases), less external burden (ROWCLAIM), and lessbalance of payments deficit (BOP 
decrease). Also because of higher sectoral export and import prices (PX and PM), sectoral 
composite prices (PC) increase in 13 sectors and decreases in the other 9 sectors, the 
equilibrium prices (PQ) increase in 15 sectors but are lower in the .other 7 sectors. The new 
equilibrium and composite prices affect sectoral net prices positively in 12 sectors and 
negatively in the other 10 sectors. The overall changes in the composite prices are reflected 
in the new general price index (GPI). The new GPlis higher than it is in the base run and 
causes increases of the domestic inflation rate (DOMINF). 
The increased general price index is causing increased sectoral wages (WL) in 21 
sectors. Lower wages in personal and household services sector (sector 22) causes the 
demand for labor in that sector to increase substantially. Precisely as in the case of 
simulating the devaluation policy, the increased of employment in sector 22 is much larger 
than the total decreases in the other 21 sectors such that the unemployed number 
(UNEMPLl) decreases (see Table 5.6). This result is important because as discussed in 
Chapter II the Indonesian economy can afford to have increased inflation but not heavier 
unemployment because the pre crisis inflation rate is low but the unemployment rate is high 
already. 
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Among other results of the strategic policy is decreased primary surplus (PRIMS). 
Such reduction is caused by liberalization of trade policy and increased government subsidies 
on health and education. By liberalizing trade the government receives less total indirect tax 
revenue, therefore, has lower government domestic revenue (GDR). As shown in Table 5.6 
with less primary surplus the GRI can only invest less (GINV decrease) because it has to pay 
more subsidies. However, health and education is an important social infrastructure 
As part of its strategic policy, the GRI uses negative adjusting nominal interest rates 
and more credit availability to reduce the nominal interest rates. With such monetary 
policies, the demand for money is lower even though domestic inflation rate is higher than 
it is in the base run, see Table 5.6. 
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TABLE5.6 
RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC REFORM POLICY 
Target New Direction Instrument New Direction 
variable magnitude of change variable magnitude of change 
(% change) 
Trade balance (TRB) 3,618.71B Increase Government 7,400.71B Constant 
(11.59) purchases of materials 
(GCONS) 
Current account (8,718.91)B Decrease Government subsidy 5,736.64B Increase 
balance (CAB) (3.41) for health and 
education (GTH) 
Rest of the world's 26,319.48B Decrease Government 8,080B Decrease 
Assets (0.49) personnel 
(ROWCLAIM) expenditures (WLG) 
Balance of payments (6,233.71)B Decrease Government debt 4,530:B Decrease 
(BOP) (0.66) services (GDS) 
Demand of money 23,787.71B Decrease Household income tax 1.2% Constant 
(MOD) (0.13) rate (htx) 
Primary surplus 2,842.75B Decrease Firm income tax rate 42% Constant 
(PRIMS) (5.77) (ftx) 
Government 13,619.99B Decrease Sectoral indirect tax Appendix Decrease 
investment (GINV) (1.24) rate on domestic E: Table 
commodities (idx) l. 
Domestic inflation · 2.1% Increase Sectoral indirect tax Appendix Decrease 
rate (DOMINF) (5) rate on imported E: Table 
commodities (timr) 1 
Nominal interest rate 23.1% Decrease Adjusting nominal (0.02) Decrease 
(NIR) (11.15) interest rate (NIRO) 
Unemployment 4,236,746.2 Decrease Changes in domestic (2,560)B Increase 
(UNEMPl) (8.09) credit creation ( dDC) 




The main objective of doing the simulations is to compare the effects of the standard 
policies with its modified version, the strategic reform policies. The policies are compared 
regarding their effectiveness in decreasing the current account deficit, preventing higher 
unemployment and more debt burden in the future as well as providing more growth 
opportunity. 
Smaller rest of the world's claim, the current account deficit plus total principal 
payments, indicates an important phenomenon. That is the standard reform policy makes 
debt burden heavier. Larger new loan is not included in the simulated standard policy. In 
reality, the nominal debt burden will also be higher in the future because of large external 
borrowing that accompanied the standard policy package. Such increased in debt burden is 
contrary to what can be expected from implementing the strategic reform policy. With the 
strategic policy the government tries to avoid having an increased debt burden in the future 
by not taking additional large loans at the first place. 
The government has less primary surplus and is less able to create growth with the 
strategic reform policy .. The primary surplus increased by 1.3 percent and the government 
total investment increased by 1.1 percent with the standard policy but they decreased by 5. 77 
and 1.24 percent with the strategic policy. Such comparison can be seen from rows 6 and 
7, column4 and 5 of Table 5.7. The changes in primary surplus are caused by the changes 
in the expenditures for health and education. With the strategic policy the economy will 
benefit from much better human resources in the future because in the standard policy the 
expenditure for health and education is reduced while in the strategic policy it is increased. 
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In addition, the economy needs less government growth creation because employment level 
is higher with the strategic reform policy (8.09 percent). 
Decreases in the gross national product is lower with the simulated standard policy 
(0.003 percent), compared it is by the strategic policy (0.09 percent). The higher gross 
national product (nor more employment) may not be happening if the standard policy is 
implemented in the reality because many firms are likely to be dying with higher than 
inflation nominal interest rate component. of the policy; When the domestic firms are 
incapable of leading the development, the government has to take charge again with the 
· continued and higher dependence on foreign creditors. The strategic policy helps the 
previously healthy domestic firms to survive by reducing the discount rate from the central 
bank to encourage their production because in the past foreign investors <;an pull back their 
· investment at almost any second. Such a high power of the foreign investors can cause crisis 
any time and the Indonesian govemme!}t who already has limited maneuver ability will not 
be able to prevent it. 
Table 5.7 compares percentage changes in the target variables from the simulations 
of the standard policy with those of the strategic reform policy. Preference of the results are 
shown in column 3. The column shows that higher trade surplus is preferred over the lower 
one and that lower current account d~ficit and lower unemployment are preferred over the 
higher ones. It is implied with such preference that the policy which can give the preferred 
result is better than the other one (column 6). Columns 4 and 5 show how much percentage 
change in the target variable from simulating the standard and the strategic policies. Column 
6 shows in which policy we get better result for each target. For example, in row one, the · 
strategic policy is better because even though both policies causes higher trade surplus, the 
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surplus is higher with the strategic policy. Among other things, Table 5.7 shows that the 
current account deficit and rest of the world's claim are lower with the strategic policy than 
they are with the standard policy. Overall, column 6 shows that seven out of 10 preferred 
results happen when we implement the strategic reform policy. Therefore, the strategic 
policy is better than the standard one. 
TABLES.? 
COMPARISON OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE STANDARD 
AND THE STRATEGIC REFORM POLICIES 
Target variable Preference Changes of the target variable Better policy 
(percentage) 
Standard Strategic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 Trade surplus Higher 7.31 11.59 Strategic 
2 Current account deficit Lower (-) 1.38 (-) 3.41 Strategic 
3 Rest of the world's assets Lower 11.24 (-) 0.49 Strategic 
4 Balance of payments Lower 3.51 (-) 0.66 Strategic 
5 Primary surplus Higher 1.33 (-)5.77 Standard 
6 Government investment Higher 1.1 (-) 1.24 Standard 
7 Domestic inflation rate Lower 40.5 5 Strategic 
8 Nominal interest rate Lower 4.15 (-) 11.15 Strategic 
9 Unemployment Lower (-) 5.81 (-) 8.09 Strategic 
10 Gross national product Higher (-) 0.003 (-) 0.09 Standard 
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CHAPfERVI 
SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Summary 
The following sections are summaries of discussion presented in the previous 
chapters. The first section is a description of the Indonesian economy's possibility of having 
another external debt crisis. The second section describes the objectives of the study and the 
COE model used for the study. The third section summarizes contradictions and possible 
effects of the standard policy package usually offered by the IMF. The last sections are 
summaries of the strategic reform policy and compare results from the simulations of the 
standard and strategic policies. 
The Indonesian economy is in a very fragile condition. By the end of 1996, it had 
every condition that Mexico had before it experienced 1995 debt crisis. Those were 
enlarging current account deficits, high dependence on portfolio capital flows, weak 
financial sector and an upcoming election. High dependence on foreign capital and heavy 
obligations to external creditors are the main sources of the economy's vulnerabiHty to any 
external shock directly or indirectly targeted to itself. The private sector has a possibility of 
facing a debt repayment problem and such problem may cause the whole economy to 
experience another debt crisis. There are three reasons to handle the next crisis differently 
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from the way the GRI coped with the previous crises. First, the magnitude of the debts is 
huge and they are owed by the private sector and the government. Second, the economy has 
a low inflation rate but faces tougher competition for maintaining its export as well as its 
domestic markets. Failure for maintaining the markets could make the economy fall deeper 
into debt. Third, the economy has a very high dependence on imported commodities and 
foreign capital. Fourth, the world economy is very interdependent and some countries have 
huge claims on the Indonesian economy so that when the Indonesian economy is in 
recession, those countries will feel its negative effects as well. 
Assuming that a debt crisis occurs and the government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(GRI) proposes to use the IMF facilities, the study tries to determine if GRI should take for 
granted the typical stabilization policy package offered by the IMF. In order to answer such 
questions, the study analyzes the theoretical background of.the standard policy, develops 
a modified policy and a CGE model, then simulates both policies with the model. 
The CGE model is designed to meet the theory behind the IMF standard policy model 
(chapter N). There are three unique qualities of the CGE model. First, the model 
accommodates a variable to show how much money the Indonesians have to come up with 
for returning principal and interest on their previous debts and for using more imported 
goods and services than, they can pay for by exporting goods and services abroad 
(ROWCLAIM). In order to show the magnitudes of other countries' claims on the economy, 
the model acknowledges four parts of balance of payments instead of just the current 
account balance. Those are merchandise trade balance, current account balance, financial 
I capital accounts and the balance of payments itself. Second, the model includes a simple 
monetary sector and uses the terminology used by the GRI to integrate more reality. Third, 
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the model specifies the relationship between interest, inflation and exchange rates explicitly. 
The standard policies are typical policies for deficit and inflationary economies that 
are likely to be offered by the IFls whenever a country takes stabilization and adjustment 
loans. There are several contradictions among the policies and all together, they preserve 
the condition of alreadyhigh dependence on foreign capital and cause a larger debt burden 
than before. When the policies are implemented in a crisis situation, the possible effects are 
heavy recession and high . unemployment following roaring imported inflation, and 
bankruptcies of domestic firms, in addition to reduction of health and other subsidies for 
many poor people. The standard austerity policy is politically difficult to carry out, 
especially when the government is becoming less popular. The standard policies will bring 
back growth only after foreign investors are willing to invest again in the economy. 
The strategic reform policy is a modified version of the standard policy. The 
modification is needed to avoid heavy recession and unemployment which may lead to 
possible losses of export markets and long term growth opportunities. This policy is referred 
to as strategic reform policy because it is aimed to solve a long term phenomenon, not just 
to solve a seemingly short term current account deficit problem. The main theme of the 
strategic reform policy is to strategically increase the survival chance of the private sector so 
that they can lead the development after the crisis instead of giving the domestic economy 
up cheaply to foreign investors. It is believed that unless the domestic economy is 
strengthened, the economy will suffer more when it faces another shock in the future. The 
objectives of the strategic policy are to cope with the crisis without incurring lasting damage 
to the economy and to minimize reductions in entitlements for the poor. The policy is 
supposed to be declared by the Indonesian government as its commitment to the AFf A 
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community. The policy is not standard, because it is not another donor sponsored program 
but a program based on social consensus of its own people. It deals with private sector 
difficulties in servicing its debts by preventing unnecessary dying of previously healthy firms 
in the crisis and by including some kind of debt reduction scheme. The strategic policy tries 
to improve the structural condition of the· economy by nurturing the economy's growth 
potential, which among other things is the competence of its people. Such a policy is 
represented by government's higher spending on health and education. In summary, among 
the main policies are: to follow the AFf A liberalization schedule; to provide.stability of 
output production; to maintain export as well as domestic markets by promoting exports and 
providing credit liquidity to import intermediate inputs; and to postpone "standard" austerity 
policy until the ORI gets approval from the Indonesian people and cooperation from other 
countries to share the burden multilaterally. 
The first three simulations with the COE model are focused on the very basic 
components of the adjustment and reform policies; those are liberalization of the real sector, 
a certain level of devaluation and some austerity policies. Following are the main findings. 
(1) The devaluation should be considered as an assistant to the efforts of transforming the 
economy into one that is more creative in allocating its resources and supplying goods and 
services abroad. (2) The economy will not benefit much from further liberalization, 
assuming that the SAM data regarding the present indirect taxes are correct. (3) The 
austerity policy is detrimental to the external balance and internal balances. It reduces the 
trade surplus and increases the level of unemployment substantially. 
The standard and strategic reform policies are then simulated with the COE model. 
The standard policy is a combination of the austerity policy with the devaluation and 
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liberalization of the real sector. The main components of the strategic reform policy are: 
reductions in government personnel expenditures and in the adjusting nominal interest rate, 
and an increase of maximum credit emissions. The debt reduction scheme was included in 
the simulation. The policies. are compared with regard to their effects on the internal and 
external balances. The improvement on trade balance and employment is noticeable in both 
policies. Therefore, it is not true that the standard policy is inflm:mcing the balances 
negatively. The strategic policy causes higher trade surplus, lower obligation to abroad and 
also lower unemployment compar~d to the. standard policy. 
Policy Implications 
There. are three sets of policy implications. They are derived from reviewing the 
economic condition during 1990 - 1996, froin reviewing the theoretical background of the 
standard IMF policy, and from the simuiations. 
The following policies are to be implemented before the crisis comes. They are 
derived from the discussion in Chapter II. First, there should be a serious attempt to fix the 
economy's sources of vlllnerability, and the GRI should really try harder to have a reliable 
record of the usage of public and publicly guaranteed debts. In this relation, the GRI should 
. . 
make the record available for public review. Second, the GRI should carefully consider how 
a policy will affect private sector ability to fulfill their debt obligation before it implements 
any policy. The second one is then included in the simulation of the strategic policy. Third, 
the GRI should design development and crisis rescue plans that do not increase the debt 
burden in the future. 
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The following implications are taken from reviewing theoretical background.of the 
typical rescue plan offered by the IMF, which is referred as the standard IMF policy (Chapter 
III). First, the GRI should anticipate and deal with the private sector difficulties in servicing 
debts and should also help "healthy" domestic firms to survive. Second, the GRI should 
postpone a wide scale austerity policy until it gets approval from the Indonesian people and 
cooperation from other countries to share the burden multilaterally. There are two ways of 
sharing the burden. (1) By preventing the Indonesian economy from losing its export 
markets, because otherwise it will be more difficult for the economy to fulfill its debts, and 
because rapid export growth is essential for the survival of the economy after the crisis. (2) 
By giving some kind of debt reduction to lessen the economy's vulnerability to external 
shock. The GRI should strengthen multilateral cooperation through AFT A and the CGI 
forum. Third, if the GRI needs to use the IMF stabilization funds, then the GRI should not 
come to the IMF without carrying a detailed modified standard rescue plan. 
The following implications are derived from the simulation results reported in 
Chapter V. First, in its detailed rescue plan, the GRI should start the austerity policy with 
reducing government personnel expenditures to show the GRI's initiatives to correcting 
itself. Second, the GRI should use the coming "another external shock ( depreciation of the 
rupiah)" to promote the idea of restructuring the production strategy instead of increasing 
dependence on foreign imported inputs and capital. Third, the ORI should try to get 
credibility for its policiesby following AFTA's schedules and choosing non-standard 
structural adjustment policies with the least additional future debt burden and less damage 
to the employment provision of the economy, and only to implement the policies after 
asking social approval from the Indonesian people. 
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Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations of the study which deserve some attention when 
considering the policy implications and the findings of this study. First, the model only 
accommodates a simple monetary sector, therefore, from one view point the economy in 
the COE model developed for this study is very simple compared to that in reality. However, 
from the orthodox theoretical viewpoint,· the choice of monetary policy instruments in the 
model is as limited as they are when a crisis develops. Second, results of the policy 
simulations should be interpreted carefully, because even though the study is done for 
analyzing 1990 to 1996 data, the data used for this study were from the 1990 Indonesian 
I . . 
SAM and were not modified with later information. Therefore, the magnitudes are less 
important compared to "more realistic" policy choices of the simulations which the policy. 
recommendations are based on. 
There are also some disadvantages of using a COE model that embodied in using the 
model built in this study. Among them is: it is very sensitive to' price and parameter changes. 
Such sensitivity exists probably because some of the variables are exogenously determined 
instead of defined as functions of the rest of the Variables, or bec~use the nominal interest 
rate is determined too explicitly. However, these disadvantages are submerged by the fact 
that the model allows manipulation of different policy tools at the same time and shows their 
effect to many sectors and agents in the economy. 
The model may be improved by adding more monetary and financial phenomena, 
or by adding oil price as another factor that explicitly influences government revenue. 
Maldng the model dynamic may not necessarily improve the quality of the model. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 1 
POPULATION AGED 10 YEARS AND OVER WHO WORKED DURING THE 
PREVIOUS WEEK BY MAIN EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
1990- 1995 
Year Main employment status 







(1) (2) (3) 
1990 14,931,076 . 17,937,511 592,667 
1991 15,437,307 17,543,835 641,817 
1992 15,744,624 18,277,794 659,013 
1993 16,465,090. · 17,974,736 731,618 
1994 20,025,275 15,566,052 1,255,895 
1995 18,345,530 21,294,955 1,198,225 
Note: (6) = (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)+(5)+ (not stated). 






















APPENDIX A: TABLE 2 
RATES OF INTEREST, EXCHANGE AND INFLATION 
1980 - 1997 
Year Interest rates Exchange rates Inflation rates 
(%) 
1980 6 627 18.5 
1981 6 644 12.2 
1982 6 692 9.5 
1983 6 994 11.8 
1984 16 1,074 10.5 
1985 18 1,125 4.7 
1986 18 1,641 5.9 
1987 18 1,651 9.1 
1988 18 1,726 5.8 
1989 18 1,795 6.0 
1990 24 1,892 12.48 
1991 24 1,961 10.84 
1992 24 2,062 9.23 
1993 24 2,110 12.82 
1994 24 2,200 12.35 
1995 24 2,308 9.24 
1996 24 2,383 8.64 




Source: 1980 - 1990: Woo, Glassburner andNasution, 1994, p.167 
1992: The World bank, 1994, p.79. 


















SERVICE PAYMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS 
OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 
(US$ THOUSAND) 
Debt outstanding Service payments 
(Including Principal Interest Total 
undisbursed) 
. 24,509,975 939,494 823,811 1,763,305 
· 26,953,145 1,054,106 990,7()8 ·2,044,814 
32,007,959 1,104,100. 1,132,291 2,236,391 
35,297,509 1,288,872 1,233,096 2,521,968 
36,352,169 1,599,633 1,628,892 3,228,525 
42,784,096 2,329,754 1,642,524 3,972,278 
50,088,546 . 2,621,963 2,071,669. 4,693,632 
... 60,447,572 ·. 3,405,766 2,272,912 5,678,678 
60,076,075 4,437,776 2,525,349 6,963,125 
59,715,366 4,435,217 2,501,122 6,936,339 
65,095,595 4,129,417 2,534,505 6,663,922 
69,003,554: 4,172,108 2,645,766 6,817,874 
70,910,847 5,007,001 2,828,308 7,835,309 




















APPENDIX A: TABLE 4 
VALUE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 1980 - 1996 
(US$ MILLION) 
Including petroleum and gas Excluding petroleum and gas 
Exports Imports Surplus Exports Imports 
23,950.4 10;834.4 13,116.0 6,168.8 9,090.4 
25,164.5 13,272.1 11,892.4 4,501.3 11,550.8 . 
22,328.3 16,858.9. 5,469.4 3,929.0 13,314.1 
21,145.9 16,351.8 4,794.1 5,005.2 12,207.0 
21,887.8 13,882.1 8,005.7 5,869.7 · 11,185.3 
18,586.7 10,259.1 8,327.6 5,868.9 8,963.5 
14,805.0 10,718.0 4,087.0 6,528.4 9,632.0 
17,135.6 12,370.3 4,765.3 8,579.6 11,302.4 
19;218.5 13,248.5 5,970.0 11,536.9 12,339.5 
22,158.9 16,359.6 5,799.3 13,480.1 15,164.4 
25,675.3 21,837.0 3,838.3 14,604.2 19,916.6 
29,142.4 25,868.8 3,273.6 18,247.5 23,558.5 
33,967.0 27,279.6 6,687.4 23,296.1 25,164.6 
36,823.0 28,327.8 8,495.2 27,077.2 26,157.2 
40053 .. 4 31,983.5 8,069.5 30,359.8 29,616.1 
45,418.0 40,628.7 4,789.3 34,953.6 37,717.9 
49,814.8 42,928.5 6,886.3 . 38,093.0 39,333.0 




















APPENDIX A: TABLE 5 
NON OIL I GAS IMPORTS COMPOSIDON 
(US$ MILLION) 
CLASSIFICATION 1993 1994 Change Jan-Aug 
(%) 1994 
Total non oil I gas import 26,230.80 29,616.10 12.91 18,731.00 
1. Consumption 1,105.30 1,363,40 23.35 803.70 
commodities 
a. Unprocessed food 139.60 192.50 37.89 125.00 
and drink for 
.. 
households 
b. Processed food and · 180.40 375.70 108.26 164.00 
drink for households 
c. Fuel and oil 18.30 21.80 19.13 ·14.00 
d. Transportation (not 108.30 53.60 (50.51) 42.40 
for industry) 
e. Durable consumption 104.10 115.00 10.47 75.40 
goods 
f. Perishable 244.70 ·212.20 11.24 168.50 
consumption goods · 
g. Semi perishable 220.60 264.70 19.99 172.40 
consumption .goods 
h. Other commodities 89.30 67.90 (23.96) 41.90 
2. Raw materials and 17,978.60 20,833.00 15.88 13,097.90 
intermediate products 
a. Unprocessed food 743.60 986.10 32.61 (>83.50 · 
and drink for 
industries 
b. Processed food and 243.50 219.20 (9.98) 148.90 
drink for industries 
c. Unprocessed raw 1,52830 1,769.30 15.77 1,117.80 
materials for 
industries 
























APPENDIX A: TABLE 5 (Continued) 
CLASSIFICATION 1993 1994 Change Jan-Aug Jan- Change 
(%) 1994 Aug (%) 
1995 
e. Unprocessed fuel 22.40 13.00 (41.96) 8.10 24.60 203.70 
and oil 
f. Unprocessed fuel 38.80 46.30 19.33 29.80 45.40 52.35 
and oil 
g. Parts and 3,397.10 3,307.60 (2.63) 2,118.10 2,483.30 17.24 
supplements of 
capital goods 




3. Capital goods 7,146.90 7,419.70 3.82 4,829.40 5,540.60 14.73 




b. Passenger cars 95.40 43.10 (54.82) 37.30 40.60 8.56 
c. Transportation 503.50 800.70 59.03 471.60 546.20 15.82 
modes 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1995, p.23. 
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ACTUAL GOVERNMENT ROUTINE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES 
1990 / 1991 - 1996 / 1997 
(Rp BILLION) 
Types of expenditures 1990/ 1991 / 1992 / 1993 / 1994/ 1995 / 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
I. ROUTINE EXPEND. 
1. Personnel expenditures 7,053 8,102 9,466 11,145 13,069 15,372 
a. Rice allowance 640 922 888 834 1,038 1,134 
b. Salaries and pensions 5,570 6,299 7,533 9,145 10,490 12,351 
c. Food allowance 382 393 473 493 801 866 
d. Other intern personnel 263 279 313 418 396 572 
expenditures 
f. External personnel 198 209 259 255 344 449 
expenditures 
2 Material· expenditures 1,830 2,373 2,870 3,032 4,296 5,274 
a . Domestic material 1,670 2,218 2,681 2,848 4,071 4,969 
expenditures 
b . External material 160 155 189 184 225 305 
expenditures 
3. Subsidies to 4,237 4,834 5,283 6,909 7,188 8,344 
autonomous regions 
a. Personnel expenditures 3,961 4,520 4,906 6,575 6,756 7,863 
b. Non personnel exp. 276 314 377 334 432 481 
4. Interest and debts 13,395 13,434 15,217 17,163 18,422 19,906 
repayment 
a. Internal debts 250 251 275 121 204 251 
b. External debts 13,145 13,183 14,942 17,042 18,218 19,665 
5. Others 3,483 1,484 1,195 2,041 204 3,645 
Total Expenditures (IE) 29,998 30,227 34,031 40,290 43,179 52,541 
Actual Routine 39,546 41,585 48,863 56,113 61,370 71,558 
Revenues (IR) 
Govt. Saving (IR -IE) 9,548 11,358 14,832 15,823 18,191 19,017 
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Types of expenditures 1990/ 1991 I 1992 I 1993 I 1994 I 1995 I 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
II. DEVELOPMENT 
EXPENDITURES 
1. Departments I Agencies 4,853 5,971 7,858 10,916 9,478 10,429 
2. Development subsidies 181 250 327 392 432 426 
to villages 
3. Development subsidies 392 583 825 916 2,554 2,518 
to regencies 
4. Development subsidies 486 573 701 741 1,318 1,277 
to provinces 
5. Investment through the 323 470 150 380 205 80 
banking system 
6. Fertilizer subsidy 265 302 175 175 457 212 
7. Construction of primary 374 522 655 595 538 498 
schools 
8. Regional development 657 708 891 1,334 1,485 1,751 
construction 
9. Sanitary facilities/public 193 269 320 340 - -
health center 
10. Construction and 3 2 1 3 - -
development of 
markets 
11. Replanting and 33 75 95 111 - -
afforestation 
12. East Timor - - - - 397 485 
13. Road facilities 679 972 1,225 1,084 - -
14. Others 505 722 708 688 904 602 
15. Aid projects 8,508 8,846 10,204 10,753 10,983 11,170 
16. Reserves 2,000 1,500 - - - -
Total Expenditures (IIE) 17,452 21,765 24,135 28,428 29,163 29,812 
Actual Development 9,905 10,409 11,098 10,753 10,983 11,170 
Revenues (IIR) 
Total Expenditures = 47,450 50,492 58,166 68,718 72,342 82,353 
IE +IIE = (IIIE) 
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Types of expenditures 1990/ 1991/ 
1991 1992 
Total Actual Revenues = 49,451 51,994 
IR+IIR = (IIIR) 
SAP = (IIIR - DIE) 2,001 1,502 
IR - DIE +I.4b = 5,491 4,527 
Primary. Surplus 
IIR - Govt. Saving = 7,457 10,407 
Budget Deficit 
Note: SAP = Excess of planned over actual budget 
Source: BPS,· various years. · · 








1994/ 1995 / 
1995 1996 
72,753 82,728 
411 · 375 
·. 7,450 8,860 
10,972 10,795 
APPENDIX A: TABLE 7 
DEBT INDICATORS OF MEXICO, BRAZIL AND INDONESIA 1978-1985 
(PERCENT AGE) 
1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
All short term and long term debt service share of GNP 
Mexico 12.0 14.1 15.5 24.8 17.4 13.9 11.8 
Brazil 7.5 11.0 11.6 12.8 13.0 11.0 10.2 
Indonesia 9.3 7.5 7.3 9.2 10.7 11.1 13.0 
All short term and long term debt service as share Qf exports 
Mexico 105.8 103.6 117.1 138.9 . 80.8 69.0 66.5 
Brazil 106.5 114.5 113.6 146.0 104.5 72.1 72.6 
Indonesia 40.8 25.1 26.1 39.0 41.7 43.3 51.6 
Public and private long-term debt service as share of exports 
Mexico 62.4 38.0 35.0 44.6 45.4 49.2 48.2 
Brazil 57.6 56.4 56.8 71.7 46.2 34.1 34.9 
Indonesia 25.0 12.7 12.9 165 18.4 19.0 25.2 
Proportion of debt that is short term 
Mexico 14.0 28.3 32.1 30.5 11.1 6.8 5.8 
Brazil 13.2 19.3 19.2 19.3 14.9 11.6 10.8 
Indonesia 9.9 13.3 14.4 18.1 15.6 16.8 14.8 
Proportion of publicly guaranteed long-term debt with variable rate 
Mexico 59.50 71.5 75.4 76.7 82.7 83.6 80.1 
Brazil 56.8 61.0 67.1 · 69.3 70.1 73.1 71.5 
Indonesia 15.0 16.2 17.8 20.0 22.8 23.7 21.7 
Effective interest rate for all long term debt 
Mexico 23.4 22.8 20.1 20.8 15.9 18.0 16.1 
Brazil 18.0 23.3 23.7 23.0 13.9 11.7 11.2 
Indonesia 17.5 15.5 16.6 16.1 14.6 15.8 · 16.6 







APPENDIXB: TABLE 1 
IMF FACILITIES 
For low income countries = For middle and high income countries = regular facilities 
concessional facilities 
1 Structural adjustment facility Stand-by arrangement 
*set up in March 1986. *covers period 1 to 2 years 
*focus on macroeconomic policies aimed at overcoming balance of payments 
(bop) difficulties. Also include policies to address structural and supply-side 
weakness. This focus is not as strong as in extended arrangements. 
*most performance criteria to assess policy implementation - such as budgetary 
and credit ceilings, reserve and extended debt targets and avoidance of 
restrictions on current account payments and transfers~are applied. 
*repurchases 31/4 to 5 years. 
2 Extended structural adjustment Extended fund facility 
facility *covers period 3 to 4 years, aimed at overcoming bop difficulties stemming 
*set up in December 1987. from macroeconomic and structural problems. *repurchases 41/2 to 10 years. 
Note 1 and 2 are loans with interest Resources are available on market-related terms, a member purchases usable 
rates 0.5% (hard) currencies with its own domestic currency. A member country repays 
Repayments are made in 51/2 to the IMF by repurchasing its own currency with currencies acceptable to the 
10 years IMF (U.S. dollar, after the Mexico crisis 1995 - 1996) 
Note:l. Members can not finance the same BOP needs under both regular and special facilities. 
2. The maximum combined amount available through General Arrangements to Borrow and New Arrangements to Borrow 
after the 1995-1996 Mexico crisis is SDR 34 billion or about $48 billion (The World Bank, 1997, p.17). 
3. For more historical details on the IMF regular facilities see Harper, 1994. 
Source: Schadler, 1995, p.3. 





fund oil facilities and, 
the latest, for 
transition economies. 
In response to 
members' special 
needs. Members 
cannot finance the 
same balance of 
payments needs under 





More than one 
Only one 
Note: 
APPENDIX B:. TABLE 2 
SUCCESS RECORDS OF THE IMF 
STABILIZATION PROGRAM1 
Numberof . Progress 
countries2 
Almost half - return to their previous policies (few countries) 
- slow adjustment (most countries) 
- still weak macroeconomic setting 
- improvedfiscal deficits (but overall high deficits because 
of heavy debt service burden) 
- stable (but at low rates) of growth, investment and saving 
- inflation increase sharply (many countries) 
- reserves steady at 3 to 4 months of imports 
- external position supported by substantial debt relief 
(increasejn arrears for some cases) 
- further debt relief from IMF was a key incentive 
Six - benefitted from debt-rescheduling (four countries) 
- reduction in current deficits 
. - reserves rebuilding 
- strong recovery of national output 
- need further adjustment for unsustainable debt-service 
·ratios 
- edging up of inflation 
- high and rising fiscal deficits 
All - structural problem: 
* inefficient state enterprises 
* slow in privatization and in fina,ncial system 
improvement 
- need improvement: 
* prudential standards 
* bank supervision 
1. Based on experiences of 36 countries from mid-1998 to mid-1991 
2. The number of countries seeking for conditional assistance from the IMl;< was 19 in 1970s, 39 during the 
first half of 1980s and 44 during the second half. In' 199Qs, the number is higher than the 1980s including 
countries in eastern Europe and countries of former Soviet Union. · 
Sources: Schadler, 1995, pp.33 - 34; Kildegrand, 1997, Alawode, 1997. 
198 
APPENDIXC 
VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 1 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
Note: 
i, j (Sector) appear in equations (in Chapter IV) 
PWM is written as PWMbar in the program (Appendix D.l) 
Variables Description Measurement 
dDC Changes in Domestic credit creation RpBillion 
dNFA Changes in net foreign assets Rp Billion 
dPWM Changes in world price of imports Ones 
ER Exchange rate · Ones 
FDEBT Firm/Private debt .· Rp Billion 
FDS Firms (Private) debt services Rp Billion 
FPRINCPL Payment on principal loans by firm Rp Billion 
GDS Government debt services Rp Billion 
GNP lag Gross national product, previous year Rp Billion· 
GPilag Previous year general price index Ones 
GPRINCPL Payment on principal loans by government Rp Billion 
GTF Government transfer to firm Rp Billion 
GTG Government.transfer to government Rp Billion 
GTH Government transfer to households Rp Billion 
HTH Transfer from household to household Rp Billion 
HTROW Transfer from household to ROW Rp Billion 
LST Total labor supply Persons 
MS lag Supply of money a year before Rp Billion 
NIRO Adjusting nominal interest rate Percentage 
PWM World prices of imported commodity Ones 
. PWX World prices of exported commodity Ones 
Qlag Previous domestic output Rp Billion 
RIRF Real interest rate (foreign) Percentage 
ROWINV ROW investment 
(foreign direct investment, portfolio investment) Rp Billion 
ROWTF ROW transfer to firm Rp Billion 
ROWTG ROW transfer to government (grant) Rp Billion 
ROWTH ROW transfer to households Rp Billion 
ROWTR Total ROW transfer Rp Billion 


































APPENDIX C: TABLE 2 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
(Sector) appear in equations 
Description 
Current account balance 
Changes in stock · 
Demand for domestic intermediate goods 
Total demand for domestic goods 
Changes in exchange rate 
Changes in high power money 
Demand for composite intermediate goods 
Demandfor imported intermediate goods 
Domestic inflation rate 
Changes in real exchange rate 
Sectoral domestic sales 
Effective real exchange rate 
Firm total expenditures 
Firm saving 
Transfer from firm to firm 


















Firm income tax rate Percentage 
Firm income· Rp Billion 
Firm disposable income Rp Billion 
Government borrowing from commercial institution .. 
(non IGGI) Rp Billion 
Government demand for domestic goods and for 
imported goods· 
Government current expenditures on 
domestic goods 
Government current expenditures on 
imported ·goods 
Government development expenditure 
Government/public debt 
Government development revenues 
Gross domestic product 
Government domestic revenue 

















































APPENDIX C: TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Description Measurement 
Gross national product 
General price index 
Government (total) revenue 
Government routine expenditure 
Productivity growth 
Government saving 
Household consumption expenditures on·domestic 
goods 
Household consumption expenditures on imported 
goods 
Households expenditures 
Household saving . 
Total household income 
Household income 
Disposable household income 
Private investment on domestic goods 
Total investment on composite goods 
Total investment on domestic goods 
Total investment on imported goods 
Sectoral capital demand 
Total capital Supply 
Labor demand 
Labor demand by industry per skill category 
Labor demand by skiH category 
Sectoral labor suply 
Total import demand 
Import of goods and services 
Demand of money 
Supply of money 
Trade and transport margins 
Domestic trade and transport margins 
Domestic trade and transport margins 
Domestic trade and transport margins 
Imported trade and transport margins 
Imported trade and transport margins 
Net final demand 
Total new debts for the year 








































APPENDIX C: TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Variables Description Measurement 
PD Domestic price Ones 
PK Capital price RpThousand 
PM Import price in domestic currency (rupiahs) Ones 
PN Net price Ones 
PQ Price for domestic and exported commodities Ones 
PRIMS Primary surplus/deficit Ones 
PRINCPLT Total payment of principal loans Rp Billion 
PX Export price in domestic currency (rupiah) Ones 
Q Sectoral domestic output Rp Billion 
QC Sectoral composite commodity Rp Billion 
RER Real exchange rate Ones 
RIR Real rate of interest ( domestic ) Percentage 
RK Rental price of capital Ones 
ROWASSET ROW assets Rp Billion 
ROWSV ROW saving Rp Billion 
ROWFAC Net factor payments to ROW Rp Billion 
ROWSV ROW saving Rp Billion 
ROWTR Total ROW transfer Rp Billion 
TF Direct tax revenue from firm Rp Billion 
TH Direct tax revenue from households Rp Billion 
TI Sectoral indirect tax revenue all comm. Rp Billion 
TID Sectoral indirect tax revenue on domestic comm. Rp Billion 
TIM . Indirect tax revenue imported comm. RpBillion 
TIS UM Total indirect tax revenue all comm. Rp Billion 
TRANS Transportation margin Rp Billion 
TRAN SD Transportation margin on domestic commodity Rp Billion· 
TRANSDRW Transportation margin on domestic commodity Rp Billion 
TRAN SM Transportation margin. on imported commodity Rp Billion 
TRANSMRW Transportation margin on imported commodity Rp Billion 
TRB Trade balance Rp Billion 
UNEMPJ Unemployment Persons 
UNEMP2 Unemployment Percentage 
VA Sectoral value added/Value added production 
function Rp Billion 
WLH Composite wage rate paid to households RpThousand 
WL Composite wage rate by industry RpThousand 
WLS Sectoral wage rate RpThousand 
XSD Sectoral export supply of domestic product Rp Billion 











APPENDIX C: TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Description 
Capital income 
Firm capital income 
Government capital income 
Household capital income 
Total capital incomes sent to ROW 
Labor income 
Household labor income 











APPENDIX C: TABLE 3 
PARAMETERS 
Parameter Description 
a0 i Value added requirement per unit of output 
aii Intermediate input requirement per unit of output 
aK Labor share parameterin production function 
alif .· capital income share of firm 
akg capital income share of government 
akli capital income share of households 
af OD elasticities of real money balances to real income 
af OD elasticities of real money balances to nominal to interest rate 
arow capital income share of ROW 
aL Labor share parameter in production function 
a/18 Elasticity of saving to interest rates and 












Constant term in saving function 
Slope coefficient in total value added (GDP) 
in investment on domestic product function 
Constant term in investment on domestic product 
function 
government investment multiplier 
Firm income tax rate 
Household income tax rate 
. . 
Sectoral· indirect business tax rate 
Real money balance multiplier 
Sectoral rate of trade and transportation margins on 
domestic commodity 
Sectoral rate of trade and transportation margins on 
Imported commodity 
Sectoral share of government consumption 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Description 
Sectoral share of government investment 
Sectoral tax rate on 1mported commodity 
capital income tax rate 
Labor income tax rate 
lritermediate input demand efficiency parameter 
· CES intermediate input demand function share parameter 
CES function exponent for intermediate demand 
Elasticity of substitution for intermediate demand 
CES import demand function shift parameter 
CES. import demand function share parameter 
Elasticity of substitution for imported commodity demand 
CES import demand function exponent 
Supply function shift parameter 
CET function share parameter 
CET function exponent 




MAIN PROGRAM AND NON CALIBRATED PARAMETERS 
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APPENDIX D. l 
CGE MODEL FOR INDONESIA 
MAIN PROGRAM 
/* ------------------production function-----,---------- *I 
vf[l :22, l]=Q - PhiLK. *((deltaLK.. *LD."RhoLK+((l-deltaLK.). *KD. "RhoLK))."(1/RhoLK)); 
/*--------------production fn in the long run-------_:-------*/ 
/*vf[l:22,l]=Q- agi*GINV"RhoLK.*((deltaLK.*LD."RhoLK+((l-deltaLK).*KD."RhoLK))."(1/RhoLK)); 
*I 
vf[23:44,l]=DS,. MGS.*((((1-deltaM)./deltaM).*(PM./PD))."(11(1- RhoM))); 
/*---------------~---Intermediate Inputs---------------------* I 
vf[45:66,l]=DIN - alphaDIN. *Q;_ 
vf[67:88,l]=DM1N - DDIN.*(((deltaDIN./(1-deltaDIN)).*(PD./PM))."(11(1-RhoDIN))); 
/*-----------.:Factors of Production: Labor---------------*/ 
vf[89,l]=GPI - sumc((HC+GC)/sumc(HC+GC). *PC); 
vf[90:lll,l]=WL- GPl.*(l+CPQ).*ALPHAWL.*((l+(DS./LD))."2); 
/*Thorbecke, 1992,p.228*/ 
vf[112:133,l]=LD - ALPHAL.*(PN.*Q*lOOOOOO)./WL; 
/*Based on level 2 prod. fn, Cobb Douglass*/ 
vf[134,l]=LDT - SUMC(LD); 
vf[135,l]=LST - LDT - UNEMPl; /* LABOR market equilibriwn*/ 
vf[136,l]=UNEMP2 - lOO*UNEMPl/LST; 
/*-----------Factors of Production: Capital----------------*/ 
vf[137:158,l]=RK- alphaK.*(PN.*Q*lOOOOOO)./KD; 
vf[159,l]=KST-SUMC(/*KD=*/0.09*Q); 
/* CAPITAL market equilibriwn*/ 
I* -----'--------------:-value added production function------------ *I 
vf[160:18l,l]=VA- alphaVA.*Q; /*level l, Leontief*/ 
vf[182:203,l]=V AL-WL.*LD/1000000; 
vf[204:225,l]=V AK - RK. *KD/1000000; 
/*----------Household Incomes and Expenditures----"----*/ 
vf[226,l]=HY - (sumc(V AL)+akh*sumc(V AK)+HTH+FTH+GTH+ROWTH); 
vf[227,l]=HYD- (1 - htx)*HY; . 
vf[228,l]=HCT - (HYD - HS - HTH); 
vf[229:250,l]=PC. *HC - Sih*HCT; 
/*-----------Firm Incomes and Expenditures--------*/ 
vf[25 l ,l]=FY- (akf*sumc(V AK)+FTF+GTF+ROWTF); 
vf[252,l]=FYD- (1- ftx)*FY; 
/*~-------------------Government Incomes-----------------------*/ 
vf[253,l]=GDR - (akg*sumc(V AK)+GTG+htx*HY +ftx*FY + TISUM+ROWTG); 
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vf[254:275,l]=TID- idx.*(PD.*DS+(ER*PWXbar).* XSD); 
vf[276:297,l]=TIM - timr.*((ER*PWMbar).* MGS); 
vf[298,l]=TISUM-sumc(TID +TIM); 
/*---------------------Government Expenditures---------------* I 
vf[299,l]=GRE - (GTH+GTF+GTG+GCT +ER*GDS); . 
vf[300,l]=GCT - WLG - GCONS; 
vf[301:322,l]=PC.*GC- Sig*GCT; 
/*------------------:-----Primary· Surplus/Deficit-----------------------* I 
vf[323,l]=PRIMS..: (htx*HY+ftx*FY+TISUM -ER*GPRINCPL- GRE + ER*GDS); 
vf[324,l]=GDEBT - 0.7*GS; 
/*---------------Saving-----------------------------------* I 
vf[325,l]=HS - alphalhs.*(HYD*(l+NIR).Aalpha2hs); 
vf[326,l]=FS.- (FYD-(FfF+FTH+FDS)); 
vf[327,l]=GS-(GDR- GRE); 
/*---------------------Investment by origin-------------------*/ 
/*Investment by government*/ . .. 
vf[328,l]=GINV - (GS+ GDEBT - ER*GPRINCPL- SUMC(CHS) - ER*RESV); 
vf[329:350,l]=IBG - SU. *PC*GINV; 
/*SU is assumed, II needed infrastructure*/ 
/*Investment by private sector*/ 
vf[351:372,l]=IBF:.. alphalip.*((GDP/(l+NIR)).Aalpha2ip); 
vf[373:394,l]=IT - IBG - IBF; 
/*Saving - Investment Balance*/ 
vf[395,l]=ROWSV - (SUMC(m - HS - FS - GS); 
/*(SUMC(IBF)*PK+SUMC(IBG) - HS - FS - GS); */ 
/*--------------------Rest of the world Accounts-----------------*/ 
/*l. Trade Balance*/ 
vf[396:417,l]=MGS - (DIN+HC+GC+IT+XSD-Q-CHS -TID-TIM); 
vf[418:439, l]=XSD- DS.*(((DELTAS./(1-DELTAS)).*PD./PX).A(l/(1 -RhoS))); 
vf[440,l]=TRB -ER"'sumc(PWXbar.*XSD - PWMbar.*MGS); 
/*2. Current Account Balance*/ . 
vf[441,l]=CAB - (TRB - ER*GDS - ER*FDS - ROWFAC + ROWTR); 
vf[442,l]=ROWFAC - (akrow*s:umc(V AI<).~ YKFROW); 
vf[443,l]=ROWTR - (ROWTH + ROWTF + ROWTG); 
/*3. Capital Account*/ 
vf[444,l]=PRINCPLT - ER*(GPRINCPL + FPRINCPL); 
vf[445,l]=ROWASSE'f,- (PRINCPLT - CAB); 
/*4. Balance of Payments*/ . 
vf[446,l]=BOP - (FDEBT +GDEBT + ROWINV - ROW ASSET); 
/*----------------------- Prices-------------------*/ 
vf[447:468,l]=PX - ER*PWXbar./(l+idx+mtdr); 
vf[469:490,l]=PQ ~ (PC.*(DIN+HC+GC+IT)+PX.*XSD - PC.*CHS - PM.*MGS -TID -TIM)./Q; · 
vf[491:512,l]=PN -(PQ- alphaDIN.*PC); 
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vf[513:534,l]=PM - ER*PWMbar.*(l+timr+mtmr); 
vf[535,l]=PK- sumc((IT/sumc(IT)).*PC); 
vf[536:556,l]=DF*(PC.*QC- (PD.*DS+PM.*MGS)); 
/*------------D10netary ---------- .------ · · ---- .--------------*/ 
vf[557,l]=MOD/GPI-mm*(((GNP/GPl)"l.2711)*EXP(-;005575*NIR)); 
vf[558,l]=MOS - (MSlag + dDC - BOP); /*23819*/ 
/*deficit is financed by high-powered money and a creation of domestic credit*/ 
vf[559,l]=MOS - MOD; /*D10ney market equilibrium*/ 
/*---------------------------Inflation Rates----.:..-------------~* I 
vf[560,1]=D0MINF - (GPI - 1)/1; /*1 = GPilag*/ · 
/*--:--------------------Exchange Rates--------~-------------*/ 
vf[561,l]=dER - (ER -1.0); 
vf[562,l]=dRER - (dPWMbar + dERO -dER); /*Relative version of PPP*/ 
/*---------------------Interest Rates---,-..---:--------------*/ 
vf[563,l]=NIR- (RIRF+dRER+ DOMINF+NIRO); /*Ahmed and Chhibber, 1989, p.33*/ 
/*RIR=l/h*(k*GNP - MOS/GPI), LM curve*/ 
/*-----------------GNP, Growth and Absorption--'~-------------*/ 
vf[564,l]=GNP- SUMC(V AL+V AK+TID+TIM) + ROWFAC; 





Elasticities of Substitution (Lee, 1993, p.76):in equations 4.1 , 4.3 and 4.5.* 
1.42 0.5 0.5 3.55 3.55 . 
3.55 3.55 3.55 2 . 2 
2 2 2 .2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 
2 2. 
Elasticities of Transformation (Lee, 1993, p.76): in ~quation 4.41.* 
3.9 2.9 , 2.9 2.9 2.9 
2.9 2.9 2.9 ·0.1 0.1 
0.7 0.7 ··.. 0,7 0.7 0.7 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0;7 0.7 
0.7 0.7. 
Constant term in saving function: in equation 4.32: 
hs 
a2 = 2 
Constant term in investment on domestic product function: in equation 4.37: 
c4' = 2 
Note: 























APPENDIX E: TABLE 1 
NEW AND PREVIOUS INDIRECT TAX RATES ON 
DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED COMMODITIES 
(PERCENT AGE) 
Indirect tax rates (idx) Import tax rates (timr) 
Base run Simulation Base run Simulation 
Farm food crops 0.7058052 0.7 2.56945 2.5694 
Non food farm crops 0.8207179 0.820717 0.4643229 0.0 
Livestock 0.9210154 0.921015 0.4331889 0.433188 
Forestry and hunting 1.0154359 1.01543 0.2539683 0.00 
Fishery 0.5066336 0.506633 1.1299435 1.12994 
Non metallic mineral 0.7344092 0.734409 0.09869 0.0 
Other mineral 1.9103356 1.91033 0.4420608 0.44206 
Food, beverag~s and 8.3975979 8.39759 1.8869228 1.88692 
tobacco 
Textile, apparel and 1.6580418 1.65804 3.5477893 3.54778 
leather 
Wood and wood 1.36895 1.36895 8.7310746 8.73107 
products, and 
construction 
Paper product 3.5120275 3.51202 9.4422106 9.44221 
Chemicals, chemical -1.1997368 -1.19973 4.6755809 4.67558 
. 
products, petroleum 
refinery and basic metal 
Electricity, gas and 0.432746 0.432746 0.05 0.0 
water supply 
Wholesale and retail 8.1155033 8.1155 0.000004 0.0 
trade, transportation 
. support and storage 
Restaurant 4.338041 4.338 0 0.0 
Lodging 4.2596614 4.25966 0 0.0 
Land transport 1.6387982 1.63879 0 0.0 
Water, air transport, 0.8335892 0.833589 0 0.0 
and communication 
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APPENDIX E: TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Indirect tax rates (idx) Import tax rates (tiinr) 
Base run Simulation Base run Simulation 
19 Bank and Insurance 0.8466473 0.84664 0 o.o 
20 Real estate and services 4.8241898 4.82418 · 0.0017 0.0 
21 Administration, defense, 1.0594648 1.05946 0.00441 0.0 
education, health, 
social services, film and 
recreation 
22 Personal and household 1.9840266 1.98402 1.291737 1.2917 
services 
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APPENDIX E: TABLE 2 
SECTORAL EXPORT SUPPLY {PERCENT AGE) 
Sector Base Devaluation Liberalization Austerity. Standard Strategic 
run reform reform 
Farrµ food crops 0.43 0.13 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Non food farm crops 2.04 0.66 2.04 2.03 2.04 2.03 
Livestock 0:06 0.02· 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Forestry and hunting 0.17. 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Fishery 0.65 0.20 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Non metallic mineraj 24.90 77.05 24.90 24.92 24.96 .24.97 
Other·mineral 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Food, beverages and 7.63 2.35 7.63 7.63 7.64 7;63 
tobacco 
Textile, apparel and •. 12.42 3.82 12.43 12.42 12.44 12.43 
leather 
Wood and wood· 11.20 3.44 11.20 11.20 11.20 11.20 
products and 
construction 
Paper products 3.62 1.11 3.63 3.62 3.62 3.63 
Chemicals, chemical 28.47 8.62 28.47 ·28.46 28.43 28.42 
products, petroleum 
refinery and basic 
metal· 
Electricity, gas and 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
water supply 
Wholesale and retail 0.42 0.13 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.42 
trade, others. 
Restaurant 1.00 0.31 1.00 l.00 0.99 1.00 
Lodging 1.09 0.33 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
Land transport 0.03. 0.01 · 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Water, air transport, 1.64 0.51 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 
and communication 
Bank and Insurance 3.41 1.05 3.41 3.41 3.38 3.42 
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APPENDIX E: TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Sector · Base Devaluation Liberalization Austerity Standard · Strategic 
run reform reform 
Real estate and services 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Social services, film 0.51 0.15 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
and recreation 
Personal and household 0.10 (0.01) 0.10 .. 0.12 0.09 0.08 
services 
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